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Abstract 
In 2012, the most popular reality TV show in China was The Voice of China 
(TVoC). It is an adaptation of The Voice of Holland, the format of which has 
been traded to many countries. Unlike its international versions, audiences 
cannot vote in TVoC due to government regulations. This research focuses on 
audience engagement with TVoC (2012), in light of this crucial difference. To 
investigate how audiences engage and make meanings with the show, this 
thesis is the first study approaches audience engagement in China by examining 
the tensions between government media policies, industry strategies and 
audience reception. Building on existing literature on media convergence and 
participatory culture in the West, this thesis argues that Internet technologies 
alongside social media enable and stimulate individual critical thinking and 
creativities which resist structural constraints such as censorship and 
commercialisation. Although direct online political participation is censored in 
China, audiences express and negotiate power as ways to construct political 
values. These online engagements bring new perspectives to understand 
participatory culture and ‘empowerment’ of audiences. Using political economy 
frameworks, this thesis highlights the power of government media policies in 
shaping TV industry and media content. Analysis of how the industry interprets 
and implements policies demonstrates how production companies use social 
media in attracting and cultivating audiences as part of promotional strategies. 
Adopting a historical reception approach with online ethnography, this study 
analyses how Chinese audiences engage with TVoC differently on two social 
media platforms: Sina Weibo and Baidu Tieba. It finds the active engagement 
of Chinese audiences/fans can be read as grassroots resistance, which can be 
achieved through different practices through different platforms. The multiple-
level analysis of this research provides a new and comprehensive approach to 
the transformational nature of online participatory culture with regard to reality 
television in non-Western contexts. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Project overview 
This research project investigates online participatory culture in mainland 
China. In order to investigate a cultural phenomenon of this type, the study 
focuses on the relationships between the importation of foreign television 
content by China’s television industry, Chinese government control of media 
content and Chinese audiences’ engagement through social media. This study 
into online participatory culture in China is important because within the world 
of media China is the biggest emerging market, having both the largest 
television audiences and the largest Internet population. By the end of 2012, 
China had nearly 1.9 billion regular cable television viewers, including 1 billion 
digital television viewers, making the Chinese television audience the largest in 
the world (People’s Daily, 2013). According to a governmental report released 
by the China Internet Network Information Center (CINIC), in 2012 there were 
564 million online users in China and this number continues to increase each 
year. This rapidly growing and transforming media landscape has attracted 
much academic interest and attention. 
This study also offers crucial insights into, and understanding of, the 
dialogues which exist between and within media cultures around the world, as 
well as the process of localisation, and the interactions between the television 
industry, government control and audience engagement in China. In China’s 
media market, the television industry has undergone a transformation as 
television, under the influence of media globalisation, has became both 
transmedia and transnational in character. International television formats and 
content flow into China, which inevitably influences the Chinese media market 
and shapes online participatory culture in China.  
Television programmes are the most popular topics of conversation on 
social media in China. However, Chinese audiences struggle with how freely 
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they can access media content and express and exchange their opinions, 
because media content and production are strictly controlled by the government. 
As Ma (2000) points out, China has a different political-economic situation to 
the liberal democracies found in many Western countries, in that the Chinese 
state continues to play a constitutive role in media dynamics. The role the state 
plays in television will be discussed in the next section through a brief review 
of the history of television in China. It is not the aim of this study to discuss 
how liberal (or not) the state has become in regard to the ‘liberating force’ of 
the market. In acknowledging that the state’s control over media is not 
weakening, this research looks at a micro level into how government control 
(policies and regulations) has shaped the television industry, television content 
and online participatory culture in China.  
Within such contexts, this thesis therefore looks at a specific case, the 
first season of TVoC, which was screened in 2012. TVoC is a transnational-
format reality television programme, localised with Chinese media content. 
This particular show has been chosen for this study not only because of its 
commercial success and popularity in China, but also because of the significant 
social-political factors which surround it. TVoC is a typical and successful case 
of the television industry using official pages on social networking sites as key 
platforms and methods for attracting bigger audiences, by offering interactive 
and participatory opportunities.  
Under the theoretical framework of participatory culture study 
developed by Western academics, this study attempts to construct a relatively 
comprehensive way of looking not just at audiences, but also at broader social-
political factors such as the social conflicts and contradictions embedded within 
Chinese society, and issues around contemporary Chinese social media that 
distinguish it from others within the world media markets. As a whole, these 
factors – industry and government – have influenced the way audiences engage 
with TVoC (2012). Thus, the main question this research asks is: how do 
Chinese audiences engage with TVoC (2012) via social media, under the 
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influences of government control over media content and industrial 
manipulation.  
In order to think about how audiences engage with TVoC and make 
meanings for reality television programmes, this thesis is the first study that 
approaches audience engagement in China through examining the tensions 
between government media policies, industry strategies and audience reception. 
Building on the existing literature of participatory culture in the West, this 
thesis argues that Internet social media technologies enable and stimulate 
important individual critical thinking and creativities which overcome structural 
constraints such as censorship and commercialisation. Although no direct 
political participation is allowed within China’s cyberspace, Chinese audiences 
express and negotiate power in their own ways, and these activities will help to 
construct political value in China. 
In very recent years there have been an increasing number of studies 
into the Chinese television industry and the country’s media policies (Keane, 
2015; Zhao, 2007; Zhang, 2009; Chan, 2003). Nevertheless, qualitative studies 
of Chinese audiences are still very limited in the methodologies and theories 
applied, largely because the history of audience research in China is only just 
over 30 years old. According to Zhou Baohua’s (2006) study of audience 
research trends in mainland China, most Chinese scholars have employed 
Western theories to study Chinese audiences and have mostly followed 
structural and behaviourist traditions. These particular approaches mean that 
audience composition, media use and media effects have received the most 
attention in studies of Chinese media; literary criticism, cultural studies and 
reception analysis are often neglected in Chinese audience studies (Zhou, 2006; 
Keane, 2015).  
It is worth mentioning that the situation regarding audience research 
conducted outside China shows a positive upward trend. Young Chinese 
scholars studying abroad have begun to study Chinese audiences by adopting 
methods from cultural studies and reception analysis (Meng, 2009; Shen, 2014; 
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Wang, 2013; Guan, 2008; Lei, 2008). Using audience reception approaches will 
help to achieve an intricate and in-depth understanding of audiences’ 
participations and responses to television programmes, leading to improved 
understanding of meanings, motivations, feelings and experiences.  
Like these scholars, this thesis focuses on Chinese audiences who are 
active viewers using television selectively to gratify their desires and needs, and 
who actively engage in online participations to make different meanings of 
television programmes, or to negotiate power and agency in online 
communities. This group of Chinese audiences are perceived as having traits of 
resistance, independence and critical thinking, and exhibiting themselves as 
talented individuals who seek self-expression and want to achieve higher social 
status (Huang and Yip, 2012).  
By adopting these notions of audience, this thesis suggests that Chinese 
television audiences should be examined through a more comprehensive 
consideration of issues such as the shifting media landscape, globalisation and 
transnational cultural flows, the increasing influence of social media, and the 
strict media policies and political environment in China. To be more specific, it 
seeks to analyse the relationships between the importation of foreign television 
content by China’s television industry, the Chinese government’s control of 
media content and Chinese audience reception.  
In particular, this project uses the reality television show TVoC (2012) 
as a case study through which audiences’ online participations and 
interactivities can be explored. Launched in July 2012, the reality television 
show TVoC adopted a successful television format acquired from the Dutch 
entertainment company, Talpa. It was an unexpected success and quickly 
became extremely popular in China. Local news reported the show as a 
phenomenon, with contestants becoming new national idols and with almost 
every episode dominating online discussions for several days after airing. In the 
current environment, trending topics on social media receive great attention 
both from the industry and government. The use of social media has been on 
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the rise in mainland China, with audiences being afforded increasing 
opportunities to engage with foreign cultural products and consequently talking 
about these foreign media products on social media in ever-increasing numbers. 
Sina Weibo, a Twitter-like social media entity, is the most popular platform in 
China, with 503 million registered users at the end of 2012 (Sina Weibo report, 
2012). 
The success of TVoC (2012), produced by the Shanghai-based Canxing 
Production, has inspired and encouraged the TV industry to import more 
foreign TV formats. It can be said the reality television production landscape in 
China has changed dramatically since 2012. The concepts of ‘format’, ‘license’, 
and ‘copyright’ have also been developed in mainland China since then. Both 
the TV industry and Chinese scholars believe that television formats from 
abroad are the key to success and ‘successful TV formats offer the chance for 
domestic TV networks to achieve good audience ratings with lower costs and 
risk’. Illustrating this trend, the number of reality television shows in China 
with imported TV formats had risen to 30 by 2013.  
A major consequence of this success has been attempts to curtail and 
control the over-saturated market. The State Administration of Press, 
Publication, Radio, Film and Television of the People's Republic of China 
SAPPRFT), formerly known as the State Administration of Radio, Film, and 
Television (SARFT), is an executive organisation under the direct supervision 
of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. As China’s major media 
regulator and censor, it is well known for its strict regulations and policies over 
the country's radio, television and film industry. SAPPRFT’s regulations have 
impacted on the way audiences are allowed to engage with reality shows, and 
the most obvious example of this is the ban on audiences voting to decide the 
outcome of reality shows like TVoC. This means that audiences’ engagements 
with, and resistance to, these controls has been pushed into online spaces in 
which audience members can discuss, more or less freely, the content of the 
shows.  
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In the past, Chinese audiences were allowed to vote for their favourite 
contestants in reality shows and had the power to decide the final results of the 
competitions. The Chinese reality television show inspired by the British reality 
competition, Pop Idol, Super Girls (2004–2006), is usually perceived as the 
most influential show of this type within mainland China and is the most well 
known outside its national context, particularly within Western countries (Liu, 
2006; Meng, 2009). There are several studies of Chinese reality television 
which have used Super Girls (2004) and its follow-up programme as case 
studies for exploring reality television and its audiences in China (Meng, 2009; 
Huang, 2014). From a positive standpoint, Meng (2009) argued that reality 
television in China has empowered Chinese audiences because it has provided a 
platform for them to practice democratic deliberation and governance in an 
authoritarian society. Huang Yu (2014) examined the Super Girls (2004–2006) 
phenomenon as representative of how Chinese youth have started to strive for 
autonomy by negotiating an influx of ideologies, thus shaping Chinese popular 
culture.  
However, Huang also concluded that the state interventions and crucial 
restrictions on reality television since Super Girl (2004) have brought talent 
show fever to an end. Huang’s observation of the state’s restrictions on reality 
talent shows demonstrates the strength of the Chinese government in 
influencing the television industry in order to pursue policies of relieving social 
tensions and promoting the depoliticised rhetoric of a harmonious society. Does 
the return of talent show ‘fever’ in 2012 mean that the state has loosened its 
control and regulation over reality television shows? The role of such state 
control over media content will be analysed in the next section, alongside a 
brief review of the history of Chinese television.  
Through interventions into the ways Chinese television audiences 
engage with and resist TVoC (2012) on social media, this thesis suggests that 
Chinese audiences are sandwiched between industry pursuit of profit and the 
state’s political regulation of media content. Nevertheless, Chinese audiences 
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seem not get lost in the mass entertainment. They use social media for self-
expression and as a tool for seeking discursive power to resist the dominant 
propaganda ideologies embedded in the programme content. Chinese audiences 
display different engagement and expressions on Sina Weibo (the official space 
for TVoC) and Baidu Tieba (the unofficial fan community). Although the ways 
and forms of audience engagement are different on these two platforms, both 
demonstrate various similar strategic resistances to the consumerist television 
industry and the dominant ideologies of contemporary mainland China.  
This chapter will first set out the context of the study, by briefly 
introducing the history of television in mainland China, the reality television 
industry in China, and issues and debates around the success of TVoC (2012). 
Following this, it briefly introduces the theoretical frameworks of this thesis, as 
well as its major media and cultural research contexts and chapter breakdowns.  
 
1.2 Cultural research context 
1.2.1 The history of television in mainland China 
Building on other scholars’ work, this thesis briefly reviews television history 
in mainland China in regard to both television institutions and programme 
content. According to Huang and Zhou’s observations (2003) the institutional 
development of television in China can be broken down into three stages. These 
authors describe the first period as spanning from 1958 to the early 1980s, 
during which time the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), specifically the Party’s 
propaganda department, dominated a ‘completely administrative monopoly’ 
role in controlling media content. The second stage lasted from the early 1980s 
to the mid 1990s, a period during which the television industry was allowed to 
coexistence in an environment containing both the CCP’s ‘administrative 
monopoly’ and ‘relatively free market competition’. From the mid 1990s until 
the present day, the Chinese television industry has evolved from being an 
‘administrative monopoly’ to a ‘relatively free market competition’ position. 
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That is to say, although still guided by the CCP, the Chinese television industry 
has now become more market-economy oriented. From the aspect of television 
content production, China’s television history can again be divided into three 
stages: ‘propaganda’, ‘works’ and ‘products’ (Zhou, 2010).   
Television broadcasting in China started in 1958. The first television 
station established was Beijing Television, followed by two more stations, 
Shanghai Television and Harbin Television, which were sequentially launched 
later in the same year. Television was developed as a political tool and 
propaganda instrument that served the CCP in imposing ideological hegemony 
on society, originally under Chairman Mao Zedong’s ideas and rulings (Hong, 
1998). In other words, Chinese television, both institutionally and ideologically, 
was incorporated into the CCP’s pre-existing media system as a propaganda 
mouthpiece. During that time, the national broadcasting system was categorised 
into ‘two tiers’ – national and provincial. The system was built with a hierarchy 
that was compatible with the CCP’s political administration, so that central 
directives could be easily delivered to local stations.  
This period is what Zhou named the ‘propaganda-led’ stage. During this 
stage there were only a few channels available to watch and television content 
was a scarce resource. The production, broadcasting and distribution of 
television content was limited, as well as the number of TV sets available to the 
population on which such content could be viewed. Chinese television 
audiences were considered to be in a position of passive acceptance of 
propaganda content, while the CCP played a completely ‘administrative 
monopoly’ role in controlling and regulating the television system and its 
content. For instance, according to Chinese scholars Zhao Yuezhi and Guo 
Zhenzhi’s observations, television content was limited to ‘feature stories about 
communist role models’, and ‘educational shows’ (2007: p. 522). During the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–67), television in Shanghai became to ‘an 
instrument of factional political struggles’ in the political movement (Zhao and 
Guo, 2007: p. 523). Although the national television audience was extremely 
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small at this time (Guo, 1991), television in China was already being used as a 
political mobilisation and propaganda instrument for the CCP’s political ends.  
Since 1983, China’s television sector has undergone rapid 
transformation and commercialisation. In particular, the period from 1983 to 
1988 was the fastest growing period for China’s television industry, with the 
average annual increase in the number of television stations being around 30%. 
Such rapid development was closely associated with China’s new political 
policies. In March 1983, at the 11th conference of national radio and television 
workers, the party state expanded the two-tier (national and provincial) 
television system into a four-tier (national, provincial, municipal and county 
networks) structure. These four tiers stood independently from one another, and 
comprised 15 provincial, 300 to 400 municipal and 3,000 county-level cable 
networks to date (Zhang, 2009). The four-tier structure enabled local 
governments to establish TV stations without additional costs to central 
government and to operate one television station within each local 
administrative area.  
During this stage, the number of television sets and television 
broadcasting institutions increased dramatically, as well as the content and 
genres of television being enriched and professionalised. In this stage, 
characterised by Zhou (2010) as ‘works-led’, watching television became an 
ordinary, normal behaviour for the Chinese population. Zhou describes Chinese 
television audiences during this stage as ‘spectators’ who take an active role in 
the viewing process by pursuing more programmes and richer genres of 
television content, as well as seeking better-quality television sets and content.  
From a positive perspective this new policy, which led to rapid 
development of national television infrastructure, allowed more Chinese 
audiences access to television. However, at the same time it also greatly 
strengthened the control of the party state because ‘television stations within the 
same administrative areas merged into one’ (Zhang, 2009: p. 11). A great 
number of county-level television stations were transformed into relay stations 
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that only broadcast programmes from China Central Television (CCTV). 
Through this structure the state-owned television stations assumed the dominant 
position in programme production and transmission in China. Categorised as 
‘national’ television, CCTV played an important role in censorship and in 
tighter control over other ‘local’ channels.  
While the four-tier monopoly structure ensured the rapid popularisation 
of television in the country, it also intensified the CCP’s central control in the 
commercialisation reform of the country’s media systems. The Chinese 
television industry was thereby shaped into a unique form of state monopoly 
capitalism; as Zhao and Guo (2007: p. 527) summarise: ‘commercialised 
operations organised into a hierarchical structure of administrative monopoly.’ 
The outcome of the four-tier structure was that the Chinese government’s 
intention to control national television and broadcasting systems did not loosen 
and television became an even more centralised aspect of state power.  
The ‘administrative monopoly’ also impacted on private producers and 
foreign broadcasters. Market-oriented reforms opened up the sphere of TV 
production to private producers, and private ownership and more competition in 
the Chinese television industry from foreign broadcasters has been gradually 
granted permission since the 1980s. From 1993 to 2002, 29 overseas satellite 
TV channels were allowed to enter mainland China, from countries including, 
among others, the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Hong Kong and 
Macao. Overseas TV news, entertainment, and integration channels were 
allowed to be broadcast in some pre-selected hotels, restaurants and special 
communities in mainland China. Nevertheless, strict regulations on media 
content limited the activities of private producers and companies, placing them 
in a vulnerable position, as topics, narratives and even ideological guidance 
consequently became subject to political influence from the CCP. 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, television stations were primarily 
dependent on government financial support that goes to major television 
stations. Most of television stations were heavily reliant on corresponding 
 11 
 
television stations’ revenues for their maintenance and development, requiring 
that television stations’ productions should be consistent with officials’ 
instructions and regulations, rather than following the demands of a market 
economy. Moreover, mechanisms of regulatory control, such as a licensing and 
permit system and ad hoc administrative orders, allowed the state to retain 
strategic control over media content and enabled state media organisations to 
secure their profits and status. The term ‘administrative monopoly’ implies that 
the overall structure of the Chinese television industry was tightly controlled by 
the Party’s propaganda department as well as other key media regulatory 
authorities, such as the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television 
(SARFT), General Administration of Press and Publishing (GAPP), Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), Ministry of Culture (MOC) and 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).   
However, in terms of operational, administrative, and regulatory control 
of the country’s broadcasting industry, SAPPRFT, as an executive branch 
directly reporting to the State Council, held the direct power in developing and 
enforcing all rules and regulations for the television, radio and film industry. It 
was mainly responsible for:  
• Approving the content of radio and TV programmes and films, overseeing 
film imports and stipulating the proportion of time allotted for foreign TV 
programmes so that they are in accordance with the requirements of the 
CCP Propaganda Department. 
• Overseeing the operation of China Central Television (CCTV), the national 
TV network; approving the establishment of cable channels and the 
installation of head-ends in cable networks.  
• Controlling access to satellite and cable networks as well as supervising 
their operations. 
These functions and responsibilities clearly demonstrate SAPPRFT’s power to 
monitor, censor and regulate television content in order to meet the CCP’s 
political interests and values. The regulatory power of SAPPRFT has remained 
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a great influence on Chinese media until the present day and its operations and 
influence will be analysed in detail in the first chapter of this thesis.  
After 15 years of negotiations, China jointed the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in December 2001. The advancement of globalisation has 
motivated the rise of economic liberalisation and deregulation in many 
countries and spheres, but this process differs in China because the Communist 
Party plays a central role in China’s media globalisation process (Zhang, 2009). 
Since the mid 1990s, the Chinese television industry has undergone a 
remarkable transformation, evolving from a propaganda instrument of the 
Communist Party into a market-oriented mass medium within the country’s 
evolving market authoritarian system.  
Taking China’s accession into the WTO as a key point, the Chinese 
television industry was affected by the penetration of external forces and the 
international rules (trade and investment liberalisation under the WTO) which 
caused issues relating to ‘opening the internal and external market’. As 
Professor Michael Keane states, China’s accession to the WTO has been widely 
considered as a crisis for the once-stable and heavily monopolised broadcasting 
system in China (Keane, 2007). In the past, the CCP used SAPPRFT to prevent 
international media conglomerates from entering into the national market and 
foreign ‘media giants’ from sharing the market between themselves (Lee, 2003: 
p.16). 
However, in order to develop intensified commercialisation as well as 
dealing with possible challenges from international media groups, the Chinese 
government had to adopt a series of market-oriented reform measures to make 
this adjustment possible. Chinese scholars later on summarised these policies 
during the reforms as ‘four separations, three consolidations, and one alteration’ 
to describe the integration and restructuring of the television and broadcasting 
system (Huang and Zhou, 2013: p, 31). Huang and Zhou explain that the ‘four 
separations’ refer to cable TV separating into cable networks and television 
stations; the separation of TV programme production and broadcasting 
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(STVPB); separately managing news channels from sports, entertainment, 
movie and other channels; and the separation of general news coverage and 
political propaganda. 
The ‘three consolidations’ were the combining of cable television 
stations and broadcast television stations, the combining of television stations 
and radio stations, and a wide-ranging restructuring including the merging of 
radio, television and cable companies into larger media conglomerates. As a 
result, the number of consolidated broadcasting groups rapidly increased from 
none to 18, with one at central level, 11 at provincial level and six at city level, 
as detailed by Liu (2007). The ‘one alteration’ policy refers to a functional 
change to municipal and county television stations. These television stations 
became responsible for retransmitting television programmes produced by 
national and provincial television stations. Furthermore, only the provincial 
administration department of SAPPRFT could provide television drama and 
movies to municipal and county television stations.  
Huang and Zhou (2003) also state that the development of the ‘four-tier’ 
television monopoly structure has led to the development of a large number of 
television stations, but that these are of small scale and low economic efficiency. 
Clearly, these new media policies and modifications have been applied as 
resolutions to the drawbacks caused by the ‘four-tier’ television monopoly 
structure. More importantly, these new policies were put in place to enable 
Chinese television to survive in the domestic market-oriented reform 
environment, and in recognition of global expectations after China’s accession 
to the WTO. During this transitional period, the post-WTO era, some studies 
have demonstrated (Zhao, 2008; Lee et al., 2008; Fung, 2008) that new media 
policies softened control of explicit propaganda messages. However, when, in 
its struggle between the market and state interests, the CCP attempts to achieve 
marketisation and commercialisation ‘the ideological function of television 
remains the foremost priority’ as Xu Minghua stated in 2013. 
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1.2.2 Recent policy changes  
In relation to this thesis, the new television policy of ‘separation of TV 
programme production and broadcasting (STVPB)’ will be addressed and 
analysed alongside the reform process. This policy is very important for our 
understanding of the current Chinese television industry and the media market. 
The STVPB policy is very similar to the UK’s commission. The reason this 
policy is addressed at this point is because it is a significant step in the 
transformation process of television stations in China.  
The STVPB is an important market-oriented reform measurement for 
the Chinese television system, as Xu (2013) states. It refers to the separation of 
television production and broadcasting in the traditional television system, 
transferring the permission for producing television programmes from state-
owned TV stations to independent television production companies. It means 
state-owned TV stations have become mainly responsible for purchasing 
television programmes from independent production companies, except for 
those providing news and sports content. Over the last twenty years, with the 
increasing popularity of digital television, Chinese audiences’ demand for 
television programmes has also grown (Xu, 2013). In these circumstances, the 
traditional broadcasting system was unable to meet the needs of Chinese 
audiences or the fast changeover of the industry to a market economy.  
As a consequence of these changes both audiences and the Chinese 
television industry wanted to implement the STVPB as soon as possible. This 
particular policy enables China to open up opportunities for independent 
production companies and allows for the penetration into the country of the 
global trade in cultural products. Although this policy was long been discussed 
in China, its actual execution and implementation process is as slow as the 
reforming process of China’s broadcasting systems and mechanisms. Some 
scholars point out that the obstruction in implementation of the STVPB is 
rooted in the interdependent relationship between production companies and 
broadcasters (Zhao, 2008; Huang and Zhou, 2003). The situation for 
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independent production companies that sit outside the national television 
system is more difficult to survive. Television stations, in their status as 
broadcasters, have restrained the production companies. Independent 
production companies cannot produce any news programmes without an 
official news report authority, and cannot buy any rights for transmitting sport 
events. They also cannot import any programmes from overseas without the 
cooperation of television stations.  
Moreover, private ownership of television channels is prohibited in 
China; broadcasters such as CCTV remain the official outlet for all private 
productions. Ye Lin (2013) explains that the usual way in which independent 
production companies and broadcasters work together in China is for the 
production company to handle the entire production process from scratch and 
for the broadcaster to simply make a decision about whether to broadcast after 
viewing the final product. Based on the estimated advertising revenue and 
potential viewer ratings, broadcasters (the TV networks) then have the authority 
to determine how much they will pay for the programmes. For the production 
company, profits come from these direct sales to the TV channels, and are 
likely to be fixed at quite low levels with no opportunity to benefit from 
additional revenue from runaway hit shows, as they would in the USA or UK 
(Ye, 2013). It can be seen that this kind of cooperation model can force the 
production company to skimp on production expenses at the cost of programme 
quality, in order to maximise profits from their fixed revenue on the sale of the 
product to the broadcaster. In consequence the quality of TV programmes may 
have been negatively influenced. 
In 2012, however, the reality television show TVoC, produced by 
Canxing Production (a production company under the Star Media group), and 
broadcast by the Zhejiang provincial television station, was widely seen as the 
most successful execution of the STVPB in mainland China (ChinaNews, 2012). 
Adopting a successful global television format from Netherlands-based 
company Talpa, TVoC became an unexpected success and according to 
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Nielsen-CC data (China Real Time Reports, 2016) since debuting in 2012 it is 
one of the highest-rated television programmes in China. Local news reported 
the show as a ‘phenomenal programme’, the contestants became new national 
idols and almost every episode dominated the following days of online 
discussions when aired. The imported television format of TVoC has been seen 
as the key factor for the success of the show (Wang, 2013; Yu, 2012). 
Besides the adoption of a successful television format, the new way of 
organising the collaboration between the production company (Canxing 
Production) and the regional television station has contributed greatly to the 
show's success. The increasing popularity of the show generated higher 
advertising revenue and profit that was shared between the production company 
and the broadcaster, in contrast to the fixed sale payment model detailed above. 
The joint investment, shared risk and profit arrangement set up between 
Canxing Production and Zhejiang Satellite Television together ensured the 
quality of TVoC, and led them prioritising audiences’ interests. It can be argued 
that the shifting business model between production companies and satellite 
television stations reflects the intrinsic meaning of the STVPB policy, as the 
state and the industry expected. Consequently, the success of TVoC has inspired 
and encouraged the television industry to import more foreign television 
formats. The reality television production landscape in China has, as a 
consequence, changed dramatically since 2012, and the concepts of ‘format’, 
‘license’, and ‘copyright’ have also been developed.  
Nevertheless, the Chinese state’s control over the television market has 
not loosened, even under the situation achieved by the implementation of the 
‘STVPB’, which was supposed to be a significant symbol of successful 
marketisation. Recent examples have showed that the state’s policies remain as 
powerful and influential as ever over the Chinese television industry. The state 
has continued to exercise strict control over market access as well as regulating 
television content and release, and reality television shows adopting foreign 
formats have drawn attention from the state media regulator. In particular, in 
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2013 SAPPRFT limited the number and airtime of shows based on foreign 
formats. 
From 1958 to the present day, China’s television system and television 
industry have undergone significant development and huge transformations. 
But the role the state plays in Chinese television remains central and powerful. 
Its media policies and its ideological guiding direction largely determine the 
scope and shape of the Chinese television industry. The next section will 
demonstrated the cultural context of reality television and its audiences in 
mainland China. 
1.2.3 Reality TV in China: under state control  
In developing an understanding of reality television in China, this section 
shows the evolution of reality television through briefly reviewing the 
differences between Super Girl and TVoC (2012). Chinese reality television has 
witnessed a rise in popularity since 2000, at almost the same time as reality 
game shows such as Big Brother and Survivor became extremely popular in 
Western countries (particularly the UK and the US) (Yang, 2014, p, 518). In 
particular, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 led to an increase in the 
frequency of international communication and cooperation between China and 
the wider world, and this allowed Chinese television programme makers to 
catch with global television trends (Luo, 2010) and popularity. Benefiting from 
this globalisation process, the television industry in China has experienced a 
transformation in marketisation, diversification, and entertainmentisation since 
its joining of the WTO.  
The development of reality television in China can be generally divided 
into three stages: the rise of reality television (2000–2004), the first wave 
(2004–2012), and the second wave (2012–present). The first wave in China’s 
reality television development is widely known as the Super Girl (Hunan TV, 
2005), followed by TVoC (Zhejiang TV) as the second wave. The focus of this 
thesis is the current landscape of China’s reality television; nevertheless, the 
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history of the evolution and development from Super Girl in 2004, inevitably 
and significantly needs to be addressed, explored and demonstrated here. 
According to Michael Keane (2013), the term ‘reality television’ 
(zhenren xiu) entered into the Chinese media industry lexicon in 2002. The 
English term ‘reality television’ is translated into Chinese as zhenren xiu (real 
people shows). This Chinese translation, although widely used to refer to reality 
television in China, does not reflect the complexity of the discussions of the 
term ‘reality television’ in Western studies. It does not simply means a 
reflection of reality, but should be understood as being inextricably enmeshed 
with the concept of generic hybridity in reality television, ‘its relationship with 
the history and status of the documentary form, and issues of theoretical, 
critical and methodological approach involved in this field’, as Su Holmes and 
Deborah Jermyn (2004, p, 2) suggest. The debates about the genre of reality 
television will be further reviewed and discussed in the following section in 
looking at the media research context.  
In general, reality television in China is understood first and foremost as 
entertaining programming in which real people display their individuality and 
abilities to the viewing public (Yang, 2014). The popularity of reality television 
has exceeded that of fictional drama serials, according to Zhu (2008), and it has 
‘claimed center stage, shifting the attention of Chinese audiences and policy 
makers, and also of China watchers in the West, away from serial drama’ (p, 
141). With this in mind, this section will review the rise of reality television in 
mainland China. From the hit talent show Super Girl’s phenomenal nationwide 
success 2004–2006, reality television as a new genre of television programmes 
became popular in China and was eventually welcomed by Chinese audiences 
in their millions. Launched by the Hunan Provincial Television Station (HNTV) 
in 2004, Super Girl achieved huge success and prominence in 2005 (Li and Lee, 
2010), with an estimated audience of 200 million (Cai and Xie, 2006).  
As a result of its success of some Chinese commentators reported, Super 
Girl has being the first wave of reality television in mainland China. With 
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regard to the show, there are numerous discussions focused on its possible 
social, cultural, and political significance, and even on its gender identity 
implications for China (Jian and Liu, 2009; Li and Lee, 2010; Meng, 2009; 
Keane et al., 2007). Furthermore, some researchers have addressed the possible 
implications of audience voting in Super Girl on the political culture of the 
nation (McCartney, 2005; Nan, 2005).  
Super Girl (2004–2006) as most popular reality talent show, is fairly 
similar to in its impacts to American Idol, in the sense that it created new forms 
of media commodities as well as new forms of fan labour. Chinese scholars 
Jian Miaoju and Liu Chang-de (2009) describe the economic development of 
reality television in China through analysing both the production and 
consumption of Super Girl. New communication technology developments 
enable and enhance the possibilities for audience engagement with reality 
television. Here the audience engagement, in Jian and Liu (2009)’s observation, 
are the volunteer and unpaid labour that was created in the promoting process 
of Super Girl, which also shows how the organisers steered and manipulated 
audience participation. Their analysis demonstrates that the entertainment 
industry was able to generate profits in China’s growing television and music 
markets, as they benefit from those new forms of unpaid labour.  
In this period, the volunteer and unpaid labour work of audience 
participation, as Jian and Liu (2009) discussed, mainly refers to the voting 
system within the Super Girl narrative. Chinese audiences were offered 
opportunities to vote for their favourite ‘super girls’, not just simply to watch 
the show. This made Super Girl become not only the most commercial and 
successful reality television in China, but also the one considered as being the 
most democratic (Yang, 2014). Yang explains that the paid voting system of 
Super Girl enhanced the pleasure and stakes of fan participation, and 
constituted a form of economic exploitation of fan emotion and fan labour. In a 
way it allowed fans to exploit the genuine voting opportunity to ‘create a 
vibrant civic space where they can form new alliances, perform fan activism, 
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and articulate alternative values and visions’ (Yang, 2014, p, 518). Previous 
studies have mainly addressed the paid voting system with regard to the active 
connections made between audiences and television programmes.  
In addressing the voting system, some Chinese scholars emphasised the 
rising power of Chinese audiences while they were actively involved and 
interacting with Super Girl (Li and Lee, 2009; Jian and Liu, 2009; Meng, 2009). 
These arguments and studies are seen from positive aspects and from more 
Western-centric ideologies. For instance, Li and Lee (2009) suggest there is a 
transformation of power relationships between the media and the audience. 
When Chinese audiences can vote with reality television, the Chinese television 
industry, in Jian and Liu (2009)’s view, is promoting concepts and ideas about 
‘democratising television’ and ‘being yourself’ to its audiences, and this 
transforms audiences engagement into a new form of unpaid labour at the 
symbolic level. In addition, scholar Wu (2011) sees Super Girl’s invitation to 
audience voting as ‘a provocative and revolutionary step’ with tremendous 
political implications (p. 53) because China’s political system has no direct 
election of government officials.  
From a different aspect, scholar Meng Bingchun (2009) examines the 
2005 Super Girl phenomenon in China through the lens of media spectacle. She 
suggests that within the context of the changes in China’s broadcasting policies 
and the process of media marketisation, the Super Girl spectacle set a milestone 
for Chinese television production with regard to fully exploiting the 
commercial value of a single programme across different platforms (Meng, 
2009). Indeed, the global transnational media conglomerates have long been 
developing a wide range of strategies aiming to exploit the commercial value of 
cultural artefacts and products. But the participatory forms that the industry 
offers may vary though time, and alter to apply to different media and national 
contexts. In the Super Girl era (2004–2006), industry focused on and used the 
paid voting system to attract audiences and fans’ discursive and affective 
engagement with the show.  
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However, in 2007 China’s broadcasting regulation administration, 
SAPPRFT, issued a list of restrictions relating to reality programmes in which 
all forms of audience voting (including short message service via mobile phone, 
telephone and Internet votes) were banned in television programmes (Yang, 
2014). Thus, as people cannot vote in the era of TVoC (201–present), the 
participatory forms of reality television have shifted to the use of social media. 
In terms of industry promotional strategies, it is the use of social media by 
production companies that performs similar functions and roles to public voting 
in the Super Girl era.  
Over the last decade, the Chinese government, particularly via 
SAPPRFT’s regulations and controls over reality shows, has become 
increasingly strict, bringing in content censorship, broadcasting time limits, and 
controls over the forms of audience participation. Regulations on television 
content in China are mainly about sex, homosexuality, privacy, gambling, 
extraordinary competition and low taste. These regulations consequently 
influenced the format of The Voice when it came to China, and this influence 
will be further explained and explored in the first chapter of this thesis.  
In 2012, the nationwide success of TVoC set off the second wave of 
reality talent shows in China (Wang, 2013). For instance, TVoC (2012) rated 
number one in China’s network prime time with 120 million viewers, 400 
million Internet users, and an achieved estimated ¥300 million generated in 
advertising revenue. The popularity and success of TVoC (2012) is one reason it 
was chosen as the case study for this research. More importantly, it was chosen 
because the show has had an enormous influence on the Chinese television 
industry and music industry. Chinese scholars (Yu, 2013; Li, 2012; Xu, 2012; 
Zheng, 2013; Wu, 2014) quickly launched explorations and discussions about 
the reasons for such success, as related to TVoC (2012) and beyond. Although 
they took different approaches in their analysis, they addressed a number of 
common points: imported foreign television formats, the format localisation 
process, the implementation of STVPB policy, the role of social media in 
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reality television, media convergence in China, and the future of China’s 
television industry. 
 Nevertheless, what is left out of their research and discussions is 
Chinese audiences’ reception of TVoC (2012), and this is an area yet to be 
researched. Therefore, this thesis tries to build upon their research, but it also 
brings in Western theories and methods of audience reception studies to 
develop understanding. In particular this thesis believes that investigation of the 
triangular relationships between government media policies, the television 
industry and Chinese audiences would provide a more comprehensive view and 
understanding of the cultural phenomenon generated in China by TVoC in 2012.  
The transformation of reality television in China has close links to the 
Chinese government’s policies and politics. Through this review, the 
importance of China’s accession to the WTO, which brought global influence 
to China’s media market and television industry transformation, can be 
investigated. Globalisation as a strategy can indeed appeal to transnational 
audiences and increase global culture flows, but only under the assumption that 
the format and content does not contain elements that seriously contradict with 
local cultural values and practices (Wang, 2009), or political regulations. From 
this review, it can be seen that various restrictions on and policies towards 
television programmes from SAPPRFT had direct impact on both the content of 
reality television programmes and on the television industry in China as a 
whole.  
The next section will focus on the media research contexts, looking into 
issues and debates around reality television studies addressing the reality 
television format, and on online censorship in China. It is important to look at 
both Western and Chinese scholars’ research outcomes, in order to understand 
TVoC (2012) as a transnational cultural-flow phenomenon and the product of 
globalisation. In this thesis, ‘Western scholars’ mostly refers to those who are 
not based in mainland China, but they are not necessarily all from the West. 
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‘Chinese academics’ refers to those who are based in mainland China and write 
in the Chinese language. 
 
1.3 Media research context 
1.3.1 Reality television studies 
While the reality television phenomenon took off in Western countries during 
1999–2000 (Hill, 2005), its development was relatively slower in mainland 
China. However, since 2012, China’s consumption of reality television has 
been on the rise, but, in line with indications by Luo (2010) just prior to this 
increase, the development of reality television in mainland China continues to 
be addressed rarely in Western commentaries and academic writing. Thus the 
academic studies of Chinese reality television production are perceived as 
lacking in substantial research.  
 Nevertheless, in Western academia, reality television has been studied 
for a long time and through various perspectives. Some of the writing on recent 
reality television discusses issues relating to the genre’s history, generic 
classification, economic origins and cultural/political meaning. Even in 
Western research, there is no single simple definition of reality television 
programming. It is a hybrid television genre that can be associated with 
anything and everything (Hill, 2005), or, as Kilborn describes it, ‘something of 
a catch-all phrase’ (1994: pp. 423), or ‘popular factual programming’ (Corner, 
2001).   
 Murray and Ouellette’s book Reality TV: Remaking Television 
Culture (2004) and Holmes and Jermyn’s Understanding Reality Television 
(2004) established cornerstone studies of current reality television. In her book 
Reality TV: audiences and popular factual television, Annette Hill (2005) 
provides an overview of how the television industry, television scholars and 
television audiences discuss and classify reality television. Ouellette and 
Murray (2004) define reality television as ‘the fusion of popular entertainment 
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with a self-conscious claim to the discourse of the real’ (p. 2). Holmes and 
Jermyn (2004, p. 2) then suggest that reality television should be understood as 
inextricably enmeshed with the concept of generic hybridity in reality television, 
‘its relationship with the history and status of the documentary form, and issues 
of theoretical, critical and methodological approach involved in this field’. 
 To better understand reality TV, it is important to highlight the 
differences between reality TV in China and mainstream Western reality TV. 
First, the Chinese translation of ‘reality television show’ is ‘真人秀节目 (Zhen 
Ren Xiu Jie Mu)’ the literal means of which is ‘real people shows’. This 
meaning focuses more on the ‘people’ who participate in such shows rather 
than their ‘reality’. Yin Hong, professor of Film and Television Studies at 
Tsinghua University, defines ‘真人秀节目’ as a particular kind of television 
programme, characterised by the recording and processing of competitive 
behaviour carried out by voluntary participants in a prescribed scenario in a 
prescribed situation, in accordance with specific rules and for a given purpose 
(Yin, 2005). Yin’s definition here also emphasises the ‘competitive behaviour 
of voluntary participants’. This suggests that the participation in them of real 
people  is the key to understanding Chinese reality television shows.  
 Apart from Yin’s definition, barely any Chinese scholars have 
developed this definition. It is also fairly ubiquitous that most Chinese scholars 
have referenced Western theories and research into reality television to examine 
the phenomenon in China. However, government interventions in media and 
culture should be carefully considered here in talking about reality television; as 
Chris Shei noted, ‘in the case of China, culture and politics work together to 
rule out the possibilities and standardisation of global media’ (Shei, 2013: 
pp. 43). The globalisation of media has accelerated the development of the 
business of television-format trading in China. However, the existence of 
deeply rooted cultural differences between the East and West must be 
considered, as the understanding of one particular television programme genre 
could be different in two contrasting cultural systems. In terms of both 
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television format and content, it is necessary to have an understanding of both 
Western and Eastern media industries. Otherwise, the misunderstanding of 
cultural products and phenomenon may lead to an overly extreme perception 
that ‘Western reality TV formats have run up against local cultural norms and 
values’ (Turner, 2010, pp. 55).  
This thesis is not intended to explore and explain these controversial 
definitions or the genre of reality television, but will focus on television format. 
Holmes and Jermyn (2004) see reality television as the type of programmes that 
have the potential to be referred to in the general and trade press as ‘events’, 
‘must-see’ or ‘watercooler TV’ (Holmes and Jermyn, 2004, p. 14). They give 
examples of this kind of programmes from among those with the highest 
audience ratings, such as Big Brother, Survivor, Popstars (ITV, 2001, 2002–3, 
UK), and Pop Idol (Fremantle/19TV; ITV, 2001–2, UK). This kind of ‘must-
see’ reality show usually comes with global formats. The circulation of ‘global 
formats’ is a key factor in the development of reality formats as ‘event TV’ 
(Holmes and Jermyn, 2004, p. 12). With its unexpected success in 2012, TVoC 
indeed fits this category. This thesis will discuss how Canxing Production 
localised foreign television formats, with regard to China’s specific production 
environment, and to wider social-political changes taking place in mainland 
China. Ultimately, is the format more important than the content of reality 
television, or not?  
In the following sections, the localisation of television formats and 
online censorship in China will be examined, in order to develop an 
understanding of the broader context of China’s reality television and the 
industry surrounding it.  
 
1.3.2 TV formats and localisation  
According to Albert Moran (2009), the television industry has three different 
models of internationalisation: licensing of programmes for broadcast 
elsewhere, international co-production, and adaptation of programme concepts 
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from one place to another (also known as ‘television-format trade’). Television-
format trading – the international sale of television programme formats –began 
to mature into a major business in the 1990s (Moran, 1998), and soon became 
popular worldwide. Trading of television formats is seen as useful as it has a 
greater chance of success with domestic audiences (Moran, 1998; Sinclair et al., 
1996), because it combines the adoption of an idea that has often been ‘proven’ 
elsewhere with the possibility of local production, materials and adaptations.  
 As reviewed in the television history section of this work, more satellite 
channels have become available to the Chinese viewer in recent years. Thus 
domestic competition between provincial broadcasters and the national 
broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) is becoming intense. In addition, 
China’s national broadcasting systems do not seem to have sufficiently a strong 
production industry at their disposal to create all the creative programmes they 
require. This has driven television programme producers to look elsewhere for 
new ideas and media content. Most recently, importing popular international 
television format has become ‘trendy’ and in high demand among Chinese 
television producers.  
Formerly, reality television and ‘infotainment’ programming in China 
were seen as ‘easy ways to produce TV that is cheaper and has less risk 
attached’ (Keane and Liu, 2009, pp. 243). But the case of TVoC (2012) has 
changed this situation. In the past, as Keane (2003) observed, reality television 
gained access to Chinese television media through local producers’ imitations 
of popular Western television formats; they simply produced a copied show 
based on international versions. However, importing television formats that 
already succeeded in other countries then caught on very quickly in China 
because of the huge success of TVoC (2012). Reality shows like TVoC (2012–
2016), Where are we going, Dad? (201–2015), I am a singer (2013–2016), and 
Hurry up, Brother (2014–2016), not only paid format-trading companies large 
fees for television formats each year, but these shows also often required larger-
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than-ever investments. Consequently, production companies now have to share 
both the risks and the advertising revenue generated with the broadcasters.  
To further discuss and explore this phenomenon in present-day 
mainland China, we have to first understand the trends in global format trading, 
know what an international television format is and be aware of the 
‘localisation’ process. For decades, the television formats of ‘reality’ and 
‘fiction’ programming have been produced and sold in international markets 
(Moran, 1998). Moran sees the global television-format trade as a global 
communication process in the form of a comprehensive transfer of know-how 
that is associated with the format license. In China, television producers call the 
imported television format the ‘bible’ (instruction book). This paper-based 
format includes not only the programme idea, but also the instructions for rules, 
plots, names, locations etc. (Schmitt, 2005; Gottlieb, 2010) together with the 
guidelines for production and some postproduction skills (Yin, 2005).  
Television scholars have viewed global television through the lens of 
cultural imperialism, focusing primarily on programmes produced by US and 
UK markets and exported to foreign markets (Oren and Shahaf, 2012). This 
thesis does not attempt to analyse general and overarching structures of the 
global format trade, as many Western researchers have done (Moran and 
Malbon 2006; Moran, 1998; Moran and Keane, 2004; Moran and Keane, 2006), 
or to explore how the global communication process within the television-
format trade is conducted (Lantzsch, Altmeppen and Will, 2009). Under the 
influence of media globalisation, television format as a programming concept 
(Schmitt et al. 2005) can be sold for adaptation in other countries. When 
television format comes to a country, it is usually adapted locally to meet 
national market conditions outside the country of origin (Jensen, 2009). The 
global dissemination of television formats shares and standardises media 
content, bringing Western values into China, and it also enables China’s 
national TV industry to be shaped by its ‘local’ cultures (Waisbord and Jalfin, 
2009) and ‘local’ television tastes (Moran, 1998). 
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Chinese scholars (Liang, 2012; Huang, 2013; Qu, 2013) as well as 
Western scholars (Waisbord, 2004; Brunsdon, 2001; Moran, 2008; Jensen, 
2009) all insist that international television formats allows local producers to 
diminish uncertainty and minimise risks by using proven ideas and successful 
experiences. This is a crucial reason for the global popularity of television 
formats, as Silvio Waisbord (2004) has examined in his article McTV: 
understanding the global popularity of television formats. Television in 
Waisbord’s view is simultaneously global and national, shaped by the 
globalisation of media economics and the pull of local and national cultures. 
The interesting fact is that although global audiences watch the same formats, 
their engagement with television content can be culturally different in ways that 
are not predicted.  
The adaptation process of television content and formats refers to the 
concept of ‘localisation’, which has been central to analyses of media 
globalisation (Hjarvard, 2003). The concept of ‘localisation’ has also been used 
to ‘describe the revitalization of local cultures and a commercial strategy to 
maximize profit in domestic media markets’ (Waisbord and Jalfin, 2009, pp. 
57). Waisbord and Jalfin (2009) summarise and discuss four distinct processes 
of ‘localisation’: ‘glocalisation’, domestication, hybridisation, and local 
production. First, the idea of localisation has been absorbed into the neologism 
‘glocalisation’ (Robertson, 1995), which included two processes: the flexibility 
of the global media market to integrate local factors and the ability to articulate 
local contents within global ideas. Television producers adjust programme 
content to meet local preferences and concerns in order to maximise audiences 
and profits. Second, localisation has been used as a synonym for ‘domestication’ 
or the customisation of international content.  
Third, localisation refers to processes of ‘cultural hybridisation’, a 
concept derived from postcolonial theory that indicates a genuine synthesis of 
diverse cultural elements into a new hybrid culture. The globalisation of media 
has accelerated processes of cultural hybridisation around the world by 
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providing opportunities for individuals to encounter media content that is 
produced outside their own cultural environments (Martin-Barbero, 2006; 
Straubhaar, 2007; Kraidy, 2002; 2005). Fourth, localisation points out the 
power that domestic media industries hold amid the increasing intricacies of 
media flows and global economies. The growth and consolidation of ‘local 
champions’ is a vehicle for the development of multilayered media flows 
(Straubhaar, 2007).  
On the whole, as Waisbord and Jalfin (2009) argue, localisation is an 
industry strategy, linked to broad business operations and the dynamics of 
importation and exportation in a growing industry. To better understand the 
relationships between the television industry and government media policies, 
this thesis suggests it is necessary to examine how Canxing Production 
interpreted and implemented SAPPRFT’s media policies and regulations, as 
well as how this process shaped the localisation process of TVoC in 2012.  
   
1.3.3 Internet in China: control, regulation, and censorship  
Apart from China’s media regulator SAPPRFT’s regulations on media content 
and its influence on the television industry, online censorship is another focus 
which needs to be introduced in this thesis. It is necessary to understand how 
social media platforms have been politically censored, and how this would have 
affected users’ online participations and receptions. Online censorship is 
achieved in two ways in China: by laws and with the use of active filters (Zhao, 
2016). ‘Active filtering’ as an aspect of China’s censorship mechanism, censors 
anything within domestic sites which is ‘hateful, threatening or pornographic’ 
and which ‘incites violence; or contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous violence’ 
(Zhao, 2016). At a practical level, Tai (2006) describes that there are four 
strategies in regulating the Internet in China: state telecommunications laws, 
technological implementations of the ‘Great Firewall’ in controlling the flow of 
information online, the cooperation of service providers and content producers, 
and the monitoring of online behaviours of individual netizens.  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In relation to this thesis, the last two are especially important. In 
Chapter 8 of this study of TVoC (2012)’s Baidu Tieba fan community, the 
cooperation of service providers and content producers will be explored as a 
clear case showing how social media has been censored by the CCP. In 
speaking of ‘monitoring the online behaviours of individual netizens’, this 
refers to the fact that the government can ‘delete the content’ or ‘take down the 
site or even shut down the data centre’ (Zhao, 2016, p, 78). In doing so, the 
CCP could control the information flow on the Internet so as to promote and 
preserve the so-called ‘harmonious society’ in order to maintain social stability 
and the political legitimacy of the Party (Marolt, 2011, p, 54). 
As a consequence of, and reflection of, the CCP’s strict online 
censorship, self-censorship is the usual tactic that the television industry, 
content producers and Chinese netizens will adopt to avoid any political 
problems. In this study, both Sina Weibo and Baidu Tieba offered strong 
assurances that posted content would be under control in exchange for official 
approval for them operating the service (Sullivan, 2012). Moreover, for Chinese 
netizens, individual Internet users have been constantly reminded that they are 
under government surveillance and threatened with vigorous punishments (Tai, 
2006; Zheng, 2007). It is hence interesting to explore 1) the extent to which 
Chinese audiences and fans are critical in discussing television content within 
the Weibosphere; and 2) how Chinese audiences and fans resist and bypass the 
hegemonic and homogeneous restraints of the government (online censorship) 
in creative ways.  
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
This thesis is composed of an introduction and a methodology chapter, plus six 
further chapters, arranged into three sections, and a conclusion. The 
Introduction outlines the aim of the research and sheds light on both its 
cultural and media contexts. It demonstrates the current cultural phenomena 
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occurring in China’s television industry and in society more widely. It 
highlights the processes of marketisation, diversification and 
entertainmentisation which the television industry in China has been 
experiencing since 2012. It provides an overview of reality television and its 
environment in mainland China, including relevant television history, 
regulatory policies relating to the television industry and an examination of the 
development of reality television in the country. It also reviews current studies 
of reality television, global television-format trading and the use of social 
media in relation to television programmes.  
The Methodology chapter follows, in which sets the methodological 
frameworks and tools used in this research are set out. As a whole, the research 
adopts Douglas Kellner’s ‘multipersepectival’ approach, by viewing culture 
from the perspectives of political economy, text analysis, and audience 
reception, in order to better understand the specificities of China’s television 
audiences and their participatory culture, and also to explore wider questions 
around the activities and agencies of audiences in China and beyond. It then 
explains the specific methodological tools this thesis uses in viewing the 
research topic from two perspectives: historical reception studies and online 
ethnography. It also justifies the choice of the two social media platforms used 
in the study, Sina Weibo and Baidu Tieba, as the main data sources for 
audiences’ online engagement with TVoC. The rest of the thesis is organised as 
follows. 
Section one (Chapters 3 and 4) explores the relationship between 
government regulatory policies and the television industry in China, and 
analyses how these two factors consequently affected and shaped the content of 
the first season of TVoC. Chapter 3 focuses on the role which government 
regulations and policies play in China’s television market. It addresses 
particular media policies which were put in place in 2011 by the government 
regulator, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and 
Television (SARPPFT), and analyses how the imported television format was 
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shaped by government regulation and policies. Hence, it constructs the 
knowledge needed in developing an understanding of the specific media 
context in China at that time. Building upon this, the chapter demonstrates how 
Canxing Production altered programme content to both satisfy audiences’ needs 
and to meet the requirements of the government in order to ensure survival 
under the censorship regime.  
Chapter 4 provides an in-depth analysis of the participatory and 
interactive opportunities offered by Canxing Production in its promotional 
strategies to generate viewing audiences and online discussions. It uses the first 
episode of the first season of TVoC (2012) as an example, to look at how and 
when participation and interactivity was embedded or foregrounded, addressing 
three stages of the show: before broadcasting, during broadcasting and after the 
show. This analysis particularly focuses on a number of aspects of the 
programme: narrative structure, editing, use of dialogue and voiceover, and 
‘characterisation’ (such as contestants’ personal stories). Through the analysis 
of the industry’s pre-designed offers embedded within TVoC (2012), this 
chapter suggests that the interactive opportunities provided by Canxing 
Production gave only an illusion of power to audiences; Chinese audiences did 
not have direct power over the programmes’ narrative and texts.  
Section two (Chapters 5 and 6) analyses how Chinese audiences 
engaged with TVoC (2012) on the social media platform Sina Weibo, focusing 
on negotiations which took place between the official promoters of the show, 
government regulations and audience responses. This investigation of Sina 
Weibo provides a potentially significant development in our understanding of 
audiences and their relationships with media. The analysis in Chapter 5 
focuses on the relationships between Canxing Production and particular 
celebrities (judges and other public figures), and the links between celebrities, 
their followers and the users of Canxing’s Weibo site. It examines how and to 
what extent Chinese audiences responded to the promotional work done by 
Canxing Production on the official Weibo for TVoC (2012). The analysis 
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discusses issues of industry promotional strategies, looking at the way in which 
the official Weibo for TVoC (2012) offered Chinese audiences a platform on 
which to share their evaluations of the show and actors (judges), their 
expressions of fandom and their critiques of the contestants in the show. 
Moreover, it emphasises celebrity as a crucial secondary field of investigation 
in this question. The analysis here highlights the power of celebrities’ Weibo 
within the Weibosphere and how such power might influence the online 
discussions of Chinese audiences. Chapter 6 puts the emphasis on Chinese 
audiences’ critical engagement and responses to TVoC (2012) on Sina Weibo. 
Drawing on the notion of anti-fandom, it seeks to illuminate the negative 
interpretive processes of Weibo audiences and users, which arose despite the 
show’s reported actual successes. 
Section three (Chapters 7 and 8) turns its focus on Chinese audiences’ 
online engagement with TVoC (2012) towards an unofficial online space, Baidu 
Tieba, on which there were potential differences in what people were willing to 
discuss and share, as compared with Sina Weibo. Chapter 7 explores the fan 
community and hierarchy of TVoC (2012) within Baidu Tieba, where executive 
fans (bazhu) had dominant power over other fans, as they regulated content and 
the meanings of texts to control the information flow in the space. It will focus 
particularly on how the ideas of power and hierarchy were imbedded into the 
fan community of TVoC (2012) on Baidu Tieba. It will move on to relate these 
to the nature of online censorship, and will also look for evidence of ‘resistive’ 
reception and behaviour that might, despite the constraints discussed, still 
challenge official directives and regulatory frameworks. Chapter 8 further 
develops the investigation of the community of TVoC 2012’s Baidu Tieba, 
focusing on how fans were able to be critical and tactical as they ‘poached’ and 
appropriated cultural texts in creative ways.  
The Conclusion brings all of the findings from the research together 
and makes the necessary summaries and comparisons of the official (Sina 
Weibo) and unofficial (Baidu Tieba) spaces where audiences may have engaged 
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differently with TVoC (2012) and the relevant issues raised. It then 
demonstrates the implications and ramifications of this research. Finally, if 
explains the contributions of knowledge, originality, research limitations, and 
possibilities for future studies in this area.  
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter will address my methodology, explaining how this study was 
carried out, and to answer the central question about how Chinese audiences 
engage with reality television show TVoC (2012) through social media, in 
regarding to the shifting media landscape and merging government policy. 
What I am interested in are the ways the industry, the government and Chinese 
audiences shaped and reshaped TVoC (2012) during its release in 2012 with its 
highest popularity.  
To unfold such complicated power relations, this thesis explores the 
tensions between government control, television industry and Chinese 
audiences, looking at not only the audience engagement with TVoC (2012) but 
also the wider economic and political contexts that are necessary and inevitable. 
In order to understand better the specificities of China’s television audiences 
and their participatory culture, and also to explore wider questions around the 
activities and agencies of audiences in China and beyond, it was necessary to 
use a ‘multipersepectival’ approach as Douglas Kellner have suggested (2011).  
Therefore, to achieve these research purposes in the study, I use 
Kellner’s suggestions of employing multivalent approaches to getting at culture. 
Kellner suggests researchers should look at texts from ‘the perspectives of 
political economy, text analysis, and audience reception’ (2011: p.15), and 
balancing those three components to provide a ‘multipersepectival’ approach to 
culture (2011: p.18). This comprehensive approach can avoid narrowly 
focusing on one dimension. In my research, the main focus is Chinese 
audiences’ reception of TVoC (2012) and their online participatory culture. 
However, to trace back this historical moment and events, and to better 
understand the cultural phenomenon generated by TVoC (2012), it is suggested 
this research should not only to focus on audience reception, but also look at the 
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wider political environment in mainland China and the shifting landscape of 
current Chinese media industry. The analysing of Chinese media production 
and consumption culture is as important as the Chinese consumption culture 
studies. Textual analysis will be applied at later stage of the thesis (in Chapter 
8). This will assist the understanding of audiences/fans’ creative work on the 
Baidu Tieba fan forum, through a more detailed analysis of the language used. 
Although this thesis only uses textual analysis method to analyse a few specific 
cases, it is significant:  
We can never know for certain how people interpreted a particular text 
 but we can look at the clues, gather evidence about similar sense-
 making practices, and make educated guesses (McKee, 2003, p.15). 
Fairclough (1992) posited that textual analysis is a part of discourse analysis. 
Textual analysis helps this thesis to shed light on how Chinese fans’ creative 
work on Baidu Tieba expresses their cultural and political resistances.  
The framework of political economy is crucial for my analysis of these 
factors around the production of TVoC in 2012. As Kellner (2011) stresses, 
political economy alone has limitations as single approach to cultural studies. 
Although it is not the key approach to cultural studies, it is as important as 
audience reception and enables analysing cultural texts within their system of 
production and distribution (Kellner, 2011). Political economy allows this 
thesis to understand and analyse how media industry/culture taught and 
arguably, manipulates its audience, such as the media production process 
(importing television format) and production company’s promotional strategies 
(through social media). 
First, in this chapter, I will highlight the theoretical framework and 
approaches in this chapter, focuses on political economy and participatory 
culture. The political economy framework focusing on questions of power and 
ideology, which helps this thesis to analyse how economic, political and 
‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu, 1991) interact in shaping cultural artefacts; how 
media texts and content are formed and influenced by factors such as 
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government regulation, ownership and economic structures of the media. 
Besides, the participatory culture and media convergence framework provides 
this study a ground to understand audiences and fans’ online activities and 
practices, addressing on issues of grassroots creativities, and the relationship 
between politics and popular culture.    
Kellner suggests we should avoid cutting the field of culture into high 
and low, or popular against elite, but to explore how relations of power and 
domination are ‘encoded’ in cultural texts, and how people can resist the 
dominant encoded meanings and produce their own critical and alternative 
readings (2011: 9). Similar, Chris Barker summaries, the purpose of cultural 
studies are analytic, pedagogic and political, and sought to develop ways of 
thinking about culture and power that can be utilised by forms of social agency 
in the pursuit of change (2004: xviii). While emphasising the social agency of 
individuals and their capacity to resist social determination and dominant 
cultural agendas, it is also important to examine how and to what extent 
individuals can resist. And that is why this study suggests looking at the 
tensions between the importations of foreign television content by China’s 
television industry, Chinese government control of media content and Chinese 
audiences’ engagement. To examine how audiences and fans can symbolically 
resist dominant meanings and the consuming culture, works from British 
cultural studies of youth subculture provide this thesis with secure theoretic 
foundations. In Chapter 6 the idea of symbolic resistance relating to fan studies 
will be further developed and explored.  
Thus, following Kellner’s suggestions of employing multivalent 
approaches to gain access to culture, this thesis draws on both a macro 
approach (political economy) to highlight the power relations that exist between 
government regulations, media industry and Chinese audiences, and a micro 
approach (textural analysis and audience reception) to understand audiences 
and fans’ engagement, and collective symbolic resistance in the age of the 
Internet and social media.  
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The second part of this chapter, I will specifically highlight the 
methodological tools. In general, I am doing a study that is based on historical 
reception study and online ethnography approach. From Chinese production 
culture to consumption culture, we then need to focus on audience reception of 
TVoC (2012) and beyond. Janet Staiger (2002)’s historical reception study 
method helps this study analyse the online discourse of audience discussions, to 
get to the heart of who said what, what they meant, and why around Chinese 
audiences’ online participation and engagement. To approach these audience 
online discussions and activities, Matt Hills’ (2002) model of online 
ethnography is used to collect data specifically from two social media platforms 
(Sina Weibo and Baidu Tieba).  
 
2.2 Methodological framework 
2.2.1 Political economy of cultural studies 
To better understand and use the political economy of cultural studies, we need 
to first understand its definitions and historical transformation. In the 1970s, 
Murdock and Golding defined political economy of communications as the 
study of communication and media as commodities produced by capitalist 
industry. This focuses on the contradictions and problems of cultural 
production-owners, advertisers and political figures who cannot always do as 
they would wish; they operate within structures that constrain as well as 
facilitate, imposing limits as well as offering opportunities (Murdock & 
Golding, 2005: 63).  
Then Nicholas Graham (1990) realized the importance of the cultural 
aspects of television consumption and its ideological dimensions. He sees 
political economy of communications as focuses on structures for the 
production of the media and communication industries under capitalism; on the 
production and consumption of media and communications; and on flows of 
information. Building on Graham, Oliver Boyd-Barrett states political economy 
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in media research is often  ‘associated with macro-questions of media 
ownership and control, interlocking directorships and other factors that bring 
together media industries with other media and with other industries, and with 
political-economic and social elites’ (1995, p. 186). In summary, political 
economy is often characterised as studying how power is produced, distributed, 
exchanged and used. In this study, the power relations between Chinese 
government policy, media/television industry and Chinese audiences will be 
significantly explored and discussed.  
To understand these power relations, I will use Vincent Mosco’s 
definition of political economy in which he describes political economy as ‘the 
study of the social relations, particularly power relations, that mutually 
constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources’ (1995, p. 
25). Specifically, Mosco provides three concepts for the application of political 
economy to the field of communications: commodification, spatialisation, and 
structuration. Commodification refers to the process in which a product’s value 
deriving from human want or need (use value) is transformed into the value it 
could get from exchange (exchange value) (Mosco, 1996: 141). Put in this way, 
Mosco describes political economy as consideration of those business 
institutions and structures that produce and distribute commodities and to 
government bodies that regulate the process. Secondly, the term ‘spatialisation’ 
according to Mosco, refers to ‘the process of overcoming the constraints of 
space and time in social life’ (1996, pp. 173): the constraints on the movement 
or flow of information, goods and services, and also to the effects of 
communication on the processes of differentiation of corporate operations and 
their subsequent reintegration.  
Mosco explained the political economy of communication has 
specifically addressed spatialisation in terms of the institutional extension of 
corporate power in the communication industry (1996, p. 175). The growth of 
media firms in size, taking up different forms of corporate concentration, can 
be explored using political economy to measure its assets, revenues, profit, 
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employees, and share value. Through analyse the process of corporate 
concentration (both horizontal and vertical), it reflects the influence of the state 
on the evolution of the Chinese television industry. Relevant media policies and 
regulations in China have shaped the way of the corporate concentration 
process. Canxing Production Company under the bigger corporate structure of 
Shanghai Media Group is a for-profit corporation but closely follow the central 
government’s regulations and policies, serving commercial interests and the 
CCP’s interests, promoting positive energies and images.  
Structuration theory joins with the process of commodification and 
spatialisation to advance a political economy of communication. Mosco 
suggests structuration as a ‘process by which structures are constituted out of 
human agency, even as they provide the very ‘medium’ of that constitution’ 
(1996: 212). By this, Mosco means to examine the relationships between 
agency and structure and the complex interactions between the two, to 
incorporate the study of concrete social institutions and the dynamics of social 
processes.  
More recently, according to Janet Wasko, political economy has 
concentrated especially on analysing issues relating to international 
communication, even before the recent emphasis on globalisation (2005:37). 
This has includes various political and economic issues related to a global 
communication system, and the expansion of media corporations internationally. 
Wasko (2005) also suggests political-economic analysis can be used to identify 
and then condemn those who control media and communication resources that 
are essential to understand relationships between media power and state power, 
as well as the media’s relationships with other economic sectors.  
Similarly to Wasco, scholar Anthony Fung have used political economy 
to examine the social relations that mutually constitute the production, 
distribution, and consumption of resources particularly in China case, where he 
suggests ‘with the global participation in the political economy of production 
and distribution in China, it is not necessarily the case that the local people will 
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have a better and free life’ (2008: 20). Fung’s work has examined the ways 
global media, transnational capital and their owners survive these political and 
economic constraints to produce content in China that is largely of a popular 
cultural nature. The popularised reality television-format-trading business in 
China is the product of global media and transnational capital. When this 
product arrived in China, the negotiations between format-trading 
companies/agencies and local production companies were affected by the 
existing political economy context of China. To understand the ‘localisation’ of 
global media (specifically reality television format trading), the political 
economy context is significant. The state regulations, policy and forms of 
informal constraint over media/culture content and distribution, in terms of 
censorship, will shape global texts and cultural products. Thus, as Fung 
suggests, the political economy of communication could helps to ‘explicate 
how culture, symbol, and mediated ideology are closely connected to the 
localisation strategies of transnational media corporations under the frame work 
of globalisation’ (Fung, 2008, p.19).  
Various studies have discussed and focused on media globalisation as a 
one-way flow of culture, from the global world to different locales. Within the 
political economy framework, power struggles and negotiations between 
different nations and between the dominant and the dominated have always 
been discussed. However, it is not the aim of this thesis to focus on discussions 
of globalisation theories and liberal conceptions. Using TVoC as a case study, 
this thesis aims to explore in depth the interplay and power relationships 
between the state, the TV industry and Chinese audiences.  
Following Fung’s work, under the political economy framework, the 
interplay of power between the global television format and the state media, 
between the commercial interests and the national ideology, and between the 
economics and politics in Chinese context will be explored and examined in 
this research. Thus the first chapter of this thesis provide an analysis of the state 
regulations, media policies and broader political–social environment in China, 
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exploring how these constrains have shaped the imported television format and 
content production of TVoC (2012). Fung’s work on localising global capital in 
China provides this thesis with a useful framework and examples to follow. 
While questioning the so-called ‘the increasing power of audiences’ (Jenkins, 
2002) in Western studies on audiences and new knowledge culture, Chapter 2 
follows the same method to analyse the relations between industry’s real 
strategies and the cultural consumptions of television audiences. Industry uses 
social media Sina Weibo as a tool to maximise audiences rating and offered 
plenty of participatory opportunities within the weekly narratives of TVoC 
(2012) and after the show. 
The political economy and audience reception studies are two areas of 
research that can compliment rather than contradict one another, as Ingunn 
Hagen and Janet Wasco (2000) states. In the book Consuming Audiences: 
Production and Reception in Media Research, Hagen and Wasko demonstrate 
how both of them can help us to understand ‘where power is located’ (2000: 
23). They suggest to understand audiences and how audiences interpret media 
content, not only in relation to the media text itself, but also ‘constituted out of 
the entire set of social production relations’ (2000: 44), and the 
‘interrelationships between communications industries, the state, other 
economic sectors, and key power bases’ (2000:11).  
Wasko’s study of the Walt Disney Company, which examines the 
history and political economy of the company, as well as exploring various 
textual readings, and the reception of and resistance to Disney products, 
provides a good example for this thesis for studying Chinese television 
audiences’ engagement with TVoC (2012). Such an approach can be used to 
trace the production context of the show and discuss its textual elements of 
‘participation/interactivity’, as well as examining the power relations between 
industry, the state and Chinese audiences.  
In the article In Defence of a Political Economy of the Media, Eileen 
Meehan and Janet Wasko (2013) argue that while ethnographic researches 
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explain how fans deal with media, political economy analyse provides ‘a larger 
context for understanding fandom as a social and economic phenomenon’. 
Meehan further explains that fan ethnography allows researchers to identify 
sites where people exercise their agency, while studies in political economy 
offer a way to identify the economic structures that limit such exercise (2013: 
72). That means to study fans and audiences should necessarily concerns 
mechanisms such as film/television promotion, publicity, and commerce. The 
great value of audiences is both to the media conglomerates and academic 
audience research.  
2.2.2 Media convergence and participatory culture 
From Michel Foucault through to fan studies, the idea of power remains central 
to academic research studies. In current audience research, the theories of 
Foucault are foregrounded to give a theoretical framework which supports the 
understanding of the relationship between cultural practices and wider social 
processes; it also makes a valuable contribution to the question of how broad 
questions of power can be researched. Foucault famously asserted that ‘power 
is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere’ (1978, p. 93). In thus positing a polycentric and pervasive theory 
of power in the field of cultural studies, Foucault offered a more subtle 
definition of power, as the complex and multifaceted mechanics of control and 
influence, which could be observed in multifarious contexts, including schools, 
hospitals, prison systems, politics, sexuality and other broad-ranging socio-civic 
domains (1988; 2000).  
To understand ‘power’, Foucault called for a more rigorous empirical 
approach to power, one that was grounded in concrete social situations rather 
than in theoretical abstractions. He provided a very thorough critical framework 
for examining the essence and operation of power relations which has become a 
key critical asset in the field. The association of power with subtle, often 
opaque and covert modes of control catalysed a broadened critical approach to 
perceptions of social phenomena. Power in cultural studies thus came to be seen 
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more broadly – as the ability of one agent/entity/institution to exert control 
(Fiske, 1993). 
Similarly, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas of ‘power’ shifted 
the critical lens of social theorists away from vast, overarching political and 
economic forces in the Marxian mould, and towards a more culturally informed 
interpretation of the relationships between people and their environments, 
which he termed ‘cultural capital’. Adopting an economic metaphor, Boudieu’s 
work on cultural capital was influential and significant in cultural studies. His 
concept of cultural capital existing in a system of exchange with economic and 
social capital refers to various symbolic elements of knowledge, skills and 
behaviours as aspects of one’s cultural competence that demonstrate one’s 
social status or standing in society. Cultural capital represented a new category 
of value which individuals may or may not possess, one constituted in a variety 
socially significant ways.  
Bourdieu’s work was pioneering because it moved scholarly perceptions 
of class away from a simplistic focus on economic restrictions, which he 
deemed insufficient in accounting for a wide variety of other ‘disparities’ (in 
educational achievement, most prominently) which expressed themselves most 
notably in differing class groups (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979, p. 8). Put 
simply, Bourdieu argued for an expanded interpretive compass when it came to 
explaining educational outcomes. His key contribution was to suggest that 
‘cultural habits’ which were ‘inherited from’ (that is, learned within) the family 
could be used to explain academic attainment (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979, 
p. 14).  
Both Foucault and Bourdieu’s works posited new theories of power, 
status and legitimacy foregrounding multivalent socio-cultural forces. For 
Foucault, power permeated all aspects of social and cultural life, being 
articulated through discourse and technology in interpersonal as well as 
institutional forms. In a similar vein, Bourdieu was engaged in questions 
concerning ‘forms and processes of the legitimisation of power and knowledge 
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in society’ (Reed-Danahay, 2004, p. 64). In addition to these similar scholarly 
interests, both represented a clearly defined departure from the cultural studies 
and sociological traditions which preceded them.  
The ideas of Foucault and Bourdieu were both very influential in the 
cultural studies departments of British universities, inflecting among others the 
works of Dick Hebdige, Angela McRobbie, Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson. In 
the 1960s, a group of academics at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies at the University of Birmingham studied British youth subcultures 
including mods, skinheads, teddy boys, punks and rockers. They suggested that 
youth subcultures constituted the way in which different classes of young 
people manifested their opposition to the dominant social-cultural order. As 
youth subcultures struggled with the dominant order, they were seeking to 
modify, negotiate, resist or even overthrow its hegemony. Whether in the realm 
of style or of action, subcultural phenomena can be read as symbolic 
manifestations of the class struggle and the contradictions within capitalism. 
This can be seen very plainly in concepts relating to symbolic resistance – most 
notably in the texts Subculture: The Meaning of Style by Hebdige (1979) and 
Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain, edited by 
Hall and Jefferson (1976).  
The latter charts the ways in which various ‘subcultures’ articulate 
positions of resistance to the dominant culture, as well as the parent culture 
(home/working class), through certain rituals, pursuits and other forms of 
cultural iconography. The former text also emphasised the ways in which 
young people resisted the dominant culture, placing particular focus on style 
and appropriations of pre-existing cultural forms (haircuts, clothing, jewellery, 
and so on) to create new patterns of (often subversive) meaning which were 
specific to the participants’ socio-economic context. Hebdige highlighted the 
great variety at play in such re-purposing of existing cultural artefacts, asserting 
that they allowed for ‘infinite extension’ as the component parts could be 
shifted ‘in a variety of improvised combinations to generate new meanings 
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within them’ (1979, p. 103). What unites the above works is the common theme 
of symbolic resistance. Hence British cultural theorists were engaging with a 
range of ideas concerning the means by which cultural identity could be 
constructed, expressed, resisted or re-purposed. As a consequence, one can 
identify a clear connection between the works of the above theorists and those 
of Foucault and Bourdieu. Just as Foucault and Bourdieu, in distinct though 
related ways, had outlined new perspectives of understanding how, where and 
why the mechanics of power operated on a social and historical scale, the 
British cultural theorists applied this same sophistication of approach to more 
nuanced and contemporary examples, looking in closer detail at the everyday 
experiences of young people.  
By the early 1990s, studies looking at symbolic modes of resistance had 
gained currency and expanded in their purviews. Of key significance in this 
regard is the work of McRobbie, which examined ways in which the media 
themselves could potentially be used as subversive tools, for instance, to 
empower women (McRobbie, 1991). McRobbie conducted a very influential 
study of female cultural forms in the mass media, looking in particular at 
‘recognisable female forms’ in teen girls’ magazines, positing an implied 
feminist reading perspective. By extension, then, such reading positions could 
be interpreted as subversive seeing inasmuch as they existed within what may 
be perceived to be a male-dominated culture. Among her most important 
observations was that teen girls’ magazines afforded a site of identity 
negotiation which eschewed subjugation to masculine priorities. McRobbie’s 
point consequently depends upon a complex definition of rebellion and 
resistance, in which both are manifested in negation (to the dominant culture) as 
opposed to explicitly affirming a specific set of values. In follow-up research, 
McRobbie suggested that some of the potential gains she had previously 
identified in subversive reading positions had been mitigated. She accordingly 
identified a notable trend of ‘neo-conservative values in relation to gender, 
sexuality and family life’ within the media (McRobbie, 2004, p. 256). While 
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McRobbie’s research was specifically concerned with gender, it must be seen as 
an important complementary work to those dealing with subcultures addressed 
above, particularly because it places emphasis on the marginalised and the 
subjugated, and the ways in which such groups may articulate positions of 
symbolic resistance.  
More recent research has built on the work of the above French and 
British theorists, expanding to encompass subcultural theories and symbolic 
resistance in the specific domain of fandom. The analysis of fan culture was 
significant since it signified a change in audience research. Fans, merged as 
objects of audience research, are conceptually representative of a number of 
popular and academic fears concerning media power. Arguably, bearing 
something of the influence of post-modern trends, especially the tendency to 
reflexivity, fan studies advanced a framework of auto-ethnographic enquiry that 
prioritises self-reflexivity as a defence against subjective biases in academic 
research (Hills, 2001, p. 51).  
Fandom, the theory holds, constitutes a critical and appreciative, though 
potentially subversive, position in regard to the artefact in question. Fandom, 
moreover, was seen to constitute a complex and intertextual endeavour sharing 
multiple interrelated discursive positions, allowing for the intertwining of ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ culture, in which even academia and fandom may possess porous 
boundaries. What Jenkins calls the idea of the ‘Aca-Fan’ (academic and fan in 
one) challenged the traditional divisions between researcher and fan subject 
(1992; 2006a).  
As with Hall et al., Hills and Jenkins invoke a more complex 
‘Foucauldian’ interpretive framework in their understanding of cultural 
phenomena. Jenkins (1996; 2006b) especially has shed much light on the social, 
personal and cultural labour at stake in fandom, in particular such as obtains 
when fans engage with media texts across multiple platforms. In one sense, 
Jenkins extends the subcultural arguments as formed by Hall et al., transposing 
the site of study from the specific locales in which youths would physically 
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congregate, to the emergent and increasingly interconnected digital realms 
constituted by convergence culture (Jenkins, 2012). In this respect, Jenkins 
(1992) and Fiske (1992) have been highly active in charting the implications of 
the expansive, interactive and ever-shifting mediasphere insofar as it may be 
seen as a dominant cultural landscape which young people must learn to 
navigate. Jenkins’s application of de Certeau’s ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ to 
include fandom is also significant and revelatory of this thesis’s investigation 
into fan studies, as Chapter 8 will apply and discuss.  
Built upon Boudieu’s work on ‘distinction’ and ‘cultural capital’, Hills 
explored and criticised its application to the study of fan cultures. Fan practices 
thus can be seen to ‘tacitly recognise the rules of their fan culture, attempting to 
build up different types of fan skill, knowledge and distinctions’ (Hills, 2002, 
p. 46). Many scholars have also developed Boudieu’s work, for instance in 
consequently coining the new terms ‘popular cultural capital’ (Fiske, 1992), 
‘subcultural capital’ (Thornton, 1995), ‘fan symbolic capital’ (MacDonald, 
1998) and ‘fan social capital’ (Hills, 2002). Hills examines and criticises Fiske 
and Thornton’s works in developing Bourdieu’s metaphor on fan culture, but he 
also affirmed that both of them have preserved and re-emphasised a central 
logic of Bourdieu’s argument as ‘the economic metaphor assumes a type of 
calculating subject, intent on maximising the return of their investment in forms 
of capital’ (Hills, 2002, p. 55).  
While Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital has been widely applied by 
many academic critics, Hills suggests we should be more explicitly analysing 
the social hierarchy of fandom, because the idea of cultural capital has been 
overly emphasised, while social capital and symbolic capital have been 
underplayed in fan culture studies. Hills also suggests that Bourdieu and his 
followers all have a tendency to interpret moral and aesthetic differences from 
the ‘master-grid’ of class difference, or through a limited 
‘dominant/subordinate’ model.  
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 Drawing on the notion of active audience, Kellner explains that ‘media 
culture provides materials for individuals to create identities and meanings and 
cultural studies work on audiences detects a variety of potentially empowering 
uses of cultural forms’ (2005: 14). The audiences’ power hence is central for 
audience reception studies and fan studies. This research of Chinese audiences’ 
engagement with TVoC (2012) draws on Henry Jenkins (2006)’s notions of 
‘media convergence’ and ‘participatory culture’. The term ‘convergence culture’ 
is used by Jenkins (2006) to describe a new era of transition where 'new and old 
media collide'. It refers to the merging of the various forms of media. When the 
‘audience’ becomes the ‘user’, the media consumer has become an active 
participant. Media technology thus provides the opportunities and materials to 
archive, annotate, appropriate, and recirculate media content.  
In my investigation of Chinese audiences’ engagement with TVoC 
(2012), focusing on audience discussion and fan community, I saw several 
examples of both media convergence. For instance, the increasing trend of 
global television-format trading to China, and the corporations between 
different medium to provide the ‘multi-screen interactivity (多屏互动)’ in 
television programmes due to technology development. Those elements were 
reflected in the case of TVoC (2012), as the production company Canxin 
Production constantly providing its audiences with participatory/interactive 
opportunities in the show’s narrative and through social media.  
Formed around the media convergence and convergence culture, 
another notion, introduced by Jenkins (2006) is participatory culture. In 
Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education for the 
21st Century, Jenkins defined participatory culture as ‘a culture with relatively 
low barriers to artistic expression and civic engagement, strong support for 
creating and sharing creations, and some type of informal mentorship whereby 
experienced participants pass along knowledge to novices’ (2009:7). With 
regards to culture absorbs and responds to the explosion of new media 
technologies, audiences are now able to archive, annotate, appropriate, and 
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recirculate media content in powerful new ways, as Jenkins indicates (2009: 8). 
But not every player has equivalent power within the convergence culture. For 
example, government policies in China have more power in shaping the 
television industry and television programme content, while television 
industries have more power than others in producing culture artefacts.  
However, audiences/fans actively engaging with popular culture 
artefacts through social media, cannot be simply leading to answer whether 
their power and agency is empowered by technological advancement and social 
media or not. By looking into the tensions between government policy, 
television industry, and audiences, we can discuss the power relations through 
the case of TVoC (2012). In broader term, the macro political-economic 
environment of a country, the development of Internet and technology access, 
or the globalisation of media culture, all may shaped or reshaped this notion of 
power relations.  
  
2.3 Methodological tools  
This study is interested in online discourses regarding to TVoC (2012). Within 
the culture studies framework, the theory and models of political economy and 
audience/fans analysis, the method this thesis chose to analysis the selecting 
sources is historical reception studies. I will then explain the reasons and the 
ways of this study selecting and choosing these online sources, and how it was 
applied in this study to make sense of the Chinese audiences’ online discussions 
and practices with TVoC (2012).  
2.3.1 Approach to audience reception: historical reception studies 
Under the wider framework of participatory culture, this research chose to 
adopt the historical reception studies as utilised by critics such as Janet Staiger 
and Barbara Klinger. Staiger (2000) describes the historical reception studies 
work combines contemporary critical and cultural studies could help 
researchers to understand why distinct interpretive and affective experiences 
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circulate historically in specific social formations. For Staiger (1992), 
a historical examination of spectators’ responses to cultural artefacts, describing 
historical interpretative strategies and explaining the cause of those specific 
strategies can make a valuable contribution to the history, criticism, and 
philosophy and philosophy of these cultural products. I have chosen historical 
reception studies because it ties together with arguments around political 
economy and also ties together with the kinds of online ethnographical work 
that is done by Matt Hills and Henry Jenkins.  
This study is about the history of the discourse around reality show 
TVoC in 2012, looking at how it was produced and distributed, what 
government responses have shaped it, and how audiences responded to those 
factors. Staiger’s historical reception method works best for this thesis. 
Historical reception study as a method can help me to go back to the historical 
moment and work through the historical moment through the archives and the 
traces of the event people have left behind. By recovering the traces of the 
event and the things that people left behind online, this research can recapture 
some of the meanings of the show had for people at the time when it came out. 
Although Staiger’s studies focus more on the importance of knowing the film 
audience, her methodology can be applied by this research to study television 
audience reception.  
Rafal Zaborowski and Frederik Dhaenens (2016) examined the recent 
academic researches of ‘reception’ in television studies, and find out most of 
the reception research within television studies aligns itself with a cultural 
studies approach. Qualitative ethnographic methods dominate the 
methodological frameworks, which include in-depth interviews (Dhoest, 2007), 
focus group conversations (Lacalle, 2012), and integrated ethnographic 
approaches (Tager, 2010), text-in-action methods (Wood, 2006), visual 
ethnographic methods (Adriaens, 2014), and auto-ethnography (Briggs, 2006; 
2007). Among them all, in-depth interviews were the most used method, 
according to Zaborowski and Dhaenens (2016). Although using in-depth 
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interviews would help to explore audiences’ reading of a particular text (Ang, 
1985; Radway, 1984).  
It is necessary to highlight the reason why this research not using the 
method of (ethnographic) interviews as many other researches did. I am not 
using interviews to talk to industry people and audiences, because the major 
concern of this thesis is how audiences engagement with TVoC (2012) through 
social media, not in discovering who they are and what cultural background 
they have. Compare to the interview method, historical reception studies help 
this study to access to more ‘historical’ materials that already left online, 
specifically tracing back those materials at different time or period in need.  
In addition, I did not classify my methodology as critical discourse 
analyses (CDA), as many qualitative researches do. It is not saying my thesis is 
not dealing with discourse analysis. Emerged in the late 1980s, CDA has been 
developed and enhanced by scholars Norman Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1993; 
1995a; 1995b; 1999), Ruth Wodak (1995; 1996; 1999), Teun van Dijk (1988; 
1991; 1993; 1995; 1998a; 1998b) and others. Indeed, the methodological 
approach of CDA can enhance cultural studies, as Chris Barker and Dariusz 
Galasinski said, and CDA provides the analytic context, skills and tools for 
researchers to study how language constructs, constitutes and shapes the social 
world (2001), to reveal the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality 
and bias (Sheyholislami, 2001). However, in this study, I intend to explore and 
analyse these online discourse from the film, television and media studies field 
where Staiger specifically called her methodology as historical reception 
studies. 
With this in mind, the following is an attempt to provide as much clarity 
as possible as to my methodological workings. In The Film Studies Reader, 
Staiger (2000) lists the steps which might occur when doing historical reception 
studies: 
1) An object of analysis is determined. This object is an event, not a text: 
that is, it is a set of interpretations or affective experiences produced by 
individuals from an encounter with a text or set of texts within a social 
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situation. It is not an analysis of the text except in so far as to consider 
what textually might be facilitating the reading. 
2) Traces of that event are located.  
3) The traces are analysed textually and culturally. That is, as new 
historians elucidate causal processes to explain conjunctions called 
‘event’ and then characterise the social significance of these event in 
relation to specific groups of people, so too does this research. 
Furthermore, the analyses avoid categorising receptions into preferred, 
negotiated, or resistant readings. Rather the processes of interpretation 
are described since more richness in explanation can be achieved than 
by reducing readings to three specific generalizations. 
4) Finally, the range of readings is considered not only by what seems 
possible at that moment but also by what the readings did not consider. 
That is, structuring absences are as important as well (p. 182).  
In my thesis, the object of analysis is the online conversations around TVoC 
(2012). It is an event and historical moment when millions of Chinese 
audiences talking about TVoC (2012) and beyond. The traces are all the 
discourses that I found out online, particularly from two online spaces: Sina 
Weibo and Baidu Tieba. Those traces are analysed textually and culturally, 
using critical discourse analysis. Therefore, I am particularly looking for 
clusters of opinions, analysing these clusters of discussions and opinions; and 
then make note of anything that is missing.  
In summary, using the method of historical reception studies lets this 
study to look at a) Chinese government policy documents and regulations on 
television industry and reality television, b) to analysis the audio-visual texts of 
the show’s weekly narrative, and c) to examine Chinese audiences’ online 
discussions around reality television show, as a whole to reveal how Chinese 
audiences engage with TVoC (2012). This approach allows the examination of 
groups of people’s online engagement with television content and beyond, in a 
way to investigate detailed descriptions of context, activity, interactions, direct 
quotations from individuals’ experiences, attitudes, and beliefs (Patton, 1990). 
In summary, qualitative studies of media engagements come largely from the 
field of critical and cultural studies. Based on the social, political, and economic 
conditions and the viewers’ constructed images of themselves, we could have 
different interpretations. 
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The first step of this thesis is to do historical reception study of the 
media industry and government, using discourse analysis to analyse the 
government policy documents and industry responses accordingly. And the 
purpose of this analyse is to show how powerful these policies are in shaping 
the media industry and media content, which enriches current academic studies 
of the political context in China’s media industry. To analyse these policies, 
requires deeper understanding of the wider political environment in mainland 
China, not only focuses on the language used in the policies themselves, but to 
examine the influence and enforcement of these policies, and the power 
relationship between the media regulations and the media industry.  
Specifically, regulatory media policies announced by SAPPRFT would 
be chosen as the main resources. Two main policies were chosen which are: 
Opinion Concerning Further Strengthening Comprehensive Satellite Television 
Channel Programme Management (关于进⼀步加强电视上星综合频道节⽬管理的意见, 
2011), Notice on Doing Well the Work of Programming and Recording for the 
Satellite Television Channel Programme in 2014 (关于做好 2014年电视上星综合频道
节⽬编排和备案⼯作的通知, 2013).  
The first policy was announced in 2011 and imposed from 1 January 
2012, specifically requires 34 comprehensive satellite television channels must 
raise the broadcast amount of news-type programmes, and at the same time 
implement controls over the broadcast of a part of programme categories, in 
order to prevent excessive entertainmentisation and vulgar tendencies, satisfy 
the broad audiences’ diverse and multi-level high-grade viewing requirements 
(Xinhua News, 2011). This policy is very important as the leading ‘opinion’ 
guidance for television industry, which has great impact on those satellite 
television channels that had been focusing on producing entertainment 
programmes including: dating game show (婚恋交友类), talent show (才艺竞秀类), 
variety show about love stories (情感故事类), game show (游戏竞技类), talk show (访
谈脱口秀), reality television (真人秀).  
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Thus, this policy set the most significant context for the importation, 
production and broadcasting of TVoC in 2012. TVoC (2012) was self-defined as 
a music reality television show and was broadcasted on Zhejiang Satellite TV. 
Because it was broadcasted on such a type of channel and was such a particular 
type of show, which were both specifically targeted by the SAPPRFT’s policy 
regulation, the first season of TVoC was heavily influenced by this policy. 
Besides reading the surface information that already listed in the ‘opinion’, the 
media industry and production companies in mainland China will also need to 
decode policy and interpret connotations to avoid potential risks for breaching 
the rules. In doing so, media policies indeed shaped the Chinese media industry 
and consequently changed the original format and content of the show. 
This thesis will first explore and quote some of the original clauses from 
those policies announced by the SAPPRFT. The criteria for this selection are 
based on two key terms in those policies: ‘reality television programme (真人秀
节目)’ and ‘satellite television channel (电视上星综合频道)’. The language use of 
these clauses such as ‘prevent excessive entertainmentisation and vulgar 
tendencies’, will be discussed and analysed in relation to industry’s implement 
and responds.  
The second step is to analysis the audio-visual texts of the show’s 
weekly narrative, specifically looking into the participatory opportunities within 
the weekly narratives of the first episode of TVoC (2012). Use historical 
reception studies method enables this research to explore what 
participation/interactive opportunities are encouraged within the narratives and 
when are people encouraged to get involved during and the show; more 
importantly, whom are audiences interacting with. The primary focus here is 
not the text itself and how audiences reading the show, but how they respond to 
those participation/interactive opportunities. The third step is to analyse 
audiences reception collected from two online social media platforms. In the 
next section, I will explain how this research used Hills’ model of online 
ethnography to approach to Chinese audiences.  
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2.3.2 Online ethnography  
In order to explore how Chinese audiences online engage with the reality show 
TVoC in 2012, this study tends to do a discourse analysis about Chinese 
government policies, the text of the show narrative, and what Chinese 
audiences were saying online about the show. Initially, ethnography was the 
common method in studying audience reception studies of television 
programmes, using participant observation and interviews to explore audiences’ 
reading of a particular text (Ang, 1985; Radway, 1984). Ethnographic research 
on online practices and communications has become increasingly popular in the 
recent years with the growing influence and presence of the Internet in people’s 
everyday lives. 
However, this study was not able to do an interactive participated 
observation or interviews (Hine, 2000; Kozinets, 2009; Phillips, 2013) of online 
communities easily because the community for TVoC was largely anonymous 
that is very hard to recapture. The specific time period this study has chosen to 
look at is 2012 when TVoC was on air, which means it is not possible to be 
embedded in the cultural phenomenon either. Where people use methodologies 
from Kozinets (2009) and Hine (2000), they tend to use interactive study to get 
into the community and be a part of the community and conversations. The 
version this study takes is historical reception study used to recover the moment 
of historical events happening on social media.  
Online ethnography rooted in ethnography. According to Ellen Seiter, 
ethnography is a research method developed from anthropology and sociology, 
and is ‘a research process in which the anthropologist closely observe, records, 
and engage in the daily life of another culture - an experience labelled as the 
fieldwork method – and then writes accounts for this culture, emphasizing 
descriptive detail’ (1999, p.10). Seiter also indicates that media ethnography 
research is based on long-term and in-depth fieldwork to study culture. 
However, as the Internet and technology develops, researchers had to take new 
way to study how audiences interpreted and used TV by observing their actual 
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practices in naturally occurring settings (Creeber, 2006), then seeking to relate 
these practices to questions of cultural power.  
Thus, this thesis needs different methodological tools to do collecting 
data and analyse. In summary, this study uses online ethnography (Press & 
Livingstone, 2006; Baym, 2000; Hills, 2002) from the reception tradition to 
approach to Chinese audiences’ online engagement, looking at audiences’ life 
on the screen rather than looking at their life in front of the screen (Facer et al., 
2001; Livingstone, 2003). It is the way this study chosen to identifying and 
locating the audiences, and to collecting data. In particular, I will follow Matt 
Hills’ model of online ethnography, looking for certain types of ways of 
‘speaking’ and ‘interaction’ are permitted and encouraged on two online spaces 
(Sina Weibo & Baidu Tieba) and whether other forms of interactions, creativity 
and criticism are present. Hills talks about all the different kinds of fan 
communities (online/offline) and he specifically looked at online fans. The 
incorporation of online ethnography approach to collecting data is useful in 
identifying and locating the audience in conducting this research and in 
accessing audiences’ engagement with TVoC in 2012, and did so in depth 
without interfering views upon television audiences.  
In his book Fan Cultures, Hills (2002) suggests the mediation of ‘new 
media’ must be addressed rather than treated as an invisible term within the 
romanticized ‘new’. What he emphasises is that we should not lose sight of 
differences introduced by the phenomenon of the 'audience-as-mediation', since 
cultural critics are otherwise in danger of replicating the 'transparency fallacy' 
in relation to new media technologies (Hills, 2002). He criticises some scholars’ 
earlier assumptions about the method of ethnography that can reveal a 
particular group, allowing the researcher to explore fan communities without 
being obtrusive. He argues that this method is the ‘oft-fantasised position of 
non-interventionist data-gathering for a particularly clear statement regarding 
unobtrusive/obtrusive Internet research strategies in relation to media audiences’ 
(2002, p.175).  
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In research terms, Internet communities are as important as offline 
communities. In this thesis, I am not carrying out a purely deeper linguistic 
analyse of the language and dialogue from online places and communities. 
Specifically, Hills (2002) indicates that online ethnography should be 
concerned with the technology itself rather than only focusing on online 
interactions between participants, because culture online is not simply a version 
or reflection of ‘offline’ culture. The emergence of social media breaks the 
geographic constrains and boundaries of different online platforms (Baym, 
2007; Jenkins, 2006). It also provides the possibilities of ‘just-in-time’ fandom. 
The term ‘just-in-time’ fandom, described by Hills (2002), refers to the 
audiences and fans that go online to discuss new episodes immediately after the 
episode’s transmission time, or during commercial breaks.  
Social media seems like a natural site of exploration and examination in 
audiences’ engagement with TVoC (2012) and may further lead to exploration 
of values in production, distribution and media content. In the case of this 
research, social media Sina Weibo was used by media industry (particularly 
Canxin Production) as a tool and platform to maintain interactive relationships 
with its audiences. Specifically, the different time periods (before broadcasting, 
during broadcasting, and after broadcasting) reveal the different and various 
industrial promotional strategies. In looking at the data from the Sina Weibo, 
Hills’ model shows a way to look into audience engagement with television 
programmes, in terms of time and technology itself. Adopting Hills’ (2002) 
notion of ‘just-in-time’ fandom, this thesis explores the diversity of responses 
to TVoC (2012) by examining as directly as possible how given audiences 
actually understand and use popular culture texts in different broadcasting time 
periods, with the intention of unfolding and revealing the importance of 
‘audience engagement’ in the current media landscape in China.  
2.3.3 Selection of social media platforms 
The first season of the reality television show TVoC in 2012 is used as the case 
study in this research, to specifically look into Chinese audiences’ expressions, 
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discussions, and practices on social media platforms, and to question audiences’ 
discursive power and agency through their online engagement. Audiences’ 
reception of TVoC (2012) is not only discussed and negotiated around the text 
of the show itself, but it also goes beyond to the wider political economics, 
social relations and cultural experiences in China. The wider cultural social 
phenomenon generated by TVoC (2012) is a major reason for choosing it as a 
case study, as explained earlier in this chapter. Extensive online discussions and 
fan activities around the show are also valuable to look into, considering the 
dynamics and volumes of online debates around the show.  
 It is also because of these large numbers of audience participations and 
engagements that the programme has gained tremendous social attention from 
academia, industry and ordinary people. The media coverage of TVoC calls it a 
‘phenomenal programme’ (Xianxiangji Jiemu, 现象级节目). Qualifying as a 
‘phenomenal programme’ requires it not only to have big investment returns 
and high ratings, but more importantly it also means a lot of people watch the 
show, discuss it with each other, and forward information about it to their 
friends. Thus, contagious topics on social media become the fundamental 
condition that determines a ‘phenomenal programme’. For academic research, 
audiences’ online engagement with television programmes provides scholars 
with valuable research objects and materials. Thus, this thesis studies the two 
social media platforms in China which have the most users and influence. 
The next sections thus will explain the criteria of choosing the two 
social media platforms. Two social media platforms, Sina Weibo and Baidu 
Tieba, are chosen for data collection and empirical discussions in regards to 
TVoC (2012). In particular, online ethnography and historical reception studies 
are two major methods in use; online ethnography helps to collect online data 
and historical reception studies enables empirical discussions and analysis. 
In China, there are several companies provide Weibo platforms, such as 
Tencent Weibo, NetEase Weibo, Sohu Weibo and Sina Weibo. The reasons this 
thesis only chose Sina Weibo to examine are mainly concerns three aspects. 
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First, Sina Weibo is the most popular Weibo in China (Chen, Zhang, Lin. and 
Lv, 2011). Since Sina Weibo emerged in 2009, it grew quickly, attracting 
hundreds of millions of users and penetrating into Chinese people’s everyday 
lives. According to the annual report of CINIC (2012), the total number of 
Internet users in China reached 538 million at the end of June 2012.  
Among them, Sina Weibo had taken a share of over 30% of Internet 
users. Weibo is usually being considered as the Chinese version of Twitter 
(Sandoval, 2009). International social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook 
are blocked in mainland China, which led Sina Weibo to a position of 
exceptional advantages and competitiveness. Similar to Twitter, Sina Weibo 
enables users to post messages (up to 140 characters), pictures or video; and 
also to follow or repost other’s messages.  
Here, the ‘others’ include friends of the users, or well-know celebrities 
and public authority figures, or industrial accounts. By the end of 2010, more 
than 5,000 companies and 2,700 media organisations in China are using Sina 
Weibo (Wang, 2010). It is the second reason to choose Sina Weibo as one of 
the major platforms, because it demonstrates an interactive communication 
between ordinary users and celebrity ‘opinion leaders’ (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 
1955). The official Sina Weibo account for TVoC offers Chinese audiences a 
platform to share their evaluations of the show and actors (judges), their 
expressions of fandom and critiques of the contestants in the show. Audiences 
constantly engage with the official Sina Weibo account of TVoC, and also 
interact with organisational accounts such as Zhejiang Satellite Television (浙江
卫视) and celebrity accounts such as the four coaches and some contestants. 
Using Sina Weibo platform in audience research could show us new ways in 
which part of the media audience is mobilising and interacting with the people 
that are making media. Ruth Deller (2010)’s work on Twitter, particularly 
audience research through Twitter, provides a good example of using Twitter to 
explore our understanding of media audiences, their relationships to media 
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products and the relationships between media audiences and those involved in 
producing the media content.  
Many Chinese scholars believe that the success of TVoC relies on the 
interactive use of social media by the production team. The characteristics and 
essence of reality television contain a great deal of ‘interaction’. Reality 
television often interacts with emerging communication platforms such as the 
Internet, broadband, mobile, text messaging, effectively bringing television, the 
web, newspapers, publishing and SMS together. Such integration has been 
embedded in all aspects of the production and broadcasting process, and also in 
the post-broadcasting period. Therefore, the characters and stories presented by 
reality television programmes are not ‘external’ to the audience; not something 
that has nothing to do with the audience. On the contrary, reality shows can 
interact with their audiences, allowing them to participate in and affect the 
content. When the audience becomes part of the programme, passive watching 
behaviour transforms into a kind of active participation and engagement. 
However, the examination of Chinese audiences’ engagement on social 
media may differ from that of Deller on Twitter. As highlighted at the 
beginning of this thesis, Chinese audiences' participation and interaction with 
television programmes have been regulated and shaped by government censors; 
for instance audiences could not vote via SMS. In light of this, Chinese 
production companies’ understanding and use of the ‘interactive’ aspects of 
reality television may different from most Western countries.  
The third reason is because Sina Weibo the site itself provides functions 
that allow researchers to trace back discussions and conversations by time. The 
website designs a function that categorise one account’s microblog messages 
according to the months of the year. It displays a timeline on the page that 
allows users and researchers more accessible in tracing back to a specific post 
at specific time. In particular, four months (June–September 2012) were chosen 
to examine audiences’ reception and practices. The broadcasting time period of 
the first season of TVoC is from 13th July to 30th September in 2012. Hence, 
 62 
 
from the first post in 2rd June to 12th July is considered by this research as the 
‘pre-broadcasting’ time. And this research also justifies other tow time period 
as the ‘early-broadcasting’ (13th July - 17th August 2012) and the ‘later 
broadcasting’ (17th August 2012 - 30th September 2012). By looking at how 
audiences respond (positively/negatively) to all this can we see how successful 
the industry/show was or not, and furthermore, the extent to which the success 
of the show was influenced by industrial and user activities, or by the Weibo 
accounts of celebrities, or other ‘opinion leaders’ in broader terms.  
In general, social media, including sites like Sina Weibo, are having a 
growing impact on Chinese society and are thus bringing changes to China, 
through giving ordinary people new opportunities for self-expression of their 
emotions and opinions. This has drawn attention from some scholars who wish 
to explore political participation via social media and online activism. Indeed, 
Weibo allows various types of users’ communication to become more 
transparent and more direct enabling mainstream media to respond immediately, 
as well as the authorities and public figures too. It is not the aim of this thesis to 
suggest that Weibo is functionally bringing digital democracy to China.  
In terms of government censorship, on the one hand, Chinese authorities 
use a variety of means to control Weibo, while simultaneously some official 
departments have opened Weibo accounts to communicate with the public, and 
even in some cases to seek opinions. The involvement of government agencies, 
authorities and public figures in Weibo has made this ‘public sphere’ more 
complex. These opinion leaders have inevitably shaped Chinese audiences’ 
discussions and engagement on Sina Weibo. While they are talking about TVoC, 
trending topics can go beyond the programme itself and extend into relevant 
social issues and conflicts.  
To examine TVoC fandom this thesis hence chooses to look at the fan 
community on Baidu Tieba. Compared to Sina Weibo, Baidu Tieba is a 
relatively small closed circle of a group of fans that share the same interests 
and fan objects. Looking into Sina Weibo data shows us how audiences were 
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articulating their shared interests in a mediated online setting originally 
established by the official group of TVoC; while Baidu Tieba provides an ideal 
platform for examining how fans operate in order to maintain a community of 
like-minded individuals. Baidu Tieba, a social network owned by Baidu, was 
established in December 2003 with fan-forum-like features and it now has one 
billion registered users and close to 8.2 million topic boards. The number of 
active monthly users is close to 300 million. The fan-generated tieba for TVoC, 
founded in June 2012, is chosen as the main space and community for research.  
Talking about fandom within the Baidu Tieba, this thesis is not going to 
make distinctions between the notions of ‘audiences’ and ‘fans’. Instead, it is 
aimed to observe audiences’ media engagement at different places and the 
potential differences. As suggested by Hills (2002) that current scholars must 
view online activity as fans’ own performance of audience hood instead of see 
online fan activity as an unobstructed view of the fan community. Thus, Baidu 
Tieba was selected as a platform to examine audiences’ activities at fan forums 
and I am interested in exploring whether different types of interactions are 
present within the forums – perhaps more critical of the show, the TV industry 
or wider social and political contexts – but also whether the types of creative 
and political (inter)activities discussed by Jenkins such as fan labour (2006, 
2007a) and activism (2007b) are more ubiquitous and/or more extreme.  
In particular, I look into fan activities and engagement at Baidu Tieba 
for two purposes. One is to explore and observe the ideas of power and 
hierarchy that have imbedded in the fan community of TVoC at Baidu Tieba, 
focusing on fan hierarchy of the community that integrates fan self-regulations 
and fan promotion. The historical reception method thus enables this thesis to 
look at a number of divergent materials collected from the Baidu Tieba of 
TVoC, community regulations and rules made by Baidu Tieba and the bazhu of 
TVoC; and to identify the contours of patterns in the audience reception data, 
analyse similarities and differences of perception and practice in fan’s 
interaction with the community regulations and their meanings.  
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The second purpose is to look into fan creativity and labour with regards 
to their reception of government censor and regulations. When fans groups 
came to the new media age, they quickly become a main force in the wave of 
participatory. However, comparing to Western fans, Chinese fans seem to have 
less free expression and need to confront political regulations and censors. The 
unofficial space Baidu Tieba, full of tactical movements, allows this research to 
explore how Baidu Tieba is used and customised by active fans who remake it 
to be what they need to subvert and divert the dominate power through their 
own conceptual, creative and political practices; and to what ends. The criteria 
for selecting fan posts from the millions of them available are based on two 
major fan creativities: e gao and tu cao. For instance, I searched the key words 
tu cao (ironic criticism) in TVoC’s Baidu Tieba, with the result shows more 
than 77,249 relevant posts including 1,972 of them titled with the term tu cao. 
These 1,972 tu cao posts are almost 100 times the 200 e ago posts. The 
quantitative data directly shows us the popularity of another cultural term tu 
cao that has generated a subcultural phenomenon in China.  
Then, I narrowed down fans’ posts by only look at the ones with the 
term ‘tu cao’ in the title of those posts. When fans use the term ‘tu cao’ in the 
title, it is a way that fans to identify their creative works and simultaneously 
attract the attention from other fans. Looking at these data, I will present a close 
reading of some of the most influential e gao and tu cao cases on TVoC’s 
Baidu Tieba in order to investigate the cultural politics of online fan criticism 
and resistance: the contexts of Chinese political regulations; the social and 
political critique implicated in the texts. Speaking of ‘influential’, I mean some 
posts that generated most fans’ responses and interactivities within the Baidu 
Tieba community. 
 
2.4 Research ethics  
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This research follows the University of East Anglia’s Research Ethics Policy 
and guidance. Take into account ethical considerations can help to minimise 
risk to participants and researchers when dealing with research involving 
human subject. In terms of research involving human participants, the 
University of East Anglia’s Research Ethics Policy defines it as broadly to 
include research that: 
• directly involves people in the research activities, through their physical (or 
virtual) participation. This may be interventional (e.g. surgery, drug trials, 
interviews, questionnaires) or non-interventional research (e.g., surveys, 
observational research) and may require the active or passive involvement 
of a person; 
• indirectly involves people in the research activities, through their provision 
of, or access to, information, personal data and/or tissue; 
• involves people on behalf of others (e.g. legal guardians of children and the 
psychologically or physically impaired and supervisors of people under 
controlled environments (e.g. prisoners, school pupils)). 
My research into Chinese audiences’ online engagement with TVoC (2012) is a 
non-interventional research that observing what audiences have talked about the 
show on social media. Thus, audiences and users will not be informed.  
As Martin Barker (2013) summarised, the four major dimensions of 
research ethics protocols are (a) privacy and confidentiality; (b) informed 
consent; (c) protection of vulnerable groups; and (d) the avoidance of harm. In 
relation to my research, the ‘privacy’ and ‘harm’ would be the main concerns. 
The two online spaces this thesis chosen to look at, are open to anonymous, but 
both requires personal users to register a username with mobile phone number 
or email address. With Baidu Tieba, only the mobile phone number from the 
mainland China can be used to register. Nevertheless, Sina Weibo seems more 
international that users can both use email address and mobile phone number of 
other 14 countries (US, Canada, Brazil, Malaysia, Australia, Japan, Korean, 
Singapore, England, France, Russia, India, Thailand, and Germany). Without 
registration, people will not be able to leave comments and interact with the 
others. Although these semi-open spaces at some extent have protected users’ 
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information flow and communication, it still has danger that users’ real identity 
can be traced by government or organisations in some extreme cases.  
This thesis tries the best to protect the safety issues of those users who 
left traces behind on social media. Their usernames would not be revealed in 
this thesis. I shall only keep the time and day when they left commons because 
it is important in relation to this study’s exploration into the different 
broadcasting period of TVoC in 2012. To be clearer, the notion of harm this 
thesis means refers to the potential leaking of user information while they being 
critical about government, policies and media industry. However, I do named 
some usernames of Sina Weibo users that are official/public accounts, 
celebrities and authority figures (the VIP users). Moderators from the Baidu 
Tieba’s TVoC fan forum are addressed by usernames as well.  
To balance between the researcher’s code of ethics and academic rigor, 
this research also want to make clear that the selecting sources are in Chinese 
language. All sources of audiences’ online commentaries are properly translated 
into English. Taking into account the possible ‘feelings of pain’ that might 
connect to specific subject and issues, the original Chinese language will not be 
presented in this thesis.  
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Chapter 3: ‘Localisation’: regulation, politics and 
industry as factors impacting on the creation and 
content of The Voice of China 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Both adapted from a Dutch production, TVoC (China) and NBC's The 
Voice (US) made a dramatic difference to television ratings in their respective 
countries. Following the showing of its premiere episode on 13 July 2012, 
TVoC attracted up to 64 million viewers a week, compared to 14 million in the 
US (CBS News, 2013). Such success caught the eye not only of China’s media 
industry and academics, but also the Chinese government regulator. The 
‘format trading’ of reality television programmes was not new to China, but it 
had never been so popular before. In the so-called ‘Format Import Year’ of 
2013, a total of more than 30 reality shows with foreign-imported formats were 
on air in mainland China (Fang, 2013), and almost every provincial television 
station aired at least one such show (Li, 2014). The formats for these reality 
shows are often transnational in origin, borrowing from programmes such as I 
am a Singer (Korea), Kpop Star (Korea), So You Think You Can Dance (US), 
Dancing With the Stars (US), TV Total Turmspringen (Germany), Britain’s Got 
Talent (UK) and The X Factor (UK). These shows share much in common: 
larger-than-ever investments, A-list celebrities as judges, imported formats and 
contestants with heart-rending stories of family tragedies, subsequently 
repeatedly found by angry audiences to be false or exaggerated (Han, 2013). 
The mass production of this kind of reality show has changed the landscape of 
China’s media industry and the markets it operates in.  
 On one hand, the sudden popularity of reality television format 
trading may spur the growth of China's television market through its mature 
standardisation of format and the spaces it has developed that allow China’s 
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national TV industry to be shaped/localised according to national ideologies. 
On the other hand, the global dissemination of formats may also bring 
uncertainty and present the Chinese government with difficulties, as it takes 
time to understand this global phenomenon and to ponder how to regulate it. 
Therefore, this is a significant point in China’s development at which to rethink 
censorship and regulations; such consideration will help us to understand 
censorship, not simply as passive suppression but more in terms of the 
(inter)relationships between government sensors, the Chinese television 
industry and the media market.  
 Many scholars have addressed issues around the (im)balance in 
China between marketisation and state control over culture in terms of 
censorship and regulation (Keane, 2010; Zhu and Nakajima, 2010; Johnson, 
2012; Zhou, 2015). Since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, the Chinese 
government has had to adopt a series of market-oriented reforms in order to 
develop intensified commercialisation, as well as to deal with possible 
challenges from international media groups. For instance, the television policy 
STVPB, addressed in an earlier chapter, demonstrates the government’s 
determination to open up the market and may contribute towards a market 
economy developing in the industry. However, alongside this reform process, 
Chinese government’s censorship control of media and culture did not loosen.  
 Several examples demonstrate that China’s major media 
regulator and censor, the SAPPRFT, has tried to curtail the television market 
since 2012 as a reaction to the phenomenal success of TVoC. On 24 July 2013, 
SAPPRFT issued a statement announcing a new regulation which postponed 
ready-to-run talent competition shows, and adjusted the allowed broadcast time 
of current shows so that they could no longer occupy large blocks of prime time 
viewing. In this statement, TV producers were instructed to abstain from 
‘extravagance, putting on dazzling packaging and playing up sensational 
elements’ in TV programme productions (CBS News, 2013). More strictly, the 
statement placed a limitation on each of the 34 satellite channels so that they 
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could only broadcast a maximum of two entertainment shows a week, with a 
limited time of no more than 90 minutes for each episode (Lin, 2013). In the 
following year (2014) satellite TV channels were, according to the People’s 
Daily (the Communist Party’s official news outlet), allowed to show only one 
new foreign-format-based reality show a year (Liu, 2013). The authorities also 
required TV channels to abstain from broadcasting shows based on foreign 
formats during prime time (7.30–10 p.m.).  
These government interventions once again provide support for the 
international understanding of China's regulatory system as a mechanism used 
by the Chinese government over many years to keep a tight rein on both 
traditional and new media, with the intention of preventing potential subversion 
of its authority. Thus, there have been various stories around how the Chinese 
government strictly controls and intervenes in media content and popular 
culture, and censors the Internet by using monitoring systems and firewalls, 
shutting down publications and websites and jailing dissident journalists, 
bloggers and activists. In this way, the Internet in China has been seen in 
Western media and academic scholarship as a battleground between state 
censorship and free expression. On the surface, censorship in China may simply 
be understood through a ‘prohibition/institution’ model that explains censorship 
‘in the first instance as a form of prohibition, of excision, of ‘cutting-out’, 
whereby certain subjects are forbidden expression in representations’ (Kuhn, 
1986, p.14). Departing from this view, and in considering the issue of 
censorship and media regulation as having general relevance, Chinese 
audiences and Internet users are more likely to adopt an anti-censorship stance 
which denounces political and moral censorship of media content and free 
expression. However, Chinese audiences as consumers should not be simply 
understood as part of a passive and oppressed public which lacks power or 
impact. Investigation of the whole range of wider power relationships and 
interplays between audiences, the media industry and the government censors 
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can enhance our understanding of the ‘localisation’ process of imported reality 
television in current China, in terms of both format and content.  
China’s television industry, which is caught between socialist ideology 
and capitalist imperatives (Zhou, 2015), is currently facing competition from 
both domestic and international rivals (De Burgh, Zeng and Chen, 2011). Thus 
the format of reality television that has already been successful elsewhere in the 
world seems to offer a significant opportunity for domestic TV networks to 
achieve high audience ratings with lower costs and risks than other 
programming options (Liang, 2012); it is also considered to be easier in practice 
for producers to localise television formats than to produce new/original shows, 
with format franchising always providing room for revision (Waisbord, 2004). 
The challenge of programme localisation is not just about ensuring quality 
standards and creative content. It also references the difficulties and 
contradictions for China’s television industry in how to localise foreign-format 
programmes into formats which are ‘politically right’ for Chinese audiences. In 
another words, production companies’ understanding and interpretation of 
existing regulatory policies and censorship mechanisms are the key factors in 
shaping very important developments during the localisation process.  
Therefore, this thesis sees the current regulations and censorship of the 
television-format localisation process as a complex example through which to 
understand media censorship and the media landscape in China. As Annette 
Kuhn (1986) suggested in her understanding of film censorship, to understand 
the format localisation process in a country which has strict regulatory 
government censorship, it is necessary to examine the social, historical and 
institutional context in which reality television is produced, distributed and 
consumed. Rather than simply understanding and defining censorship, in her 
study of British film censorship, the author indicates that: 
Historical and sociological studies of film censorship have invariably 
emphasised its institutional and prohibitive aspects, constructing it as an 
activity on the part of specific organisations – organisations whose avowed 
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objective is to place controls on films, usually by excluding from them themes, 
topics and images deemed for one reason or another unacceptable 
(Kuhn, 1986, p. 315). 
While acknowledging that censorship is not a one-way traffic of 
repression, Kuhn, in borrowing from Foucault’s theories of power, redefines 
censorship as a far more fluid and productive process; ‘an activity which 
participates in an apparatus, a set of practices whose interrelations are imbued 
not so much with power as with the ‘play’ of power (1986, p. 27)’. Employing 
Kuhn’s approach to understanding censorship, the localisation of reality 
television format should not be simply seen as a passive object subordinate to 
the SARPPFT or other institutional censors; rather, it is a power negotiation 
between the government censors and production companies.  
Building upon Kuhn’s ideas, Kate Egan’s (2007) book Trash or 
treasure? Censorship and the changing meanings of the video nasties, 
examines the discourses that inform the circulation of a group of banned films, 
suggesting that censorship is not just about rules and regulations, but also about 
the discourses that generate censorship and the cultural and commercial 
consequences of a censorship act or law. From this viewpoint, Egan suggests 
there should be less focus on the rules and regulations of the censor and more 
on the discursive sites where key practices and discourses around censorship 
emerge. Thus, analysing ‘a range of discourse, groups and ideologies in context’ 
(Egan, 2007, p. 10) would help in developing understanding of the censorship 
that is embedded in the format localisation process taking place in China. 
Among China’s media regulators and censors, the SARPPFT is not the only one 
involved, but it is the most identifiable and prohibitive institution, in that it 
directly executes ‘cuts, bans, and censor boards’ (Kuhn, 1986, p. 315). Current 
research into China’s censorship inevitably involves and stresses the 
SARPPFT's media policies and regulations in various fields (Zhao, 2008; 
Scotton and Hachten, 2010; Willis and Chan, 2016; Su, 2016, Chin, 2017). The 
rules and regulations directly issued from the state censors are indeed still 
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central in influencing and shaping television content. Previous censorship and 
regulations (cuts, bans, and censor boards) imposed on television programmes 
provide examples of and assist in tracing production company actions taken to 
avoid censorship, both in preproduction and postproduction. Through making a 
comparison between the formats of The Voice (USA) and TVoC, Qu Jirong 
(2013) has discussed the principles of the localisation process for foreign 
formats. In this comparison, Qu briefly points out that while in The Voice 
(USA), the power is always in the hands of its audiences, because the outcome 
is decided solely by public vote, TVoC only gives such power to parts of the 
audience, and to media representatives who were present at the live studio 
recording of the finale episode. His discussion of the localisation process does 
not, however, explain the reasons for such a difference, for instance the 
historical ban on public voting within reality shows following on from Super 
Girl, the show which has drew more than 400 million viewers who sent a total 
of 8 million text-message votes for their favourite contestants in the final 
episode in 2005 (He, 2012). To investigate this aspect of government influence 
over reality television formats, a brief review of China’s media regulations and 
interventions from the Super Girl case in 2004 (known as the first wave of 
reality television in China) to TVoC in 2012 (known as the second wave 
(Beijing Daily News, 2012)) is useful in understanding how the format of TVoC 
was shaped by government regulations and policies. By comparing the Chinese 
version to the original Dutch format of The Voice of Holland, which was aired 
in Holland in 2010, this chapter will highlight and identify ways in which 
TVoC’s format has been changed and localised for Chinese audiences, through 
investigating the details of how and why this process of adaptation and 
localisation took place. 
However, rather than focusing on criticising the Chinese government’s 
media regulations and policies, or addressing the political significance of 
democracy in the conventional sense (topics which will be explored in Chapter 
Five), this chapter aims to unpack the power relationships which exist between 
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television-format localisation, government censorship and audiences. It will 
look at China’s media regulations, its politics and its television industry as 
factors, exploring how they impacted on the content localisation process of 
TVoC, and addressing how and why the purchased format of The Voice changed 
when it came to China.  
While Liu Xichen, CEO of Shixi Media (a format-trading company), 
claims that the secret of TVoC's success lies in the fact that it strictly followed 
the original format, and that this is the key to the success of the show, this 
chapter argues that the importation of successful foreign TV formats cannot 
guarantee the success of Chinese TV adaptations. Under the highly restrictive 
media regulations in China, producers seek their own ways to maintain 
audiences, giving them ‘illusions’ of participatory power in determining 
competition results. The producers achieve this result through encouraging 
audiences to use new media to participate and interact. Thus, the last section of 
this chapter will go on to analyse how the industry has reshaped the relationship 
between Chinese audiences and TVoC.  
 
3.2 Government regulation in shaping The Voice of China  
The first section of this chapter will discuss and explain why the format 
localisation process of TVoC is important, and why it is unique to China. This 
thesis argues that government regulation changes the relationship between 
formats, industry and Chinese audiences. Unlike experiences in other countries, 
where producers could follow the original format, the situation is far more 
complicated in mainland China under the regulations and control of the 
Communist Party, since national culture and ideologies have to be taken into 
serious consideration.  
Rebecca Yang, the CEO of the IPCN, finally signed the contract with 
Talpa in 2011, after several rounds of negotiations. Yang stated that, in order to 
eliminate Talpa’s biggest concern about the Chinese government and its 
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policies, the wording of the Force Majeure/Act of God clause in the contract for 
TVoC had been changed from ‘God’ to ‘government’, to protect them from 
political risks (Xie, 2012). ‘Act of God’ is a legal term for events outside 
human control, such as sudden floods or other natural disasters, for which no 
one can be held responsible (Black, 1990, p. 33). What Yang did was to alter 
the contracts by changing the usual ‘Act of God’ to ‘Act of government’, in 
order to indemnify Tapla against unpredictable Chinese government 
interventions and changing media policies. 
 The unstable media regulation system and frequently changing media 
policies have a huge impact on media content creation in mainland China, and 
politics has always been considered as the most complex theme in mainland 
China. As Yan-Xu Tong (2002) points out, social changes in China have been 
brought about by confrontations between classes, national interests and interest 
groups. Hence the impact of politics is found in almost every aspect of Chinese 
society, including culture and cultural industries. While the TV industry stands 
between the government and audiences, the balance of following political 
regulations and satisfying audiences’ needs is not easy to achieve.  
In China, mechanisms of regulatory control, such as the licensing and 
permit system and ad hoc administrative orders, allow the state to retain 
strategic control over media content and enable state media to secure their own 
profits (Zhao and Guo, 2008). The key regulatory authorities for the media are: 
the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT), General 
Administration of Press and Publishing (GAPP), Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT), Ministry of Culture (MOC) and Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM). However, in terms of the political impact on media 
content, SAPPRFT is the most important and direct regulator for examination 
in this chapter.  
The official Chinese Embassy in India’s website (State administration of 
radio, film and television, no date) identifies SAPPRFT as an organisation 
under the direct supervision of the State Council, which is in charge of the 
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country's radio, television and film industry and directly supervises China 
National Radio, China Radio International and China Central Television. 
SAPPRFT coordinates important propaganda activities with TV stations and 
censors, organising and managing the transmission coverage of their 
programmes. With its clear political stance, in 1997 SAPPRFT implemented a 
media monitoring system to monitor all TV programming for overall political 
orientation (Zhao and Guo, 2008). This system is called ‘Guang Bo Dian Shi 
Guan Li Tiao Li’ (Regulations on Administration of Radio and Television), and 
it constructs the basic rules and regulations that all TV stations and production 
companies should follow. Then in 2004 a further system, known as the 
‘Regulations for the Administration of, Production of, and Dealing in Radio and 
Television Programmes’, further censored China’s broadcast content (Baker 
and McKenzie, 2012).  
Besides putting in place and monitoring fundamental regulations, 
SAPPRFT also has direct editorial responsibilities over major state media, 
including CCTV (China Central Television), Beijing TV, Zhejiang TV, and so 
on, through publishing normative documents called ‘Tong Zhi’ (notifications), 
to deal with particular media phenomena and issues. For instance in July 2013 
there were considered to be too many musical talent shows on air in mainland 
China, most of them having been adapted from foreign TV programmes. As a 
result, SAPPRFT gave provincial TV stations orders that ‘satellite channels are 
not allowed to produce singing talent shows during a given period of time’ 
(Han, 2013), and 12 ongoing singing shows were told to adjust their broadcast 
schedules, with some upcoming shows being put on hold. Production 
companies have to follow notifications and orders such as these from 
SAPPRFT, because the majority of media outlets in China are wholly state-
owned and private investors are therefore highly restricted.  
Private ownership of television channels is prohibited in China and this 
means that state broadcasters such as CCTV remain the official outlets for all 
private productions. In order to have programmes shown via state television, 
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private production companies usually closely follow advice from TV stations, 
right through from initial brainstorming to final production, and this in fact has 
constituted the main mechanism of content control in the country. As scholar 
Chang (2008) has argued, the success of a television programme relies not only 
on creative content but also on the content providers' flexibility and creativity in 
dealing with SAPPRFT regulations and officials. This insight reveals the 
interdependent relationship between TV stations, production companies and 
SAPPRFT.  
It can be said that China’s TV companies are tightly state-controlled and 
must adhere to tough rules on morality as well as strict political guidelines. 
Over the last decade, SAPPRFT’s regulations and controls on reality shows has 
become increasingly strict, including content censorship, broadcasting time 
limits, and even the form of audiences’ participation. Taking reality talent show 
Super Girl as an example, there were many direct regulations issued by 
SAPPRFT regarding the show. Due to the huge influence of the show, 
SAPPRFT imposed a rule in 2006 that ‘contestants who participated in a 
competition reality show must be at least 18 years old’ (Jiang and Li, 2011), in 
order to secure the safety of teenagers. In 2004 the show Super Girl from 
Hunan Satellite Television attracted 400 million Chinese viewers and soon 
gained fame as the most popular entertainment show in the country, with 
following seasons planned. However, it was taken off the air on September 16th 
2011 by SAPPRFT, due to its failure to meet the regulations, including running 
for longer than two hours and being screened during prime time (Moore, 2011). 
A similar example of such activity is the 2007 controversy over Chongqing 
Satellite Television’s talent show Di Yi Ci Xin Dong (First Heart Throb); 
SAPPRFT banned the show on 15 August 2007, because of ‘the gaffes of 
judges’ and ‘low taste’ (Wang and Lei, 2007). On 23 August of the same year, 
SAPPRFT required a cosmetic surgery reality show, Mei Li Xin Yue (Beauty 
Promises), to stop broadcasting immediately on Guangdong TV, because it felt 
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that the show’s content included transsexual issues, images of blood and horror 
and ‘low taste’ (Xia, 2007).  
More recently, Chinese scholars such as Lu (2013) and Zheng (2013), 
observed that ‘Xian Yu Lin’ (China orders cutback on TV entertainment in 
2011) and ‘Jia Qiang Ban Xian Yu Lin’ (further orders of cutbacks on TV 
entertainment in 2013) have become the key principles and guidelines for 
media content production in China’s recent TV industry. In these regulations, 
SAPPRFT limited the number of entertainment programmes, from 
matchmaking game shows to dance contests, which it allowed to be aired. From 
I January 2012, Provincial television stations were required to broadcast more 
morality-building programmes, disseminating traditional virtues and socialist 
core values, and had to implement controls to prevent ‘excessive entertainment 
and vulgar tendencies’ (Xinhua News, 2012). These so-called ‘suggestions’ in 
fact further limited broadcasts of dating shows, talent competitions and five 
other similar types of programmes. Between the prime time hours of 7:30 p.m. 
and 10 p.m., satellite television stations cannot air more than two of these types 
of programme weekly, and no more than nine shows of this type can be aired 
nationwide (Xinhua News, 2012).  
The first season of TVoC was launched in 2012, one year after the 
‘Orders Cutback on TV Entertainment’. The programme content was hugely 
influenced by the regulations. Hence, in this political context, this chapter will 
look at how the television industry has responded to government media 
regulations and how these regulations changed the format of TVoC.  
 
3.3 Industry response to the government regulations  
Before discussing and analysing the changes made in the format and content of 
TVoC, the global TV format market and the definition of ‘TV format’ will be 
introduced. Then the format of TVoC (the first season in 2012 as brought from 
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Talpa by Star Media, hereafter referred to as TVoC (2012)) and how it has been 
changed under the impact of the SAPPRFT regulations will be investigated.  
TV formats can be sold to media companies in China by companies in 
other countries, providing new possibilities for cultural hybridisation in global 
TV exchanges (Waisbord, 2004) but also perhaps reducing the variety and 
diversity within cultures (Lindner, 2012). In 2009 the Format Recognition and 
Protection Association (FRAPA), which is made up of members from 34 
countries worldwide, published a report, ‘TV Formats to the World’, which 
shows that a total of 445 original formats had found their way to foreign 
screens between 2006 and 2008. During that time, the production value 
generated by traded formats reached approximately €9.3 billion (FRAPA 
Report, 2009). Through 20 years of development, a huge and lucrative global 
industry of TV format trading has been generated which has now penetrated 
into China’s TV market. The report also shows that talent shows, and studio 
game and quiz shows are the top-earning genres, along with makeover/coaching 
shows (FRAPA Report, 2009), and this trend is the same in China as in other 
countries. 
As Waisbord (2004) indicated, globalisation has intensified 
interconnectivity, a term which can be defined as structural and institutional 
linkages among television systems and industries worldwide, resulting in an 
increasingly integrated global business governed by similar practices and goals. 
The dynamics of such global business are ‘reflected in the popularity of 
television formats’ (Waisbord, 2004, p. 359) and format here means 
programming ideas that can be adapted and produced by different national 
ideologies. For instance, there have been 46 versions of the reality competition 
show Pop Idol produced around the world, and Got Talent and The Voice have 
been spun off into more than 50 territories. While some people may exaggerate 
the importance of TV formats (Wang, 2013; Yu, 2012), it is still necessary to 
take a look at what a TV format contains and what role TV formats play in the 
success of reality shows.  
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Simply speaking, the term ‘TV format’, as defined by Austin Burbridge 
of Cinema Minima (Burbridge, 2014), describes the overall concept, premise 
and branding of a copyrighted TV programme. In detail, a TV format merges 
both the exogenous culture inherent in the format and the local dynamics input 
by local producers (Zhang, X., 2014). For local TV producers, it seems easier in 
practice to localise TV formats rather than to produce new shows (Waisbord, 
2004). This is because format franchising always provides room for revision of 
imported formats, thus offering some measure of predictability based on past 
performance in numerous countries. It is also believed that format creates a 
chain of value that can be modified and extended across national boundaries, as 
well as within national media systems. Keane points out that, unlike finished 
programmes, a format can be 'filled' with culturally specific content, and 
licensed co-productions can ensure the potential for added value in terms of 
technology transfer (Keane, 2002).  
Scholars who are more critical, such as Waisbord, would argue that 
although format television ‘does not eradicate national cultures’, it is a 
reflection of a ‘global industry solely concerned with quick commercial success 
and [with] no patience for innovation’ (Waisbord, 1988, p. 381). Here, the term 
‘innovation’ is highly concerned by Chinese government in these days with 
regards to television programmes. There was a fear among Chinese television 
industry that the buying spree of foreign TV programme may cause harm to 
local television market. Scholar Gong Wen, from Tsinghua University, thinks 
that recent Chinese reality shows are in their second stage of development: 
copyright importation and localisation, following the initial imitation stage. In 
this second development stage, rather than seeking to make a construction 
according to a foreign model, China seems to be turning in a direction that 
jettisons most of the tenets of Western ideology and allows Chinese people to 
rediscover traditional ways of making life work, using the tools and 
opportunities provided by the global economy (Pan, 2008). Pan also argues that 
the success of China is not a result of adopting Western ways, but of sloughing 
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them off. Here the question arises: does the format localisation process indicate 
a sloughing off Western ideologies or decreasing opportunities for diverse and 
complex representations of local and national communities (Waisbord, 1988) as 
China fears?  
The programmes supported by imported TV formats share the same 
standardisation and quality of content as other countries, however this cannot 
secure the success of a reality show. Especially in China, with its complex and 
strict media content regulation system, the localisation process and negotiation 
with government media policy is more crucial than the TV format itself in 
determining a show’s success. Thus, format as a solution seems ideal for 
Chinese television industry to allow it to learn new technical skills from abroad 
and deploy them within its own cultural contexts. While copyright importation 
brings the concepts, ideas, management style and operational know-how from 
abroad, China’s TV industry is still under pressure from government 
regulations and audiences.  
TVoC comes with a production manual, or ‘bible’, which records every 
detail of the original TV programme, such as lighting, theatrical design, stage 
setting and even standards for choosing the contestants (Xinhua News, 2012). 
IPCN bought the format from Talpa for ¥3.5 million Yuan, and then sold it to 
Star Media and Zhejiang TV, the propaganda director of TVoC, Wei Lu, told 
the press. As an agency, IPCN translated the whole production ‘bible’ and also 
participated in the production process as an assistant, guiding the programme 
production, execution, marketing and other areas of operation. The producer of 
TVoC claims it shows respect to the original show as the ‘bible’ even has 
guidelines for choosing the four judges, stating that two top national stars, one 
judge liked by young people and a judge providing a tough live experience 
compared to the other three judges are required (Tian, Sun, and Chen, 2012). 
All the different versions of the programme share the same standard content, 
which makes The Voice a recognisable global brand; every television company 
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wanting to produce the show must pay a license fee for use of the owner’s 
intellectual property.  
As has been briefly mentioned in the introductory paragraph, Qu Jirong 
(2013), from Hunan University of Science and Technology, proposed the 
principles of the localisation process for imported formats, after making a 
comparison between the formats of The Voice (US) and TVoC. In the 
comparison, he argued that while in The Voice (US) the power is always in the 
hands of its audiences because the outcome is decided solely by a public vote, 
TVoC only gives such power to its four professional judges, plus 99 media 
practitioners (representatives from different media outlets) for the finale. Su 
Holmes (2004) has examined participation via phone voting, which for decades 
has been a staple process for UK TV talent shows such as in Eden (2002), The 
Salon (2003), Big Brother (2000), Pop Idol (2001) and Fame Academy (2002). 
She describes interactivity in reality television as primarily being conceived as 
operating at the level of software, but also involving viewers using new digital 
technologies (hardware) to cast their votes. Public voting, as an important 
aspect of interactivity in reality television in which industry gains profit, has 
been banned in mainland China since 2007, when SAPPRFT required all reality 
competition shows to ‘cancel live broadcasting and reject using SMS voting 
and online voting’ (Li, X., 2009). Although there is no public vote in TVoC and 
other reality shows in China, TVoC (2012) still had huge success in attracting 
TV audiences of 120 million and 400 million Internet users, as reported by 
Huanqiu News on 22 August 2012. In the next section of this chapter the 
success which Star Media as the production company achieved will be explored, 
together with an investigation of the other types of interactivity it designed and 
offered to its audiences.  
Star Media responded to SAPPRFT in two main ways. First, though a 
new way of organising the collaboration between the production company (Star 
Media) and the TV station (Zhejiang satellite), which contributed greatly to the 
show's success. Both the record high ratings and the fact that the show was 
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popular right from its premiere have caused people to wonder what it is about 
this particular talent show that makes it stand out from many of the other 
similar programmes that appear on Chinese television. Looking back at China’s 
TV broadcasting history, it is unprecedented for a production company and a 
TV station to form a partnership joint venture of this type, in which the parties 
share both the revenue and the risk (Ye, 2012). This meant that the Zhejiang 
TV station had to take on a greater amount of financial risk than had happened 
in China before, and this is the main reason why it took Star Media quite some 
time to find a network that was willing to cooperate.  
Ye (2012) states that the usual way in which production companies and 
broadcasters work together in China is for the production company to handle 
the entire production process from scratch and for the broadcaster to simply 
make a decision about whether to broadcast the show. Based on the estimated 
advertising revenue and potential viewer ratings, broadcasters (TV networks) 
then have the power to determine how much they will pay for the programmes 
offered to them by producers. For the production company, there will be no 
further profit after receipt of a fixed production fee, no matter the amount of 
earnings generated by sales of advertising during the transmission of the show 
(Ye, 2012). When this process is examined it can be seen that this kind of 
cooperation model often forces production companies to skimp on production 
expenses at the cost of programme quality, in order to maximise their profits. In 
consequence, the quality of TV programmes has been reduced, and such 
practices could negatively influence the development of China’s TV industry. 
In contrast, in the new partnership model used in the case of TVoC 
(2012) Star Media and the Zhejiang satellite station shared the same risks. Star 
Media signed a valuation adjustment mechanism (VAM) with Zhejiang TV, 
whereby the producer and the network share both the risk and the potential 
rewards from a show (Fang, 2012). This agreement included the following 
stipulations on sharing advertising revenue: if audience ratings surpassed 2 per 
cent, advertising revenue would be shared in a ratio of 7:3, but if ratings did not 
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reach 2 per cent and advertising revenue was low, then the production costs of 
roughly ¥100 million were to be borne by Star Media alone (Liu, 2013). With 
this kind of motivational pressure, Star Media and Zhejiang TV bent over 
backwards to offer the best-possible show and related promotional campaigns. 
Star Media was in charge of costs for components from sound equipment, stage 
setting and audio post-production to coaches, bands and technicians, and 
Zhejiang TV put forth their best efforts in advertising sales to successfully seal 
a title sponsorship deal, worth ¥60 million, with a beverage company.  
In China, judgement about the success of TVoC (2012) was mainly 
based on audience ratings, while in other countries this may not have been 
considered a key factor in relation to either social influences of the show or its 
commercial success. For instance, The Voice UK, which is broadcast by the 
BBC, encourages audiences to vote for their favourite artists by either voting 
from a land line phone or from their mobile, using Mobile Short Dial Codes, 
which are numbers called (not texted) from UK mobile phones where callers 
are charged a guaranteed fixed price for the call, regardless of their UK mobile 
network provider. MSDC numbers are shorter than normal telephone numbers, 
typically between 5 and 7 digits long. 
The BBC FAQ page about voting indicates that callers from UK mobile 
phone networks pay the same charge to vote as callers from a BT landline – 25p 
for each vote for The Voice UK contestants with a minimum of 10p of this 
amount going to the charity the BBC Performing Arts Fund. The BBC itself 
does not receive any revenue from the calls. In the case of TVoC (2012), the 
provincial TV station, as the authorised broadcaster and network, shares the 
revenue earned with the production company.  
The response and attitude of Star Media to the ‘no public voting’ 
regulations can be speculated upon from the perspective of the unique situation 
and motivational pressures present in the joint venture. What happened in 
China is that Chinese audiences did not know they would not be able to vote 
before the final competition date was c. On the 21st September 2012, Tencent 
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News said that ‘tonight is the final competition of TVoC. The result is in the 
hands of the newly added 99 media practitioners (representatives from different 
media outlets as judges) instead of the four judges’. This indeed caused 
questions from, and discussion among, the public. Wei Lu, the advertising 
director of TVoC, explained to the press that ‘We couldn’t do a public vote as 
the original ‘bible’ (format) requires in mainland China because we have clear 
regulations on this. Hence, we decided to change the format to one that 
combines professional judgement from coaches and representations of ordinary 
audiences’ tastes in determining the final result’ (Wu, 2012). Lu’s explanation 
led the public to think that TVoC (2012) had a better format than the original. 
 In fact, audiences’ discussed this issue and their doubts about the 
fairness of the 30,000 live audience voting for the final competition, as well as 
showing their dissatisfaction with the live-audience-voting-only process. Also, 
they disagreed with the fact that only the host announced the result, without 
specifying the number of votes cast. Lu further explained this as a way, in 
accordance with the foreign practices, to protect the contestants’ self-esteem 
and self-confidence (Jingjiang News, 2012). Zhejiang TV also came forward to 
claim their authority and fairness. It is not difficult to discover that the industry 
in fact had a strategic plan for dealing with the regulations on public voting 
issues in China. In cooperation with the provincial TV station, the joint efforts 
of the two sides the production company and the TV station) seems to have 
soon resolved the dissatisfaction and doubts of the audience.  
 
3.4 Reshaping the relationship  
As has been shown, TVoC (2012) caused heated discussions among audiences, 
particularly those communicating via the Internet. These discussions tell us that 
Chinese audiences did care about their right to vote, and that they wanted to 
know the details of the voting process. Not all Chinese audiences knew that 
voting was a part of the show in other regions, but among those who did, many 
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complained via the Internet about not having this option. Star Media, in 
cooperation with Zhejiang TV, needed to seek a new way of maintaining the 
idea of participatory audiences, despite the fact that they could not vote. Jian 
and Liu (2009) argued in their analysis of how the organisers and producers of 
Super Girl steered and manipulated audience participation that participatory 
audiences are symbolically paid using a form of 'dream-fulfilment' and are 
attracted by the apparent democracy that is displayed during these singing 
contests. ‘Dream-fulfilment’ and ‘democracy’ are the key offers which the 
industry gives to its audiences (Jian and Liu, 2009). Because Chinese audiences 
cannot vote freely during the show, the industry turns to creating ‘dream-
fulfilment’ and ‘democracy’ by offering interactive opportunities through new 
media, especially by encouraging the use of Weibo. Unlike the UK reality show 
industry, which sells its shows with ideas such as ‘You decide!’ (Big Brother), 
‘But this time you choose!’ (Pop Idol) and ‘If you want to have your say’ (The 
Salon) (Holmes, 2004), Star Media uses the term ‘interactivity’ to attract 
audiences, meaning participation through social media interaction rather than 
through public voting.  
In real social life, watching TV is not only a form of entertainment; it 
also gives people opportunities to get together with family and friends, to share 
their feelings and to enjoy social activities, with television continuously 
providing audiences with communication topics for them to respond to. 
Interactivity, simply speaking, includes seeking programme information, 
participating in the show, downloading videos and ringtones, posting on 
message boards, chatting with friends/fans, and subscribing to newsletters. As 
Holmes (2008) states, ‘the core media channels through which interactive 
opportunities are offered are the conventional telephone, mobile phone, text 
messaging, digital TV and the internet’. In addition, the online viewing 
experiences of sharing and discussing on social media provided audiences of 
TVoC (2012) with further interactive opportunities. For instance, on 8 October 
2012, the total number of those viewing TVoC (2012) online in mainland China 
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reached 1.3 billion; by the end of the final performance more than 1.1 billion 
topics/messages related to the show had been posted on the Tencent microblog 
website. As Jenkins (2002, p. 80) says, Chinese audiences are believed to be 
‘gaining greater power and autonomy as they enter into the new knowledge 
culture’ and the new media market.  
Use by audiences of social media platforms such as Sina Weibo was 
strongly encouraged among audiences of TVoC by its production company. The 
cooperation between TVoC (2012) and social media caused much discussion 
and debate among Chinese scholars and journalists. Writers believe that social 
media platforms such as Sina Weibo provide a potentially significant 
development in the understanding of audiences and their relationship with the 
media (Deller, 2011), bringing about convergence between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
media and between ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ (Jenkins, 2006a). 
 From 2005 to 2009, reality shows in China mainly provided audiences 
with ‘interactivity’ through text messaging, the conventional telephone, and 
online forums. Following Sina Weibo’s emergence in 2009 it grew quickly, 
attracting hundreds of millions of users and penetrating into Chinese people’s 
lives. According to the annual report of the CINIC (China Internet Network 
Information Center, 2012), the total number of Internet users in China reached 
538 million by the end of June 2012, and Sina Weibo took over 30% of these.  
Similarly to Twitter, Sina Weibo enables people to share short textual 
messages with others in the system (the maximum length of a message is 140 
characters). Users can choose to follow people they know personally or 
celebrities and public figures, news alerts, businesses or simply people they 
think look interesting. Sina said in 2010 that more than 5,000 companies and 
2,700 media organisations in China were using Sina Weibo (Wang, 2010).  
In relation to reality shows, quantitative data from Sina News (Sina, 
2012) reported that recent research from Sina had found that in China 20 per 
cent of respondents participated in reality shows via text messages and 6 per 
cent via telephone calls, while a much larger 72 per cent participated through 
 87 
 
Weibo. Thus, it can be seen that Weibo occupies a very important position in 
current Chinese audiences’ lives, as shown by the large percentage of Chinese 
viewers’ who actually use Weibo. In addition, the reality television industry can 
use Weibo to obtain useful information, guide public opinion, and inspire 
viewers’ desires (Li, 2014). 
 Exploring how Weibo work can aid understanding of how they are used 
by the TV industry to maintain participatory audiences. TVoC (2012) operated 
two main official microblog accounts on Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo. This 
reflects the current trend for TV programmes to operate official microblog 
accounts as a complement to television programme information, with audience 
members being encouraged to follow and interact with these accounts via 
programme websites and TV broadcasts. These accounts are active throughout 
the week, and they interact with viewers during the live shows, asking and 
answering questions and sometimes playing quizzes and games (Deller, 2011).  
On the official Sina Weibo of TVoC (2012), original posted information 
(including programme information, news announcements and videos) and 
reposted information (from other official or celebrity accounts) provided a 
space for users where they could participate through the activities such as 
‘Like’, ‘Repost’ (Retweet), ‘Save for later’ (Favourite), ‘Comment’ (Reply) and 
‘Report’. The repost (like retweeting) can be understood both as a form of 
information diffusion and as a means of participating in a diffuse conversation 
(Deller, 2011), bringing users into a particular thread where they can engage 
without directly addressing it themselves (Boyd, 2010).  
Weibo itself, as an interactive social media space, allows large numbers 
of people to participate, share and discuss. For example, on 30 September 2012, 
Chen Yao, a Chinese celebrity, wrote on her own Sina Weibo account, while 
she was watching the final competition of TVoC, ‘Jike Junyi (contestant) sang 
brilliantly tonight, very touching. Actually she sings very well in every 
competition, she deserves to be named as “The Voice of China”’ (Zhu and Yao, 
2012). This message generated 4,651 comments and 3,561 Weibo users 
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reposted it, using the thread to talk about whether or not they liked Jike Junyi 
and their reasons. The divergence or consensus within those discussions and 
comments would then have been reviewed by followers of Chen Yao and 
themselves. Online social groups/communities were hence generated by users, 
based on their shared interests and ideologies. If it is posited that the SMS vote 
for Super Girl, to some extent, achieved democratic participation where 
everyone had one vote, Zhu and Yao (2012) argue that Chen Yao, with 25.93 
million Weibo fans, in theory holds 25.93 million votes in the new media era. 
In this way, they also suggest Weibo can be seen as ‘democratic’ spaces. 
However, in this thesis the question of how much power audiences actually 
have will be addressed; while people can freely talk to each other on Weibo or 
back up the views of celebrities and authority figures, they still have no direct 
power over the show, either in determining the content or the results. What 
audiences do have is indirect power through following and joining online 
discussions, however it is hard to prove that the online discussions feed back to 
the show as either direct or indirect power.  
So far, the official page of TVoC on Sina Weibo contains 8,117 
officially published pieces of information and has 1,577,878 fans (followers). 
Weibo users can also follow particular topics by searching for and following 
messages containing keywords. From 13 July 2012 to 1 October 2012, the total 
number of messages on Sina Weibo about the term ‘The Voice of China’ 
reached 46,612,906 (Li, 2014). Quantitative statistics from Nianzhi.cc (a 
marketing and operations management tool for Sina Weibo) show that there 
were 149,685 reposts/sharings and 132,893 comments by followers of TVoC’s 
official Weibo during August 2013. The simultaneous use of social media and 
smartphone apps while watching the show has given audiences more 
participatory platforms than previously existed, reshaping the relationship 
between audiences and TVoC (2012).  
To sum up, this chapter has examined how China’s media regulations, 
politics and its television industry have impacted on the content localisation 
 89 
 
process of TVoC. The purchased format of the original show The Voice was 
changed when it was broadcast to Chinese audiences. As the content of reality 
shows has been highly censored in mainland China since 2006, the producers of 
TVoC (2012) have had to follow the (new) regulations coming from SAPPRFT, 
both regarding the content of the show and the form of public voting. Standing 
as it does between government and audiences, the production company Star 
Media chose to cooperate with a state-owned TV station, sharing the risks and 
revenues, and working together to steer and manipulate audience participation 
because Chinese audiences cannot vote. Hence the use of the social media 
option of Weibo has been strongly encouraged in order to enable audience 
participation. By selling the notion of ‘interactivity’, the TV industry provided 
its fans and participants with a form of ‘dream-fulfilment’, ‘democracy’ and 
power. In addition, because of China’s specific political regulations on reality 
television, under which audiences do not have the power to vote for their 
favourite contestant in determining competition results, Weibo, as so-called 
‘democratic’ spaces, attract people accustomed to a communist regime to 
express themselves with a certain amount of apparent democracy, as displayed 
in the Weibo spaces. 
However, as the government’s censorship of Weibo becomes 
increasingly strict, a drop in Weibo users has been observed. A recent study by 
the Telegraph, which sampled the activities of 1.6 million Weibo users, found 
that activity had been dropping since late 2011, and had dropped precipitously 
in the autumn of 2013 (Custer, 2014). The Telegraph’s recent analysis shows a 
sharp drop after nearly every government incursion into Weibo’s operations. 
For example, Weibo activity fell sharply when the Chinese government began a 
new crackdown on online rumours and in 2013 arrested several high-profile 
account holders, including Angel investor Charles Xue. Whether government 
censorship should be seen as responsible for the decreased interest in Sina’s 
Weibo service cannot, so far, be evidenced. But the Telegraph’s observations 
about Weibo and government censorship indeed caused social debate in China. 
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Hence, this thesis proposes a hypothesis that, in reaction to government 
censorship and regulation, Chinese audiences will engage and interact 
differently with official (Sina Weibo) and unofficial (Baidu Forum) media 
platforms. Sections two (Chapters 5 and 6) and three (Chapters 7 and 8) of this 
thesis will test this hypothesis. 
  
 91 
 
Chapter 4: The Voice of China (2012): 
participation and interactivity 
‘Consumers have become key participants in media culture; the debate 
now centres on the terms of their participation, not whether spectatorship 
is active or passive.’  
– Henry Jenkins (2004) 
 
‘An individual who ‘productively’ responds to one media property, brand, 
or cause may be a ‘passive’ listener to many others; activity and passivity 
are not permanent descriptions of any individual.’ 
– Henry Jenkins (2013) 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter analysed how SAPPRFT’s regulations and policies 
increasingly influenced the content and format of TVoC in 2012, as well as 
those of the Chinese television industry and media market as a whole. It 
demonstrated the significance of traditional television ratings in the case of 
TVoC (2012). Traditional television ratings, as Jenkins (2013) describes, 
represent the audience as the primary commodity exchanged through the 
practices of broadcast media. For Canxing Production, traditional television 
ratings are the decisive factor which determines its share of advertising profit 
with the television broadcaster Zhejiang Satellite Television.  
In addition to its interest in traditional ratings, Canxing Production’s 
concerns regarding audience engagement with TVoC can be identified in its 
promotional strategies and the narrative of the show. This is an example of 
what Jenkins (2013) describes as the engagement-based model for measuring 
the value of audience engagement. The industry now sees its audiences as a 
collection of active agents whose labour may generate alternative forms of 
market value, in that engaged audiences are more likely to recommend, discuss, 
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research, pass on, and even generate new material in response to the original 
product (Jenkins, 2013). According to Jenkins, viewed from this perspective the 
understanding of the measurement of audiences and their online participation 
during this transitional moment is: 
... shaping by a series of competing frames: lurking versus legitimate 
peripheral participation; resistance versus participation; audiences versus 
publics; participation versus collaboration; hearing versus listening; 
consumers versus co-creators (Jenkins, 2013, p. 155).  
To measure the value of audience engagement, the television industry must 
now not only focus on the traditional ratings system, but also on various 
formats that can provide direct audience connection.  
To investigate such developments, this chapter discusses and analyses 
concepts and theories of audience engagement by addressing interactivity and 
participation in the case of TVoC (2012). Participation and interactivity are 
factors which have become increasingly visible in China with the phenomenal 
rise of reality television in recent years. As will be shown, participation in, and 
interactivity with, television programmes have been of increasing interest for 
both individual Chinese television producers and for the television industry as a 
whole. The first section of this chapter will discuss the definitions of the terms 
‘participation’ and ‘interactivity’ as these terms are used in the Chinese 
television industry and in academic discourse. 
 Few studies have looked into the concepts of participation and 
interactivity as they have been recently adopted by the Chinese television 
industry, or at the differences between the two. Understanding the difference 
between participation and interactivity enables this chapter to analyse the ways 
in which Canxing Production used the pre-designed participation and 
interactivity aspects contained within the TVoC format as a significant 
promotional strategy before the show was broadcast. This section will explore 
various transmedia strategies that emerged as Canxing Production sought to 
attract and sustain the interest of active audiences, as a way of motivating the 
engagement of more casual viewers.  
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The second section analyses the weekly narrative of the first episode of 
TVoC (2012), focusing particularly on factors such as the narrative structure, 
editing, use of dialogue and voiceover, and ‘characterisation’ (such as 
contestants’ personal stories). It aims to investigate how and when interactivity 
was embedded and foregrounded within the show. More importantly, by 
analysing the content of TVoC (2012), this chapter will determine when 
audiences participated, whom they are participated and interacted with and 
what effects such activities had.  
While Chinese audiences could not vote in TVoC (2012), they were 
offered many ‘interactive opportunities’, as advertised and proclaimed by 
Canxing Production. A number of Chinese scholars have stressed the 
importance of providing audiences with ‘interactivity’ in television 
programmes, suggesting that the innovation of interactive models is one of the 
important strategies needed to improve the competitiveness of TV 
entertainment in the new media era (Song, 2009; Wang, 2014; Hu, 2012; Chen, 
2011). It can be seen that powerful conglomerates are protecting their own 
interests as they enter the new media marketplace. In many Western countries, 
the focus on engagement is now central to the reconfiguration of audience 
power (Jenkins, 2013), meaning that audiences will gain greater power and 
autonomy as they become part of the new ‘knowledge’ culture. 
To approach debates about audience power in the Chinese context, this 
chapter focuses on two major issues with regard to audiences’ engagement with 
TVoC (2012). Firstly, how Canxing Production measured the value of audience 
engagement with reality television programmes, and secondly, the ways in 
which audiences engaged with TVoC (2012) on different platforms. Addressing 
the debates about the ‘increasing power of audiences’ (Jenkins, 2013; Hills, 
2006), this chapter tries to question whether this is a ubiquitous phenomenon 
that can be applied to the Chinese context as well. 
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4.2 The concept of interactivity 
Before analysing the interactive opportunities on offer for TVoC (2012), this 
chapter will discuss and explain the meaning of interactivity in the context of 
reality television. There is no simple and precise definition of the concept of 
interactivity in relation to new media, and without such a definition the concept 
can be too broad to be truly useful. In Chinese text, the term 互动 (hudong) is 
used in a similar way to the English word ‘interactive’. Xinhua Dictionary 
literately defines ‘互动’ as ‘influencing each other’ which is the same as the 
OED’s definition of the English word. Professor Hu Yong, from Peking 
University, describes ‘interactivity’ as a key term in new media (Hu, 2012). 
Therefore in this study the English term ‘interactivity’ will be considered to be 
the equivalent of the Chinese term 互动 and will be used as such in relation to 
new media.  
In terms of people’s real social lives, watching TV is not only a form of 
entertainment; it also give people opportunities to get together with family and 
friends, to share their feelings, to enjoy warm social activities, and it 
continually provides audiences with topics they can respond to in a number of 
ways. Interactivities, simply speaking, include seeking programme information, 
participating in a show, downloading videos and ringtones, posting on message 
boards, chatting with friends and other fans, and subscribing to newsletters. 
However, the Chinese TV industry seems to confuse the words ‘participation’ 
and ‘interactivity’. They have overused the term ‘interactivity’ in characterising 
aspects of their shows which encourage audiences to participate and get 
involved.  
In her article ‘But this time you choose!: approaching the interactive 
audience of reality television’, Holmes (2004) reviewed this term ‘interactivity’ 
in relation to reality television and identified that, because it invariably spans 
both software and hardware issues, it has a range of potential meanings. She 
also points out that interactivity in reality television should not be simply 
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conceived as ‘actual, physical interaction in the form of choices, decisions and 
communicative input to the system’ (Holmes, 2004, p. 217) or ‘the ability for 
message receivers to respond to message senders’ (Jensen and Toscan, 1999, p. 
15).  
Reality television shows such as TVoC (2012), do indeed provided 
audiences with interactive opportunities using digital technologies; ‘the 
physical cooperation of the audience’ as Jensen and Toscan explain. Using this 
concept, interactivity between reality television and audiences is offered 
through the conventional telephone, mobile phones, text messaging, digital TV 
and the Internet, all of which means have been constantly updated by the 
progress of media technology development. In addition to these digital/new 
technology aspects, Holmes (2004) also adds ideological dimensions such as 
‘the idea of audience agency’, ‘the empowerment of users’, and ‘new liberties 
of action’ (p.217). These build on Jensen and Toscan’s (1999) assertion that 
interactivity ‘represents a channel for the transfer of power and authority to the 
viewer’ and thus alters the power relations between audience and text.  
This ideology certainly suits most of the Western reality television 
examples, such as Big Brother, Pop Idol, Fame Academy, The X Factor, The 
Voice UK, I’m a Celebrity, The Salon, etc. Holmes (2004) indicates these 
reality programmes can be linked to a concept of interactivity that ‘is generally 
seen to imply some sort of transformative relationship between the user of the 
media and the media form itself’ (Marshall, 2004, p. 13) and ‘allowed their 
consumers to feel involved in determining the nature of the text’ (Griffen-Foley, 
2004, p. 553). 
Built upon this conceptualisation of ‘interactivity’, the notion of 
modifying content on reception seems to be very important in defining and 
discussing interactivity in relation to reality television. Interactive opportunities, 
as TVoC promised, could be discovered in the proliferation of new media 
formats which allow more participation. However, as long as audience 
‘feedback’ could not become a crucial discourse in the text and the visual space, 
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the existence of so-called ‘empowered’ audiences should be questioned. In light 
of this shortfall in the reality of interactive engagement, the power of audience 
engagement with reality television in the current Chinese context should be 
questioned and explored.  
 
4.3 Before the show: promotional strategies  
This section explores TVoC (2012)’s pre-designed participatory and interactive 
opportunities. New media and technologies played an important role in the 
promotional process, and one month before the shows aired on 13 July 2012, 
the programme’s promotional team launched a series of PR activities and 
advertising to ‘warm up’ audiences for its first season. Promotional events were 
held in 15 major cities across mainland China and the show did indeed get a 
certain amount of public and media attention, as the team expected (Souhu 
News, 2012). Then, following overwhelmingly positive reports from 
newspapers, magazines, radio, television and the Internet, Chinese audiences 
started to get a sense of what TVoC was about. Professional journalists in China 
contributed to spreading relevant information and at the same time also built 
audience suspense and appealed to them to participate.  
Meanwhile, Canxing Production, in cooperation with well-known 
websites such as Sina.com, Sohu.com, Tencent.com, Youku.com and others, 
tried to maximise the programme-related information flow and spread on the 
Internet. Canxing Production operated two main official microblog accounts, on 
Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo, of which Sina Weibo had more users and 
greater social influence. According to the 2012 annual report of CINIC, the 
total number of Internet users in China reached 538 million at the end of June 
2012, of which Sina Weibo had a share of over 30 per cent.  
Canxing Production used Sina Weibo to build ‘buzz’ before shows aired 
in order to drive tune in during broadcasts, and to keep the buzz going by using 
the platform as a ‘democratic space’ where users would be free to discuss the 
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shows during and after airing. Weibo then offered the opportunity for fans to 
follow the official TVoC (2012) pages and create communities using hashtags 
(similar to those on Twitter), which then reminded audiences of the show 
throughout the days leading up to the next show. For instance, Weibo created a 
#The Voice of China hashtag to foster interest in the show before it aired. Fans 
could search the #The Voice of China feed on Weibo to see videos of the 
contestants and promotional celebrity footage of events that had happened 
during the weeks before the show, and they could engage with the show’s 
content, by posting and commenting on reactions to the videos.  
This engagement spread throughout many social groups. The result was 
that a great many people become emotionally invested in the performances 
because they had watched this big event approaching. People then wanted to 
tune in, particularly to watch the stars perform live during the show. 
Another important aspect of the promotional activities of TVoC (2012) 
was the selection procedure for contestants. In the summer of 2012 TVoC set up 
an official online platform, voice.5ige.cn, where people could upload audition 
videos or audio files to access the opportunity to become a contestant. However, 
there is no evidence available showing that any contestant who attended this 
first season’s auditions was selected from this platform. In fact, it was the 
directorial team of TVoC which chose contestants, in a short, intensive period 
leading up to the show being recorded. The activities of this team in relation to 
the selection procedure for contestants will be addressed in the next section.  
In December 2012 Canxing Production announced their cooperation 
with Sohu.com, an organisation which assisted in the use of interactive 
functions of new media to get TVoC (2012) further promoted on the network 
platforms (Zhang, 2012). The two businesses decided to organise network 
channel selection of outstanding contestants who could go straight into the 
second season of TVoC, to be broadcast in 2013. Once individuals were chosen 
as contestants, they would have a chance to get their friends or families 
involved in the show as their support teams. This is evidence of the way 
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ordinary audiences were offered the chance of entering the narrative of the 
show and becoming a part of the text, but in a limited, controlled, and packaged 
way.  
Canxing Production used new media technologies to enhance its 
programme promotion process and to attract public interest and engagement. 
TVoC’s page on Weibo could be seen as an open-to-all platform, including 
audiences, authorities and celebrities, while apps on smartphone and tablets 
were more like private platforms. In recent years, some TV-centric apps on 
smart phones and tablets have emerged as helping the industry to better 
understand viewers’ interests in television programmes, and in enhancing the 
‘stickiness’ between users and TV programmes and stations. Recent research by 
The Nielsen Company estimated that 41 per cent of tablet owners and 38 per 
cent of smartphone owners use their devices at least once a day while watching 
television (Nielsen, 2012). Known as the ‘second screen’, a device such as an 
iPad or smartphone can supplement and augment what audiences see on TV, 
and this suggests that TV-centric apps indeed meet the demands of consumers. 
Canxing Production created the official TVoC app which adds complementary 
features to existing TV-centric apps. 
There are in total 71 relevant apps for TVoC in the Apple Store and 85 
apps in Google Play (Xinhua Net, 2013). Although most of them seem to be 
‘copycats’ of each other, they do provided audiences with mass information 
flows related to TVoC. In 2013 the Canxing Production set up its official app of 
TVoC and provided users with updated information, news and videos for five 
reality shows, The Voice of China (2013), Kuwo Zhen Shenyin (2013), 
Entertainment Dreamworks (2013), Wulin Zhengba (2013), and Wuchu Wo 
Rensheng (2013). This app also offers users live broadcast viewing of these 
shows and allows them to comment on each programme and share their 
thoughts and feelings. The official app of TVoC allows its users to check in to 
the show that they are watching and see what others are watching at the same 
time. It asks its users to vote for their favourite contestants, and it also allows 
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them to predict the competition results and to enter a free prize draw. 
Additionally, users can share what they have seen while using the app as well 
as jokes, and criticisms of Weibo and other social media, such as Tencent 
Wechat.  
Another social media app which can be compared to Weibo is Tencent’s 
Wechat, also known as Weixin in Chinese. This is a more private space where 
users’ posts are used with more intimacy to share text, images, and short voice 
messages. Weixin was launched in January 2011 and quickly amassed about 
400 million registered users. It is similar to WhatsApp, TalkBox, LINE, 
Facebook and Kakaotalk, but is more of an aggregator of the existing services 
of various social networking tools: part Facebook, part Instagram, part walkie-
talkie and part subscription service. A person’s posts are visible only to 
‘accepted’ friends, and the kinds of information shared – photos of one’s 
children or random observations about the day – are typically intended only for 
a defined circle of friends and family. Publicly ‘tagging’ friends in photos and 
posts, which is one of Facebook’s signature functions, does not exist in Weixin; 
instead, what appears in your timeline is entirely controlled by the account 
holder.  
Unlike Weibo, Weixin is used almost exclusively on Internet-enabled 
mobile devices, not desktops (Larson, 2013). This new media technology is 
becoming more important and appealing to the television producers and the 
industry. Before the show aired, TVoC built up its ‘gongzhong hao’ (public 
account) on Weixin through which audiences were encouraged to subscribe to 
its daily news about the show and related information. This account also offered 
a link to the show’s Weibo account. Users could share news and information 
from TVoC’s gongzhong hao to their ‘pengyou quan’ (friends circle), choosing 
which of their friends they did or did not want to be included. Along with 
supplying information, this gongzhong hao offered users three dimensions of 
participation: ‘hudong’ (interactivity), ‘chaoji tiyan’ (super experience) and 
‘wei huodong’ (small events). To be more specific, hudong included a link to 
 100 
 
‘wei shequ’ (community) and ‘wei shi’ (video of the show); chaoji tiyan links to 
other media platforms such as Sina Weibo, Tencent Video and Xiami Music; 
and wei huodong provides connection to smartphone games and raffles. In 
considering these opportunities, which were offered to audiences by Canxing 
Production as ‘interactivity’, it is posited that the company actually used 
Weixin to offer information and participatory opportunities, rather than genuine 
interactivity.  
As a whole, the promotion process before the show aired was staged by 
the media from the very beginning to attract attention, with fans and 
commentators all contributing to boosting the hype, and this activity can be 
seen to have reinforced the concentration of power in the hands of the media, 
rather than with the audience.  
 
4.4 Participatory opportunities within the weekly narratives 
This section explores how Chinese audiences were encouraged to engage with 
those participatory and interactive opportunities in the weekly narratives of 
TVoC (2012) which were put in place as part of Canxing Productions’ pre-
designed promotional strategies. Su Holmes’ (2004) work on The Salon 
provides a good example of the analysis of the interactivity featured within 
television programmes. As part of this investigation the contexts pertaining 
both before and after the show was broadcast are also relevant, and are crucial 
in understanding audience engagement and power. This section will explore 
what participation and interactivity opportunities were encouraged within the 
narratives, together with researching the points at which people were 
encouraged to get involved, both during and after the show. Even more 
importantly, the objects of the audiences’ interactions will be explored.  
In comparison to reality shows such as The Salon, Big Brother and Pop 
Idol, TVoC (2012) offered very limited interactive opportunities to its audiences. 
As discussed previously, general audience voting had been cancelled as a result 
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of government requirements, and so it seems that only a limited number of 
people were given the right to vote in the final of TVoC (2012). The audience-
voting format adopted granted the audience an apparent say in who deserved to 
gain celebrity status (Hellmueller and Aeschbacher, 2010, p. 21). In the final 
show of TVoC (2012), the result of the competition depended on the total 
number of votes from two groups of people: 30,000 audience members present 
at the live show and one media practitioner representing each of 99 media 
outlets. Consequently, power was not actually in the hands of audiences, 
because the voting process and outcomes were not fully available to viewers 
within the show’s narrative.  
How then were screen audiences who were unable to vote encouraged to 
participate in TVoC (2012)? Canxing Production offered two main participatory 
opportunities: the presenter and the rolling titles. The first episode of TVoC 
aired on 13 July 2012 on Zhejiang TV in a prime evening slot, from 7.30 p.m. 
to 10 p.m. Official news sources reported that the shooting of TVoC (2012) 
started on the evening of July 4th 2012 at Shanghai Pudong University stadium 
(Meng, 2012). In fact, the whole project had started several months earlier. 
Wangyi Entertainment reported that, in contrast to other reality talent shows, 
such as Super Girl, TVoC had no mass auditions. Instead, Canxing Production 
set up a directorial team which sought contestants and so-called ‘good voices’. 
Lu Wei, the publicity director of TVoC, revealed that this team contained one 
director and three assistant directors, and that each assistant director had a 
group of more than a dozen sub-directors working for them.  
The group as a whole was divided into two main sub-groups: the online 
group and the offline group. The online group was mainly responsible for 
looking for good voices on popular music web sites, music enthusiasts’ bulletin 
boards (BBs) and in online communities; the offline group played the role of 
‘star hunters’, searching for talent at music schools, bars, and even enterprise 
ensembles and community arts organisations. It is therefore the case that all the 
contestants who were took part in the blind auditions had, in fact, been pre-
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selected by the directorial team. Despite this, taking the first episode of TVoC 
(2012) as an example, audiences were encouraged to participate and it was even 
suggested that they could become contestants: 
Tonight, at this stage, we will start a war about music, we are looking for 
a real singing genius; is that you? (Shao Hua). 
We are looking for the most incredible singing talent; we are looking 
forward to finding a good voice on this stage. 
Shao Hua, the presenter of TVoC (2012), made these statements at the 
beginning of the first show. In contrast to The Voice UK, which has two 
presenters (one female and one male) who put a huge amount of passion and 
enthusiasm into the intensive atmosphere of the show, Hua was mainly in 
charge of introducing the interactivities on offer and the commercial advertising. 
He repeatedly highlighted the purpose of the show and reminded audience of its 
watching focus. In addition, he also said: 
If you get the approval of three or more coaches you can win a ¥10,000 
music dream-fund provided by Suning Yigou. 
Here, Hua used the term ‘you’ to include both the contestants and the screen 
audiences. In offering a ¥10,000 fund, he called upon audiences to participate 
by signing up for the competition. However, in reality audiences would never 
be given a chance to be on screen or in the text of the show. This ‘hook’ 
provided audiences with a promise of both participation and interactivity which 
was, in fact, illusory. According to Janet Murray (2010), interactivity can be 
both procedural and participatory. Murray (2010) also argues that for something 
to be interactive it must be participatory. In this situation audiences could 
physically participate with the show through sending text messages, as 
presenter Hua directly called on them to do:  
By sending a supporting text message ‘A+contestant’X to 10669588298, 
you will have the chance to receive a ¥50 coupon offered by Suning 
Yigou. 
Beside this direct appeal for participation from the presenter, other 
information passed to the audience through the format of rolling titles. When 
playing the background story of the contestants, there were intermittent titles 
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‘follow voice.5ige.cn’ showing under the contestants’ names, reminding 
audiences that they could access more information through the official website 
of TVoC (2012). The most frequent words on the rolling titles would be 
‘participate in the SMS interactive of The Voice of China’; ‘follow the official 
Sina Weibo of TVoC’; ‘leave comments @ The Voice of China’; ‘leave a 
message to support your favourite contestants’; ‘check the official website of 
Zhejiang TV www.zjstv.com,’; ‘the official website of The Voice of China is 
‘voice.5ige.cn’ and ‘get to know more about things behind the scenes’. These 
clear, brief statements showing repeatedly to audiences provided information 
outside the show itself and called people to participate, but did they constitute 
an interactive platform between audiences and screen where they could 
communicate and interact? 
The rolling titles asked audiences to participate in the show through 
other medias, such as Sina Entertainment, Tencent, Baidu News, Wangyi 
Entertainment, Renren, Fengxing, PPTV, Tianya forum, Xunlei Kankan, 
Miduole and Kuwo Music. Some of these media platform are social media 
websites ( e.g. Renren), some are online news websites (Sina Entertainment, 
Tencent, Baidu News, Wangyi Entertainment), while some are digitalised 
watching platforms (Fengxing, PPTV, Xunlei Kankan) and Kuwo Music is a 
platform offering free online music listening and legitimate download services. 
This activity represents technological media convergence, as described by 
Jenkins, in that there is technological fusion and producers marketing a text 
across a range of media platforms (Jenkins, 2006).  
 The official website (voice.5ige.cn) also offered a ringtone (singing by 
contestants) download service which allowed audiences to simultaneously 
explore and download the music they liked from the show to their mobiles. 
Again, this is evidence of media convergence, this time between TVoC (2012) 
and the music industry.  
Jenkins also examines cultural convergence, a term referring both to the 
ways in which audiences may relate to the media culture and the meaning-
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making strategies which arise from such activities (Jenkins, 1998). As Holmes 
indicated, it is difficult to clearly distinguish media and cultural convergence, as 
they are processes which are fundamentally interlinked (Holmes, 2004).  
In TVoC (2012), the results of audience feedback were also played out 
through the rolling titles. The production team would select which comments, 
feedback and opinions from audiences’ text messages should appear in the 
rolling titles. Most of the feedback appeared to have come from Sina Weibo, 
taking the form of a user’s nickname plus the content of their comment. The 
selected comments on screen were shown to audiences briefly and using a small 
font. In the first episode of TVoC (2012), about 40 audience feedback items 
were shown in the rolling titles, such as: 
@ Baijiaxiaoxian: @ The Voice of China. Wish to see really good singers. 
Don’t let us down. Oh, I have always liked Zhejiang TV’s... fighting! 
@ Shuishoumange: @ Zhejiang TV @ The Voice of China. It’s finally 
begun, really looking forward to seeing this! 
@ Houmanman: watching @ The Voice of China. This copyright 
programme feels good. The opening contestant was very impressive.  
None of these expressed a negative attitude about the programme or Zhejiang 
TV and so it seemed that all viewers were looking forward to seeing the show. 
Along with comments on the programme itself, positive audience feedback 
about the contestants and the four judges was also displayed: 
@Yiouwen: I haven’t seen such a good show for a while, the wisdom of 
Huan Liu, lovely personality of Ying Na, the passion of Chengqin Yu and 
the tears of Kun Yang; makes me feel real. Zhejiang TV offers us such 
good and clear voices! 
@Lijinhuobuyaotaichongdong: love Yong Huang’s voice and his love for 
his girlfriend, so touching!  
It is not the intention of this research to comment on the authenticity and 
content of this audience feedback or the opinions contained, but rather to use it 
as evidence for the claim of there being only limited interactivity within the 
weekly narrative, as previously presented in this section. It can be said that the 
selected participations and audience feedback items used did not impact on 
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what audiences saw in the show, despite the fact that they looped back into the 
rolling titles of the show. Interactivity in the case of TVoC (2012) did not 
appear to imply some sort of transformative relationship between the user of the 
media and the media form itself (Marshall, 2004), nor did it allow consumers of 
the show to feel involved in determining the nature of the text (Griffen-Foley, 
2004). Content creators were still the sole determiners of programming 
objectives and outcomes. The use of new technologies relating to television 
programmes created a wider arena for participation and interactivity beyond the 
show itself, but these activities were not capable of disturbing the power 
hierarchy between the Chinese government, the TV industry and the audiences 
of the show.  
 
4.5 Social media: Sina Weibo 
There is little evidence in TVoC (2012) of the products of interactivity being 
exploited in the service of an ongoing narrative for televisual consumption; the 
pre-selected audience feedback and opinions discussed above had limited 
impact on what was seen on the screen. However, this lack of genuine audience 
impact seemed to have had no effect on the popularity of the show. Statistics 
show that TVoC (2012) attracted 120 million TV viewers and 400 million 
Internet viewers following its first airing in July 2012. As at 8 October 2012, 
the total number of the online video viewings of TVoC (2012) had reached 1.3 
billion in mainland China; as at the end of the final performance, there had been 
more than 1.1 billion topics/messages related to the show posted on Weibo. The 
online viewing experience, sharing and discussions on social media and the use 
of relevant apps on smart phones and tablets together provided audiences with a 
wider participatory platform. Chinese scholar Yang Zhirong (2013) suggests 
that new media is one of the most significant factors in the success of TVoC 
(2012). He particularly mentions Sina Weibo, which has become a crucial 
platform for helping to promote the programme. It is also believed that social 
 106 
 
media such as Sina Weibo provides a potentially significant development in our 
understanding of audiences and their relationship with media (Deller, 2010), 
and of the convergence between old and new media and between producers and 
consumers (Jenkins, 2006). 
Sina Weibo works in a similar way to Twitter. It is a China-based 
microblog site, and is one of the most popular sites in China, used by well over 
30 per cent of Internet users. It enables people to share short textual messages 
with others using the site (the maximum length of a message is 140 characters). 
Users can choose to follow people they know personally, as well as celebrities 
and public figures, news alerts, businesses or simply people they think look 
interesting. More than 5,000 companies and 2,700 media organisations in China 
use Sina Weibo. Nowadays, the TV industry operates official Weibo accounts 
as complements to its programmes, providing information which audience 
members are encouraged to follow and interact with via the programme 
websites and during TV broadcasts. These accounts are active throughout the 
week between transmissions of shows, and they also interact with viewers 
during the live shows, allowing them to ask and answer questions and 
sometimes to quizzes and games (Deller, 2010). So far, the official page of 
TVoC on Sina Weibo has published 11,085 pieces of information and has 
1,859,626 fans (followers) (Sina Weibo, 2014).  
On the official Weibo of TVoC, original post information (including 
programme information, news announcements, videos) and repost information 
(from other official or celebrity accounts) is provided to users allowing them to 
then participate through activities such as ‘like’, ‘repost (retweet)’, ‘save for 
later (favourite)’, ‘comment (reply)’ and ‘report’. The repost can be understood 
as both a form of information diffusion and as a means of participating in a 
diffuse conversation (Dellar, 2010), which would bring new users into a 
particular thread where they can engage, without directly addressing the 
originator (Boyd, 2010). Reposting is also a way users can engage with others 
(friends, celebrities) while getting messages out to new audiences. 
 107 
 
 As well as the actions detailed above, Weibo users can also follow 
particular topics by searching for keywords. From 13 July 2012 to 1 October 
2012, the total number of messages on Sina Weibo relating to #The Voice of 
China reached 46,612,906 (Zhu and Yao, 2012). As an example, on 30 
September 2012, Chen Yao, a Chinese celebrity, wrote on her own Sina Weibo 
account while she was watching the final competition of TVoC (2012): 
Jike Junyi (contestant) sings brilliantly tonight, very touching. Actually 
she sings very well in every competition, she deserves to be called ‘The 
Voice of China’.  
A total of 3,561 Weibo users then reposted this message and it generated an 
additional 4,651 comments, in which users talked about and discussed whether 
or not they liked Jike Junyi and the reasons for their views. The divergence or 
consensus within these discussions and comments would then have been picked 
up by followers of Chen Yao and of each reposting user. From observing this 
trail of posts, reposts and comments it can be seen that online social groups and 
communities are generated by users, based on their shared interests and 
identities.  
What makes the discussion of television programmes on Weibo 
particularly interesting is that audiences used Weibo while they watched TVoC 
(2012). Quantitative statistics from Nianzhi.cc (a marketing and operations 
management tool for Sina Weibo) show that there were 149,685 reposts/shares 
and 132,893 comments by followers of TVoC’s official Weibo during August 
2013. Here the notion of ‘liveness’ arises, that is, live transmission offering a 
potential connection to shared social realities as they are happening (Couldry, 
2004a). Couldry identifies two forms of liveness: online and group (Couldry, 
2004b). Relating to the Weibo phenomenon, liveness refers to a group of 
friends who are in continual contact via their mobile phones through calls, 
texting, social media, and apps. In terms of TV Technology, new research from 
Accenture (2015) reveals that people use social media while watching TV to:  
• obtain more information about a show, product or service 
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• apply for coupons and promotional codes 
• enter contests and lotteries 
• watch another video 
• interact with others who share similar interests 
• share/recommend the video/programme being watched  
• make a purchase 
This has highlights the situation of audiences use social media to directly 
interact with television content while watching live series programmes across 
multi-screens.  
While Western scholars have already started to examine the potential 
problems that the liveness of Twitter can cause for viewers following and 
contributing to discussions about a programme (Deller, 2010), Chinese 
discourse talks about such aspects of Weibo in a more positive way, by 
emphasising the benefits of the interactive function, and appealing to media 
companies to use Weibo extensively in TV shows (Yang, 2013). Chinese 
scholars Zhu and Yao, in analysing the interactive transmission process of 
TVoC (see below), point out that the show provides its audiences with basic 
information and content through traditional media – the TV – as a one-way 
transmission process (Zhu and Yao, 2012). They then suggest that TVoC creates 
for itself a focused communication tool, by inviting public opinion leaders 
(celebrities) to participate in online discussions in order to create trending 
topics on Weibo.  
This type of activity enables messages and links to be circulated to 
millions of users within a matter of minutes. Furthermore, Zhu and Yau argue 
that TVoC on the Weibo platform is, to a certain extent, a ‘live show’. The 
onscreen content is, in fact, providing nothing but the background information 
and sources for audiences’ online discussions on Weibo, and that Weibo offers 
them a platform on which they can participate, by producing content and 
interpreting text (Zhu and Yao, 2012). Their argument is similar to Couldry’s 
idea of liveness in seeing reality shows as live events with audiences watching 
at the same time but in different locations (Couldry, 2004).  
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Figure 1. Interactive transmission process of TVoC   
In Zhu and Yao’s exposition of the interactive transmission process of TVoC, 
they explain the ways in which public figures and celebrity opinion leaders 
(Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955) and the official accounts of media organisations 
exert influence within the ‘Weibosphere’. The interest of this present research is 
to investigate the influence of audience (fans/Weibo users) participation in 
shaping the narrative and content of TVoC (2012), in contrast to and in addition 
to the influences discussed above.  
The following situation which occurred in TVoC (2012) provides a good 
example of Weibo discussions affecting what is seen onscreen. Xu Haixin, a 
female contestant from Chengdu, sang a song called ‘Self’ in the first episode 
of TVoC (2012). Her explanation of why she chose to sing this song – ‘to 
continue my dead father’s music dream’ – moved the judge Huan Liu to tears, 
and he was then chosen to be her tutor for the show. Her clean, innocent 
appearance and her touching story led press commentators to discuss her in a 
very positive way after the blind audition.  
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However, some Internet users soon found out that Xu was lying in her 
touching story about singing for her dead father. Xu was suspected of using her 
father’s death to gain sympathy and to ‘hype’ herself, as she did in another 
talent show HuaErDuoDuo (Qinhai TV) one month before TVoC (2012). The 
fans on Weibo suspected that Xu’s withdraw from HuaErDuoDuo was due to 
her participation in TVoC (2012). Eventually, these rumours and comments 
annoyed the makers of HuaErDuoDuo. On 18 July 2012, they posted a 
declaration on the programme’s official Weibo page to clarify the reason 
Haixin Xu gave on 16 June 2012 to their production team about her withdraw 
from the show:  
Xu sent us a video to tell us that she had just received news that her 
grandfather was critically ill, and her grandmother had collapsed (Weibo, 
2012). 
In addition, HuaErDuoDuo uploaded the video that Xu sent to the production 
team. 1,826 Weibo users reposted this video and 610 users commented on it, 
including: 
@LongleLulu: @The Voice of China. Please let her out now! Who knows 
who’s the next person to die in her family: her aunt, uncle, sister, brother? 
She sings well, but without a sincere heart, she is very vulgar, garbage, 
disgusting… 
Following this, more users began to dig into her past and pictures of her with 
dyed yellow hair, a sexy nightclub image, in love with 43-year-old man when 
she was 23 years old etc. began to be posted. As a whole, it can be said that the 
effort from Internet users destroyed Xu’s public image and credibility. Then, on 
24 August 2012, in episode 7, Haixin made the following statement before the 
competition: 
There was a lot of controversy about me after the previous show. No 
matter whether they were positive or negative, they gave me power to 
progress forward.... Tonight, at this stage in the competition, I will leave 
everything behind, and just focus on the next song. I’m myself. I’m happy 
and strong.  
As one of the top four contestants in Huan Liu’s team, Haixin Xu was 
eliminated, with only 28 votes from the 99 media practitioners, while Yawei 
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Yuan received 83 votes and Jike Junyi 93. Then Huan Liu, Zu’s tutor, 
explained her elimination as follows:  
Please listen to me: Haixin is a professional contestant who has been 
studying music and singing for many years... and at this time, as we all 
know, there were too many other factors that influenced the impression 
she gave and her image…  
In saying there were too many other factors, Liu was referring to the 
discussions and disputes on Weibo and the Internet about Xu’s personal stories. 
What he said on the show was an appeal to general audiences in which he tried 
to call for sympathy and toleration for Xu. In this respect, it can be seen that 
audiences were gaining greater power and autonomy as they entered into the 
new knowledge culture and the new media market, as described by Jenkins 
(2002). Their opinions had huge social influences that could loop back to the 
show and even affect the result of the competition. In the case of TVoC (2012), 
it was not the ability to vote on the text of the show, or the proliferation of 
intertextual sites around it, that constituted this influence, it was the social 
media options available which gave audiences the power to interact with TV. 
When audiences watched TVoC (2012), they were not interacting with the show 
and its production team. Instead, they were participating in online discussions 
and interacting with other audiences including celebrities and fans.  
 
4.6 Participation as consumption  
In mainland China, it was felt that Canxing Production used TVoC (2012) as the 
starting point for it to reform and build up a music industry chain, and perhaps 
as an even a bigger strategy than this. In other versions of The Voice, the 
relationship between contestants and the show was terminated after the season 
finale. The company behind the show did not have anything to do the 
contestants’ future singing careers. However, in China, Canxing Production 
took a longer view. From their perspective, the production and broadcasting of 
TVoC was simply the first step.  
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After the show broadcast, various strategies were used, such as music 
concerts and films relating to TVoC (2012), to extend the show into Chinese 
audiences’ everyday lives, allowing them to continue to engage with it. In 
relation to TVoC (2012), participation as consumption happened not only 
between Chinese audiences and the on-air shows, or among Internet users, but 
also among related transmedia events. Marshall points out that the term 
‘interactivity’ has been overused by the new media industries in order to sell the 
distinctiveness and value of their new technologies, to the point where 
interactivity seems to represent little more than ‘hyperbole, hucksterism and 
hype’ (Marshall, 2004, p. 13). From this point of view, this section explores 
how Canxing Production provided participatory opportunities after the show as 
part of their money-making strategies by providing audiences with participation 
as consumption. Eileen R. Meehan suggests that economic dimensions, such as 
corporate structures, market structures and interpenetrating industries, must be 
added to analyses of the media generally, if the texts and intertexts of mass 
culture are to be fully understood (Meehan, 1991). 
The corporate structure of Canxing Production and Star Media China 
will now be examined. Canxing Production (also known as Starry Production) 
is the professional production company under Star China International Media 
Ltd. (Star China Media, SCM), which has produced a variety of the most 
popular TV programmes in China, including TVoC, China’s Got Talent and So 
You Think You Can Dance. Star Media China is known as a leading media 
entertainment group in China, with business interests ranging from TV 
production, broadcasting, filmmaking and artist management, to music and 
concert production. It was 53 per cent owned by China Media Capital (CMC), 
which was set up in 2009 as the country’s first culture-focused private equity 
fund. CMC operates three 24-hour Mandarin channels – Xing Kong 
International, Xing Kong Chinese and Channel [V] Chinese – covering Hong 
Kong, Macau and Southeast Asia.  
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The Shanghai city government’s Shanghai Media Group controls 32.5 
per cent of CMC, and other major shareholders include the state-run China 
Development Bank, as well as China Merchants China Direct Investments Ltd., 
which is also controlled by the state-owned China Merchant Group. As of 
January 2014, CMC acquired the remaining 47 per cent share from 20th 
Century Fox and thus became the sole owner of Star China Media Ltd, a highly 
concentrated and integrated media conglomerate. CMC is operated by Li 
Ruigang, who also heads the Shanghai Media Group, one of the more 
entrepreneurial state-owned film and TV groups. Li has been working at the 
Shanghai Media Group since 1994, is very familiar with Chinese government 
policies and the political environment, and is particularly interested in 
participating in the Chinese government’s media industry reform project. He 
had for some time been exploring ways to set up separate production and 
broadcasting businesses for TV shows. It can be said that Star Media China, 
under Li’s leadership, is a for-profit corporation, but one which closely follows 
the central government’s regulations and policies promoting positive energies 
and images.  
In January 2012, new rules from SAPPRFT took effect, limiting the air 
time allowed for game, talk, and talent shows, thus requiring the nation’s local 
government-owned broadcasters to put more emphasis on news. The state 
newspaper Global Times said the SAPPRFT also required more shows aimed at 
building morality and prompting the core values of socialism (Zhao, Shen and 
Tan, 2012). As a consequence, TVoC has developed into a cultural phenomenon 
which extends beyond the show and its commercial activities and events.  
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Figure 2. Corporate structure of the production of TVoC  
In the digital era, extra footage on digital channels, trailers, exclusive clips and 
messages, previews, pre/sequels, spinoffs, adaptations and spoilers, and in fact 
every event/fact surrounding reality shows, can be sent to audiences through 
both old and new media options. In relation to TVoC (2012) Canxing 
Production produced additional programmes for its audiences. TVoC was 
broadcast every Friday night from 9:15 p.m. Afterwards, a related reality show 
which had been produced by Canxing Production, Ku Wo Zhen Sheng Yin 
(2012,) was broadcast as a sequel to TVoC (2012). This was a talk show 
interviewing contestants from TVoC (2012) who were the current subjects of 
social media discussions and public concerns. The whole programme only 
TVOC
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lasted about ten minutes after the first broadcasting of TVoC (2012) every 
Friday on Zhejiang TV. But the full version lasting about 20–30 minutes was 
sold to and exclusively broadcast on Iqiyi.com, a digital video platform in 
China. Contestants who appeared in this show became minor celebrity figures, 
sharing their personal feelings and stories with audiences, and providing 
consumption which may or may not have been at odds with predicted 
interpretive strategies of the main show’s audiences (Gray, 2010).  
At the same time, audiences were encouraged to access additional 
information and footage on the Internet. Chinese scholar Li Xiang sees this as a 
complementary relationship between TVoC and Iqiyi.com, using advanced 
network technology such as sharing, commenting and reposting to build up a 
virtuous cycle focusing on user interests (Li, 2009). In cooperation with media 
industry players, such as digital media companies and Internet protocol TV 
providers, Canxing Production offered its audiences participatory opportunities 
through the production of their own materials that expanded audiences’ 
understanding of both the text and the franchise. 
In 2014, Canxing Production created, and China’s national TV channel 
CCTV-3 aired, the first original, native Chinese talent show format, Sing My 
Song, with the slogan ‘looking for the best original songs in China’. The series 
first aired on CCTV-3 in January 2014, with a finale on 21 March 2014, 
earning a total season viewership of 480 million and a total viewer share of 37 
per cent in China (data from CSM media research). CCTV-3’s ratings increased 
by 59 per cent compared to the previous year, for the same time slot 
(Starchinapress.com, no date). More recently, Star China Media bought the 
format of the American musical comedy-drama TV series, Glee, from 
Twentieth Century Fox Television International Distribution, and the Chinese 
version of the show is currently under production by Canxing Production. The 
success of TVoC (2012) has allowed Canxing Production to produce more 
reality shows, such as TVoC (2013), Sing My Song and the Chinese version of 
Glee and all are positively disseminating cultural values where these indeed 
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meet the central government’s requirement of shows building morality and 
prompting and supporting the core values of socialism. 
As has been suggested, Star Media China operates TVoC as a cultural 
phenomenon, extending music and music events, such as new albums, music 
concerts, films and commercial performances, to various cities and venues and 
into people’s lives. Jenkins describes this as ‘media convergence’, implying 
technological fusion and/or producers marketing a text across a range of media 
platforms. In contrast, ‘cultural convergence’ refers to the ways in which 
audiences may relate to media culture and the meaning-making strategies which 
arise, with convergence occurring within the minds of individual consumers 
and through their social interactions with others, according to a new set of rules 
that no one involved actually fully understands (Jenkins, 2006). In general, Star 
Media China’s cooperation with the music industry has produced things such as 
new albums, music concerts, commercial performances and legitimate music 
downloads. After the first season of TVoC, the first step in this direction taken 
by Canxing Production was to release an album of TVoC, made up of the most 
popular songs sung by contestants from the show. Meanwhile, there were 
accompanying releases of compilations of new creative music from the four 
judges/coaches: Liu Huan, Na Ying, Yang Kun, and Harlem. Then some 
contestants (Li Daimo, Ding Ding, Quan Zhendong, Zhang Wei, Duo Liang) 
quickly released their new music albums and some (Xu Haixin, Yuan Weiya, 
Jike Junyi, Jin Zhiwen) released EPs. Audiences and fans bought these new 
albums and EPs in huge numbers during a depressed economic period for 
record companies.  
From December 2012 to the Spring Festival of 2013, ten nationwide 
tour concerts of TVoC were staged. Interestingly, these concerts also followed 
the format of the show, with the original four judges/coaches as leaders of four 
teams, with audiences being offered opportunities to vote for the best team and 
singer after each concert. This format indeed enhanced the interaction between 
the audiences and the stage, and between the concerts and the celebrities. In 
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addition, a world tour concert of TVoC was also planned for the United States, 
Canada, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Hong Kong, in 
response to enthusiastic requests from audiences and fans.  
Some contestants quickly became famous after the show and staged 
their own personal concerts. For instance, the 25-year-old singer Jike Junyi, 
who won the third place in the first season of TVoC in the summer of 2012, 
held her first concert in Beijing on 23 March 2014. Rising stars like Jike Junyi 
staging their own concerts inevitably became topics of public discourse and 
focuses for further audiences’ involvement. 
To ensure fan attendance and participation, Star Media China also 
released a movie spin-off during the Christmas season, on 27 December 2013, 
entitled ‘The Voice of China: Turns Around for You’, produced by Canxing 
Production. The film brought together contestants from the first and second 
seasons in a warm and uplifting story about a group of young, aspiring singers. 
It was further released in January 2014 in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Malaysia, as the show had been closely watched and followed by many 
audiences outside China for the preceding two years. However, this film was a 
failure, with only ¥3 million of box office takings for an investment cost of 
¥850 million, and this suggests that Chinese audiences do not blindly consume 
programme derivatives. 
Most cultural production in the United States is done by private, for-
profit corporations and, as Meehan has examined, corporate imperatives operate 
as the primary constraints shaping the narratives and iconography of the text, as 
well as the manufacture and licensing of intertextual materials (Meehan, 1991). 
However in mainland China, private ownership of television channels is 
prohibited, meaning that state broadcasters such as CCTV are the official 
outlets for all private productions. In order to have programmes shown via state 
television, private production corporations usually closely follow advice from 
the TV stations, from initial brainstorming sessions to develop ideas, right 
through to production. This process has, in fact, constituted the main 
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mechanism of content control in China. In another words, the Chinese 
government and its policies have influence in shaping the narratives and 
iconography of the text and the intertexts of TVoC through their regulation of 
the TV stations. An example of this type of influence is SAPPRFT’s agreement 
to allow the broadcasting of the reality television show, Happy Boy, in 2007 by 
Hunan Satellite TV, with a specific requirement for the station to provide pre-
designed public service content within the show. Although there was no clear 
requirement from the SAPPRFT for TVoC (2012) to provide public service 
content, Canxing Production and Star Media China seek to maintain a good 
relationship with the government and claim themselves to be good cultural 
players, and not just commercial producers. Besides the commercial activities 
Canxing Production offers, it also provides many public service and charitable 
activities and educational events for its audiences.  
On November 23rd 2012, San Ya International Beach Music Festival 
was held by Canxing Production at San Ya, a popular tourist resort in Hainan 
Province, which attracted music lovers from across the country. The music 
festival invited tutors and singers from TVoC to perform, following the same 
format as the show. Two professional entertainment agencies owned by Star 
Media International Media Co. Ltd. were responsible for this event. As one of 
the major organisers, Star China Media claimed that the aim was to make this 
music festival a top-level music feast for Chinese audiences 
(Starmediapress.com, no date). Sun Su, minister of the San Ya Publicity 
Department, announced that this cooperation with Canxing Production was 
aimed at developing San Ya as a base for the creation of original music, a 
cutting-edge pop music publishing platform, a music products trading centre, 
and the vacation destination for musicians.  
Contestants from TVoC (2012) were also encouraged to engage in 
charitable activities, again through Canxing Production’s arrangements. On the 
one hand this can be seen as helping contestants/celebrities to build good public 
images, but on the other hand it is also in line with national policy requirements 
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and so reflects government influence. Chinese audiences were offered endless 
participatory opportunities as consumption after the show was broadcast, so that 
their participation in the manufacture of media artefacts would generate not 
only profit for media makers but also diversity in commercial culture, to 
generate a wider cultural phenomenon beyond the show.  
On the whole, this chapter suggests that all interactivities offer 
participation, but that not all participation can be interactive. While the 
television industry provides endless participatory opportunities to its audiences, 
this chapter argues that the Chinese television industry in fact produces an 
illusion of interactivity that is aimed at attracting engaged audiences for 
commercial profit. The recent growth of interactive opportunities through social 
media enhances the possibilities for audience engagement and conversation, but 
also increases the complexities of audience measurement. The television 
industry only offers Chinese audiences a vision of participation, rather than the 
real power proclaimed by the industry. The analysis in this chapter has 
demonstrated that Chinese audiences had no direct interactive power, as their 
engagement could not be woven into the narrative and content of TVoC (2012). 
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Chapter 5: Hierarchies within the ‘Weibosphere’  
‘There are clear hierarchies of power within the ‘Twittersphere’ with 
celebrities, journalists and ‘official’ accounts from organisations playing a 
very visible role in (re)circulating information and influencing debate, 
which must be recognised when we consider the claim for it being a 
democratic space where all can participate.’ 
– Ruth Deller (2011) 
 
5.1 Introduction  
While the first section of this research has analysed industry, regulation and 
interactivity (participation) in TVoC (2012), this second section will explore 
Chinese audiences’ engagement with TVoC (2012) on Sina Weibo. It will 
examine audience responses in relation to the TV industry’s official promotions, 
to stardom as a phenomenon in social media and to government control. There 
are two chapters in this section, examining audiences’ responses from two 
different aspects. This chapter will reveal the ways in which audiences 
responded to the official Weibo site for TVoC (2012), and will examine the 
importance of celebrity Weibo accounts within the ‘Weibosphere’. The next 
chapter in this section will then turn to the negative interpretive processes of 
Weibo audiences and users, despite the show’s reported actual successes. This 
aims to build towards a more balanced view of the reception of TVoC (2012).  
In order to investigate Chinese audiences’ reception of TVoC (2012), it 
is important to clearly understand the meaning which the title of the show has 
for them. The Chinese title ‘中国好声音’ (Zhongguo Hao Shengyin) translates 
directly into English as ‘China Good Voice’. This implies to the Chinese 
audience ideas of ‘the perfect voice to represent China’ and carries with it 
connections to certain CCP political ideologies.  
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In the era of social media, everyone can build up their own social 
networks online. The online discussions, images, videos, news and 
conversations posted on social sites can be regarded as user participation 
opportunities provided by social networks. Those user participations, both from 
the grassroots and from celebrities will have a certain influence on these 
platforms as well as in the ‘real’ world. In mainland China, social media 
platforms popular abroad, such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and others, are 
blocked by the Chinese government as they fear that ‘unfettered Internet access 
could undermine Communist Party rule’ (Lee, 2011). Hence, Sina Weibo, 
China’s most popular microblogging platform, operated by Sina Corp, has 
become a major social media platform that has huge influence in Chinese 
society. As stated by Sina CEO, Charles Chao, ‘The right way to enter this 
market was Weibo’s initial function, but now it is changing to become a 
platform that has a great need for people to communicate, to share among 
friends, among people who know each other’ (Lee, 2011). This chapter 
suggests that Sina Weibo is the most direct platform for reaching the Chinese 
public and the quickest way to communicate with Chinese audiences.  
In recent times, the simultaneous use of social media and smartphone 
apps while watching television programmes, and the idea of multi-screen 
viewing experiences, have given Chinese audiences more participatory 
platforms. Weibo, as a supplementary tool for television, provides people with 
opportunities for discussing all kinds of television programmes, interspersed 
with discussion of home and family life, work, the weather, current affairs and 
whatever they are watching at the time (Deller, 2011). In China, as elsewhere in 
the world, the combination of social networks, second screens and TV has 
given rise to a new relationship between viewers and television. Thus the 
traditional roles in the communication paradigm have been altered irrevocably. 
TV is no longer just a communication medium, but rather it actively 
involves its users and stimulates interpersonal communication in current 
Chinese society. New technologies and social media have extended 
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interpersonal communication beyond the boundaries of family, friends, and 
geographical regions, as Buschow, Schneider and Ueberheide have argued. 
They conclude that practitioners (Bulkeley, 2010; Ericsson ConsumerLab, 2011; 
Nielsen, 2011; Richardson, 2010) and researchers (Baillie, Fröhlich, and Schatz, 
2007; Chorianopoulos and Lekakos, 2008; Geerts, 2009; Schatz, Baillie, 
Fröhlich and Egger, 2008; Summa, 2011) propose the merging of television and 
social media technologies into the notion of ‘social TV’. They also explain that 
practitioners believe that networks and channels in particular can benefit from 
social TV ‘because users could return to linear TV driven by simultaneous 
communication in social media’ (Buschow, Schneider and Ueberheide, 2014, p. 
130). The promotional work done through social media is aimed at keeping 
audiences watching, and growing those audiences so that they can be ‘sold’ to 
advertisers. Exploring Weibo also provides a snapshot into the ways that 
television fans enhance their own viewing experiences using social media tools.  
The official Weibo site for TVoC offers Chinese audiences a platform to 
share their evaluations of the show and actors (judges), their expressions of 
fandom and their critiques of the contestants in the show. Here the question 
arises, how and to what extent did Chinese audiences respond to the 
promotional work done by Canxing Production on the official Weibo for TVoC 
(2012)? And what role did celebrity Weibo accounts play in this promotional 
process in generating more audiences? The activities of celebrity accounts in 
Weibo present a crucial secondary field of investigation in this question, 
because they illuminate the promotional strategies that Canxing Production 
used to promote TVoC (2012) on Weibo. While the industry operated the 
official Weibo for TVoC (2012), providing promotional information about the 
show and creating trending topics online, the communication and interaction 
between the official Weibo site and other celebrity accounts is also a crucial 
area of research in understanding audience engagement and participation. 
Hence, this chapter will also explore Weibo’s capabilities and impact on 
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celebrity discourse, by discussing how celebrity accounts were used and 
maintained by the industry to build up online communications and influences.  
Inevitably, issues of power relations arise in discussions of social media 
and audiences and these issues must be addressed. As Deller says, the 
hierarchies of power among celebrities, journalists and ‘official’ accounts from 
organisations play a visible role in (re)circulating information and influencing 
social media debates. In better understanding Chinese audiences, Weibo 
provides a potentially significant development in our understanding of 
audiences themselves, and of their relationships with media. Observing and 
measuring users’ engagement with TVoC (2012)’s Weibo provides a utility and 
value in exploring the relationships which develop between industrial 
organisations, celebrity accounts and grassroots audiences. In Chapter one, this 
thesis examined China’s specific political regulation of reality TV and its 
audiences and then pointed out that Weibo acts as a so-called ‘democratic space’ 
(Zhu and Yao, 2012). This aspect of Weibo’s offer attracts some of those 
people who are accustomed to a communist regime to express themselves using 
the apparent democracy that is displayed in the Weibo spaces. This is the 
reason that this chapter chooses to investigate Weibo in more detail.  
It is commonly felt in China that Weibo has the power to liberate 
Chinese audiences, allowing everyone to communicate freely. However, just as 
Deller (2011) argues in relation to the Twittersphere, not all Weibo users share 
the same levels of influence and power within the space. Consequently, the 
interest of this research is to uncover how Chinese audiences may participate 
and respond in different ways to those which the industry’s promotions invite 
and encourage, while simultaneously considering the emerging hierarchies of 
power relations among different groups of users. This chapter will suggest that 
celebrity accounts play a significant role in leading public opinion and 
influencing the discussions which take place within the Weibosphere. 
Nevertheless, grassroots users have been empowered by Weibo so that they can 
influence celebrity and media companies in return.  
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In 2015, the official Weibo site for TVoC had 1,858,881 followers and 
12,026 official posts. Through examining these Weibo posts, this chapter 
applies an online ethnography (Hills, 2002) approach to studying the 
hierarchies between users, and to exploring Chinese audiences’ engagement 
with TVoC (2012). The first season of TVoC was broadcast from 13 July 2012 
to 30 September 2012, but its official Sina Weibo site posted its first Weibo 
messages on 2 June 2012, meaning that the official promotion started one 
month before the show was aired. Posts made during this time period (from 2 
June to 30 September 2012) will be chosen as the research sample of Weibo 
discourses for this study.  
Before analysing audiences’ relationships to one another and to the 
show’s producers and favoured celebrity, this chapter will look at the ways in 
which Canxing Production maintained the official Sina Weibo site for TVoC 
(2012) between June and September 2012, and then will further explore how 
the industry encouraged people to talk about the show on Weibo. It will explore 
what types of messages were posted, and what themes or topics motivated 
audiences to share and discuss TVoC (2012) with others, especially while they 
were watching the show. To aid this analysis, this chapter particularly considers 
how users interacted with others, especially celebrities, in relation to the show.  
This chapter will then discuss audience responses to TVoC (2012) on 
Weibo during three periods of time: pre-broadcast (2 June–12 July 2012); early 
broadcast (13 July–17August 2012) and later broadcast (17 August–30 
September 2012). It will examine how Canxing Production promoted the show 
during these time periods and when and how celebrity accounts (e.g. the four 
judges’ Weibo accounts) were introduced in order to focus audience responses 
and participation. Only by looking at how fans responded (both positively and 
negatively) to this activity by the production company can we ascertain how 
successful the industry and the show were. Furthermore, the extent to which the 
success of the show was influenced by industry and user activity, and/or by the 
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Weibo accounts of celebrities, and other ‘opinion leaders’, can be investigated 
and evaluated. 
 
5.2 The use of Weibo by Canxing Production 
In mainland China, Sina Weibo is the most discussed and controversial social 
media site. According to the Sina Corporation annual report of 2011 it had 
more than 50 million active users per day, and 10 million newly registered 
users per month, A user profile on Sina Weibo displays the user’s name, a brief 
description of the user, their number of followers and the numbers of accounts 
they follow, and the number of Weibo posts they have made. Scholars, Asur, 
Yu and Huberman (2011), has identified two types of user accounts on Sina 
Weibo, regular user accounts and verified user accounts; by verified user 
account, he means one that typically represents a well-known public figure or 
organisation in China.  
Sina reported in its 2011 annual report that it had more than 60,000 
verified accounts, consisting of celebrities, sports stars, well-known 
organisations (both governmental and commercial) and other VIPs (Sina 
Corporation annual report, 2011). Among these verified accounts there were a 
total of 1,772 TV programmes registered on the official Weibo account in 
China in 2012. This is an example of the way in which TV programmes 
convergence with social media, in the interaction between them and social 
media sites such as Sina Weibo, through mutual promotions aimed at the 
development of each other’s interests.  
The interactive and participatory opportunities offered by Weibo seem 
to have been widely embraced by China’s media industry, alongside other 
online media options such as official websites, blogs, and online video channels 
(Youku, Tudou, Iqiyi and etc.). The media industry has managed Weibo as a 
promotional strategy, in order to make connections with Chinese audiences, 
where ‘the active attitude towards participating is seen as a basic and enduring 
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characteristic of audiences, not as something new and unique to the current 
media situation’ (Sundet and Ytreberg, 2009, p. 385). Weibo is a platform for 
various groups to come together, including celebrities, journalists, producers, 
writers, media organisations and the users of that media. As Murray (2004, p. 8) 
says, the industry shows an increasing willingness to ‘disseminate highly 
guarded production information and intellectual property in the interests of 
sophisticated viral marketing and audience development schemes’.  
Canxing Production managed the official Weibo site for TVoC to 
promote, lobby and win over a large audience, by providing audiences with 
information relevant to the show and participatory and interactive opportunities 
(as discussed and explored in the previous chapter) as the first step in the 
promotion process. More ambitiously, Canxing Production routinely displayed 
an official hashtag at the beginning of a post to encourage discussions, and to 
use the function of @someone to interact with other public figure’s Weibo 
accounts (including celebrities, producers, journalists, and media organisations) 
to build an online community. These activities were together intended to lead 
public opinion.  
Like Twitter, the homepage of Weibo shows a list of the top nine 
trending topics which is constantly updated, and allows a subset of participants 
to use hashtags (#) to mark posts topically, so that others can follow 
conversations centring on a particular topic (Boyd, Golder and Lotan, 2010). 
Users can create topics with a keyword in the content through the use of a 
hashtag in front and behind this keyword, for example, #The Voice of China#. 
Through this process, Weibo users can get a sense of the ‘hottest’ recent topics 
which other users have been discussing most frequently. Monitoring hashtags 
and keywords is also a way in which the industry can measure audience 
engagement and participation. For instance, the official Weibo for TVoC (2012) 
created many different hashtags in relation to the show during June 2012: #Gift 
from TVOC#(#好声音送好礼#), #TOVC contestants#(#好声音学员鉴赏#), #TVOC 
tabloid# (#好声音快报#), #TOVC Q&A# (#好声音有奖问答#), etc.  
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This was during the pre-promotion period, so these hashtags created by 
Canxing Production reflect certain themes and topics that the industry wanted 
audiences to know about the show and to discuss. This function meant that the 
Weibo could quickly gain public attention prior to the broadcasting of the first 
show. Using hashtags, messages and links can be circulated to millions of users 
within a few minutes. Similarly, current affairs and news stories are frequently 
and instantly being accessed by users. Another service of Sina Weibo is 
‘@someone’. As with Twitter, directed conversations can involve the use of the 
‘@user’ syntax to locate others and address messages to them (Boyd, Golder 
and Lotan, 2010). This allows the information sender to ensure that the person 
who they target using @user can see their message.  
The official Weibo site for TVoC (2012) between June and September 
2012, with its 1,861,667 followers, was one of the most popular Weibo 
accounts for a Chinese TV programme on the Weibo platform. As at 8 October 
2012, the online video for TVoC (2012) had reached 13 million views, while 
during the broadcasting period, online discussions on Weibo had reached over 
800,000 in number, with related trending topics raising this figure to 1.1 billion. 
Quantitative data shows that the two platforms for TVoC (2012), the TV 
programme itself and the Weibo account, complemented each other and helped 
the show to attract large audienceship and generate wider social influences. 
With over 1.1 billion relevant trending topics, the first season of TVoC was very 
successful and active in soliciting engagement with fans online. 
After examining the posts collected from the official Weibo site for 
TVoC for the period 2 June to 30 September 2012, it is apparent that Canxing 
Production maintained the official Weibo site for TVoC (2012) as a means of 
promoting the programme to other Weibo users, and encouraging them to 
watch and to interact with it. Before, during and after the show, many messages 
and a great deal of information were posted to exhort audiences to watch the 
programme on Zhejiang TV and on other online platforms. The promotional 
messages were all generally positive, with repeatedly emphasis on the purposes 
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and principles of TVoC, and explaining what ‘The Good Voice of China’ is and 
what the show was looking for.  
 
5.3 Pre-broadcast period (2 June–12 July 2012) 
Canxing Production had been promoting TVoC (2012) since the 2 June, one 
month before the show aired on 13July 2012. They posted more than 300 
Weibo messages during this time, in order to spread information about what 
TVoC (2012) was, the nature of its imported format, slogans, principles, and 
narrative. In doing so, the initial effort by Canxing Production was to provoke 
conversation about the show within the Weibosphere. However, at this stage, 
the promotional work done by Canxing Production was limited to some Weibo 
users and some pre-existing Weibo fans of the four coaches/judges.  
Compared to the other two time periods, the fewest number of Canxing 
Production-originated Weibo messages were posted during this pre-broadcast 
stage, and related comments and responses by audiences were the fewest as 
well. Interactive conversations between Canxing Production and audiences took 
the form of a Q&A process. Initially users were curious about the programme, 
perhaps knowing only that it was the Chinese version of The Voice. The official 
Weibo of TVoC (2012) responded to users with a mixture of commentary and 
responses to people’s questions posted at the official site: 
WuZhengyi: Can I participate in the show? 
TVOC: @WuZhengyi: Hello! The principle of our program is about 
 ‘only listen to good voice, we don't look at the appearance’! As long as 
 you are willing to show us your beautiful voice, you can join us. Please 
 pay attention to our website for more details. (19 June 2012, 16:16 p.m.) 
While answering questions from audiences, Canxing once again emphasised 
and promoted the purpose and value of TVoC. Furthermore, Canxing 
Production created a hashtag #The Voice Q&A# (#好声音 有奖问答#) for a 
series of Weibo posts that invited users to participate in the Q&A process. This 
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activity required participants to answer questions and repost on their own 
Weibo, using the function of @, to notify at least three of their friends (Weibo 
followers): 
‘Tomorrow is the time to win an iPad! Today’s question is a little bit hard. 
Everyone please look carefully. How long is each episode of The Voice of 
China?’ (28 June 2012, 18:36 p.m.) 
Almost every #The Voice Q&A# Weibo post would generate more than 500 
reposts and comments. This Q&A process created interactions between TVoC 
(2012)’s official Weibo and its followers, who could be the potential loyal 
audiences and fans of the show, and so further helped to get information about 
the show disseminated and promoted.  
In addition, during the pre-broadcast period some posts were not 
directly connected to the show itself. The content of such posts was irrelevant 
to the music, discussions of singing talent or the four coaches and celebrities. 
Audience’s responses could also be unconnected to official posts. During this 
time some users appeared to be more willing to engage with Weibo posts that 
were linked to the four coaches. These users tended to be pre-existing fans who 
had already been following the coaches’ Weibo sites. Canxing Production 
posted new Weibo using @‘celebrity name’, so the celebrity concerned would 
see this post immediately and would repost the message. Once they had 
reposted it, the followers of this celebrity account would receive the Weibo 
message as well. For instance: 
TVOC: ‘If you have a beautiful voice, if you want China to listen to your 
voice, if you need a tutor, then come to The Voice of China to make your 
dream come true. Join the group of coach Na Ying. @NaYing @NaYing 
fanclub’ (20 June 2012, 19:15 p.m.) 
NaYing fanclub: repost (June 20, 19:16 p.m.) 
Bluechouchou: @NaYing fanclub: repost (June 20, 19:36 p.m.)  
yixiaoerhuo iNY: repost (June 20, 22:09 p.m.) 
Through this ‘repost’ process, the original promotional information 
about TVoC was spread quickly. From the perspective of audiences, this 
promotional process can be seen as very limited and had little influence within 
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the Weibosphere. Limited information and limited receivers made the 
promotional work done by Canxing Production in the pre-broadcast period 
seems unsuccessful. However the accuracy of this assessment of its success 
depends upon an accurate reading of the purpose of Canxing Production in 
carrying out this activity; it could be seen as successful, if Canxing 
Production’s only aim was to create chains of communication that would 
continue to be used later on during the broadcasting of the show.  
 
5.4 Early broadcast period (13 July– 17 August 2012) 
Within a few hours of its first live broadcast on Zhejiang TV on 13 July 2012, 
TVoC (2012) immediately captured the Chinese audiences' attention and 
achieved a number one position in the national TV ratings. At the same time, 
the volume of discussions on Sina Weibo was increasing. Using a trending 
topic #The Voice of China launched# (#中国好声音开播#) and the ‘voice’ of a 
first person view, Canxing Production managed the official Weibo site for 
TVoC (2012) as an interactive platform for Chinese audiences: 
TVOC: #The Voice of China launched#: Countdown to 60 minutes! Can’t 
wait to share with you the true voice and the true music. Let’s create a 
different music festival, love you ... @Zhejiang TV China Blue, for more 
information, please visit http://voice.5ige.cn/ (13 July 2012, 20:16 p.m.) 
TVOC: # The Voice of China launched#: From Heilongjiang, only 24 
years old, do not be deceived by his beard. Couch Na Ying affectionately 
called him ‘Momo’, so close they are… then will he be one of her team? 
Please do lock down ‘The Voice of China’! Participate in interactive 
discussions at the official website. @ Zhejiang TV China Blue @ 5ige 
Original Music. (13 July 2012, 22:05 p.m.) 
The majority of audiences showed a positive attitude to the show in responding 
to the official posts and their discussions are mainly concentrated on the 
fairness of the blind auditions, the humour and sincerity of the four judges, and 
the touching stories of the contestants. Through these texts Chinese audiences 
showed their affirmation and support of the show itself. In particular, it was the 
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blind auditions and the spinning chairs which made TVoC (2012) different and 
refreshing for Chinese audiences.  
The four coaches/judges, Liu Huan(刘欢), Yu Chengqing(庾澄庆), Na 
Ying(那英) and Yang Kun(杨坤), who were all famous recording artists in 
China, actually went out and recruited good singers, listened to the contestants 
in spinning chairs facing away from the stage so as to avoid seeing them, and 
thus judging them only by their voices. In addition the criteria used to choose 
the mentors/judges were the same as in the versions of the show aired in other 
countries. According to South China Morning Post (2012), the four judges 
needed to be celebrity artists, often including one influential figure from the 
music industry, one grassroots singer, one designed to attract young audiences 
and one female. Canxing Production followed the imported format precisely; 
however, audiences discussed this format and the narrative of the show in 
regarding to fairness and vocal ability: 
Sean-Chenxiaoyu: I missed the live show yesterday, now watching the 
rebroadcast. The show really looks good, even the tears of judges  and 
contestants are so real and touching! (14 July 2012, 17:46 p.m.) 
Beau-beit: I completely love the spinning chairs!! (14th July 2012, 12:10 
p.m.) 
Sheyingshi-Zixian: it really has sincerity…let more grassroots dreams 
come true… how exciting. (14th July 2012, 20:17 p.m.) 
From the above discourses, it is clear that audiences articulated their reasons for 
their love of the show in relation to their personal feelings and life experiences. 
To some extent, this reveals fans’ emotional bonds between themselves, and 
others in a modern, mediated world (Gray and Harrington, 2007).  
Like most reality talent shows, the contestants remained the central 
focus of audiences’ attention and discussion. On Sina Weibo, the vast majority 
of fans seemed to have their own personal ‘idol’. Either because of contestants’ 
real talent, or because of their experiences and stories, fans could always find a 
resonance with their ‘idol’ and show them their support.  
jessicaOhu: Like this innocent little girl (Xu Haixin), and her explosive 
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power, [good] Good night friends. (14 July 2012, 00:35 a.m.) 
nayang de Qinchun: her voice is special and such a cool personality. 
Support our Dongbei Girl (Wu Mochou). (28 July 2012, 11:49 a.m.) 
The resonance between fans and contestants enabled conversations among 
TVoC’s Weibo which occurred asynchronously and outside geographic 
constraints, but they were still typically bounded by a reasonably well-defined 
group of participants in some sort of shared social context (Boyd, Golder and 
Lotan, 2010). Fans were actively interacting with others who shared similar 
interests and backgrounds. They interacted and engaged with each other on 
Weibo, answering questions for one another, and discussing the same topics. 
Through these practices, their online conversations bound them to watching the 
show in real time in order to keep up with the rest of the community on Weibo. 
This is referred to as ‘just-in-time fandom’, by Matt Hills (2002, p. 10). Hills 
describes ‘just-in-time fandom’ a result of a techno-evolution towards fuller 
‘interactivity’, in which fans go online to discuss new episodes immediately 
after the episodes’ transmission times – and even during advertising breaks. 
New media technology enables Chinese audience to share their speculations, 
commentaries, thoughts and questions, as in many other countries. Debates 
should now not only focus on the quality of fan engagement, but also on the 
timing of fan responses (Hills, 2002). 
Interestingly, it seems that Chinese audiences were highly interested in 
the four coaches (Liu Huan, Yu Chengqing, Na Ying and Yang Kun) and their 
performances in the show. For instance, @Juejiang de Luobo posted:  
This summer, I am obsessed with The Voice of China… it attracted my 
attention even more than the Olympic Games. I love the affinity of Liu 
Huan, the openness of Na Ying, the humour of Yu Chengqing, and the 
sensibility of Yang Kun. I love you all… and all the good voices and 
talent made me a loyal audience member!’ (28 August, 22:20 p.m.)  
With specific analysis and expressions about the performative personae of 
coaches, this fan also engaged with the original Weibo posted by TVoC (2012), 
as though speaking to another user online. For example, @Smile-dodo said:  
Suddenly feel I was moved by TVoC. Lots of famous stars may not be 
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able to render that kind of mood in a song... Suddenly feel @Yang Kun is 
so sensitive and soft, liked it.’ (20 July 2012, 23:00 p.m.)  
Through ‘@Yang Kun’, fans are willingly making an interactive 
communication directly with the celebrity, although the celebrity may not 
respond to this Weibo message.  
The performative personae of the four coaches appears real, direct and 
authentic to audiences, and Sina Weibo offers audiences/fans a platform where 
they feel they might be able to have interpersonal communication with them. 
The changing relationship between celebrities and their followers within the 
Weibosphere reflects the ‘intercommunicative dimension of online social 
networks’ (Marshall, 2010, p. 43). However, this changing relationship does not 
represent a shift into a new realm of star interactions, but rather an evolution of 
existing frameworks that reflect new convergence and technologies, as Thomas 
(2013) suggests. 
This chapter has examined, and suggested a ‘failure’ of, Canxing 
Production’s attempts to promote the show though Weibo during the pre-
broadcast period. However, in the early broadcast period, the celebrities’ Weibo 
did make a significant contribution to the success of TVoC (2012)’s promotion. 
With the programme launched, more and more topics were created for 
audiences to discuss on Weibo. Many celebrities, as opinion leaders, 
participated in the discussions of those topics and these encouraged more 
interactive communication with audiences.  
For instance, Yao Chen, a Chinese rising star, with more than 77 million 
Weibo followers, commented on her Weibo site: ‘The Voice of China refined 
the most valuable things in life… positive, optimistic, sincere, and brave’ (16 
July 2012, 01:53 a.m.) and ‘I have a serious question, when will the judges 
change their clothes?’ (28 July 2012, 00:16 a.m.). One simple question shows 
her concern with TVoC (2012) and in return this post generated more 12 
thousand audience responses. In another example, the Chinese–American 
singer, Li Wen also reposted a Weibo message about TVoC (2012) to show her 
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support for the show. Other celebrities followed the official Weibo site for 
TVoC (2012) and interacted with it, including Feng Xiaogang (film director), 
Zhang Liangying (singer), Li Xiang (famous presenter), Wang Luodan (actor), 
Yang Kun (actor) and Wu Peng (swimming athlete).  
The popularity of TVoC (2012) was reinforced by celebrities’ 
engagement within the Weibosphere, and in particular by their pre-existing fans. 
Together they led to new explorations of information-sharing and discussions. 
Furthermore, Weibo users could generate the desire to search for and share 
information about TVoC (2012) when they saw relevant Weibo posted by their 
celebrity ‘idol’ or by other public figures they followed.  
The show became more popular as fans of the celebrities became aware 
of the presence of these celebrities on Weibo, and their interaction with TVoC 
(2012). Celebrities’ engagement with the show not only accelerated the speed 
of information transmission and expanded the scope of influences, it also added 
great value to the information itself. Hence, during the initial broadcast time of 
TVoC (2012), the show quickly generated rising public awareness through the 
influences of celebrity promotion, and further user comments and reposts of 
celebrity Weibo messages followed.  
In addition, TVoC (2012), as a music talent show, created new stars 
during the early broadcast period. Contestants from the show registered their 
own Weibo sites during the broadcasts, and gathered growing numbers of 
followers and fans. When they interacted with TVoC (2012)’s Weibo account, 
and reposted and commented on the official site, those rising stars also 
generated more power in leading public opinion. And in the early broadcast 
period, almost all fans were relatively neutral or positive about TVoC (2012) 
and its content. When viewed in this way, it is obvious to see that grassroots 
audiences did not share the same power and influence as celebrities and public 
figures in the Weibosphere. The managed interaction between Canxing 
Production’s TVoC Weibo and the celebrities’ Weibo formed a powerful force 
within the Weibosphere that led to the generation of public opinion and 
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discussions. And indeed Canxing Production has successfully attracted more 
audiences and Weibo followers through maintaining the official Weibo site for 
TVoC. However, this relationship within the Weibosphere rarely lasts forever 
and in this case it soon changed during the later broadcast period. The next 
section of this chapter will explain how audiences’ attitudes and discussions 
changed during the later broadcast period.  
 
5.5 Later broadcast period (17 August–30 September 2012) 
In Yu and Asur’s work (2011), the key topics that trend on Sina Weibo are 
examined, and then contrasted with the authors’ observations of Twitter. They 
state that, compared to a global social network such as Twitter, where trends 
seem to largely relate to current global events and news stories, China’s Weibo 
trends are created almost entirely from reposts of media content such as jokes, 
images and videos. Their argument is not entirely correct with regard to Weibo 
and its users, however. In fact current news frequently leads to trending online 
discussions on Weibo, especially when considering TVoC as an example. 
This section will explore how fans articulated their responses to 
negative news about TVoC (2012) reported during the later broadcast period. 
Jenkins and Deuze have identified that the ‘democratisation’ of media use 
brings: 
‘a broadening of opportunities for individuals and grassroots communities 
to tell stories and access stories others are telling, to present arguments 
and listen to arguments made elsewhere, to share information and learn 
more about the world from a multitude of other perspectives’ (Jenkins and 
Deuze, 2008, p. 6). 
Thus this section will analyse audiences’ responses to find out whether Weibo 
has functioned as a ‘democratic space’ which has empowered Chinese 
audiences and consequently changed the power relations between audiences, 
industry and celebrities in the Weibosphere.   
Audiences often interpreted and understood the show and its wider 
contexts through their own experiences, and likened them to their self-identities. 
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After almost every episode, new topics about TVoC (2012) (many of them 
initiated by Canxing) would emerge on the Weibosphere, catching users’ 
attention and generating discussions. However, especially during the later 
broadcast period (after the blind auditions), there were more negative news 
reports generated about TVoC, both online and offline. Some of the negative 
news was claimed to be industrial marketing hype, and some was sought out by 
audiences and reported to the Weibo site. No matter how real the news was or 
not, a larger volume of Weibo discussions was in fact generated about TVoC 
(2012) at this stage than in the early broadcast period.  
It not hard to find intense online discussions of TVoC (2012) on the 
Weibosphere which also include social issues, especially when those 
discussions included the participation of celebrities and public figures. Stories 
from Weibo discussions then started to be regularly featured in mainstream 
news outlets (Deller, 2011). For instance, news service websites such as 
Xinhuanet and Chinanews wrote that they could ‘reveal the secret of coaches’ 
clothing’, reflecting back on the previously quoted celebrity Yao Chen’s Weibo 
regarding the judges’ never-changing outfits. This indicates that the celebrity 
and public figures’ Weibo had become the sources for mainstream news outlets, 
providing them with entertainment news stories. Likewise, mainstream news 
outlets also used responses from Canxing Production and audiences to the 
TVoC Weibo as supplemental evidence and discourse to support their reports.  
In addition, discussions on Weibosphere were seen to have impacts on 
the television programme and its content. Because Chinese audiences widely 
discussed negative news, rumours and controversies about the show on the 
Weibosphere, Canxing Production had to react to this. It issued statements to 
clarify relevant facts, and provided short clips of interviews with involved 
celebrities and contestants. Canxing Production even responded to these within 
the show, thereby creating a good public image. While media industries were 
‘manufacturing consent’ by enabling participation, and seeking to contain and 
control the emerging power of new knowledge cultures, the power of audiences, 
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derived from their pooled knowledge from diverse backgrounds, should not be 
neglected. It is the media outlets which have the power to define and control the 
meanings of the show, but the audiences have now played a part in influencing 
this process. 
After the last blind audition, audiences started to question the sincerity 
and fairness of TVoC (2012) on Weibo. On 24 August 2012, a list of 
contestants to go to the final rounds of TVoC was posted (or leaked) on the 
Internet. Although fans felt disappointed about the spoiler, the volume of online 
discussions at Weibo increased as more people became interested in the issues 
of authenticity and fairness. This incident then triggered a large-scale 
discussion and argument online. In addition, some fans began to investigate the 
‘real’ identities and occupations of contestants and coaches, and then to expose 
them on Weibo. For instance, user Biguanyeji (稗官野记) revealed the Taiwanese 
coach Yu Chengqing’s birth and family history: his ancestral home was in 
Yunnan province; his grandfather is a warlord and he has a politician father. 
Some 3,738 Weibo users reposted and commented upon this revelation.  
These revelations then evolved into discussions of complex political 
issues between Taiwan and mainland China. Sensitive political topics and 
social issues, such as the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, 
always get Chinese online users more engaged in online discussion. This is not 
to suggest that a certain type of online discussion would invariably lead to a 
celebrity response on Weibo. However, in this case, Yu Chengqing had to 
personally respond, and so commented on Biguanyeji’s Weibo that: 
This means I travelled from Taipei to Kunming to go to high school every 
day? I was born in Taiwan! Before the age of 25 I never left Taiwan! (20 
July 2012, 01:16 a.m.) 
This example shows a direct interaction between Yu and Biguanyeji on Weibo. 
Yu Chengqing, as the more powerful figure on Weibo, was challenged and 
influenced by users’ online discussions. This shows the power of the users, in 
that they were able to learn how to master different media technologies to 
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‘bring the flow of media more fully under their control and to interact (and co-
create) with other users’ (Jenkins and Deuze, 2008, p. 8).  
In the promotional process for TVoC (2012) on Weibo, Canxing 
Production tried to widely spread the show’s relevant information and content 
across the Internet. In this way, it expanded its revenue opportunities, 
broadened media markets, and reinforced consumer loyalties and commitments. 
The producer provided advertisers with opportunities for new ways to 
incorporate publicity within shows. For example, the colour red element in 
TVoC (2012) reminded Chinese audiences of the main local sponsor Jiaduobao 
(a herbal tea), as in the Netherlands this colour element subtly refers to 
Vodafone.  
Through making use of product placement, or explicitly placing logos 
on the screen, the show and sponsor indeed drew the attention of Chinese 
audiences and consumers. In response, audiences expressed a great deal of 
resentment related to the ‘over-commercialisation’ debate. Generally, Chinese 
audiences had very strong anti-commercial feelings and responses towards the 
show. Internet users mocked the host of the show, Hua Shao, as a ‘salesman of 
tea (Jiaduobao)’ and ‘the tongue of China’ for his fast-talking presenting of a 
long advertisement for Jiaduobao in 40 seconds. The official Weibo site for 
TVoC (2012) posted a message to describe Hua Shao,  
TVOC: #The Voice of China# Hua Shao is one of the best presenters 
from Zhejiang TV. He also dabbled in many other fields such as creative 
literary, film, drama, musical, director, etc. A great number of TV viewers 
see him as a mighty host. Participate in the official interactive discussions. 
@ Zhejiang TV China Blue @ 5ige Original Music.@Xinlannet @Jieliya 
(31 August 2012, 20:54 p.m.) 
In response 91 Weibo users reposted this message and responded with 156 
comments. Most of these comments were hostile to this official promotional 
description of Hua Shao: 
weifeng-zhiliang：extremely don’t like him!!! Please repost (31 August 
2012, 20:55 p.m.) 
gudansongruanmianbaodian: why doesn’t he become a behind-the-scenes 
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worker, as he has so many talents? (31 August 2012, 20:56 p.m.) 
longxiaqianchen: he is the biggest failure of the show…. (31 August 2012, 
21:07 p.m.) 
red—zheng: too many advertisement, a bit overdone (31 August  2012, 
 21:32 p.m.) 
This three main sections of this chapter have discussed Chinese audience 
responses to TVoC (2012) at Weibo during three periods of time: pre-broadcast, 
early broadcast and later broadcast. The first explored how Canxing Production 
set up its Weibo account one month before TVoC (2012) aired to promote the 
show and enhance the visibility of the programme online. Through this strategy, 
Canxing Production created chains of communication that would continue to be 
used later when the show was being broadcast. However, the limited 
information spread, numbers of followers and influence within the 
Weibosphere all demonstrated that the promotional work done by Canxing 
Production in the pre-broadcast period appeared to be ‘unsuccessful’. Counter 
to this view, this chapter then introduced the importance of celebrities’ Weibo 
account.  
This chapter has revealed the shifting relationships between media 
products within the Weibosphere. The hierarchies among the Weibosphere are 
based on the reality of users’ offline lives. In this it differs from the Baidu 
Tieba community, in which the hierarchies of the fan community are based on 
fan engagement and audience consumption, and constant renegotiations of the 
power between industry, celebrity and audience. In the next section of this 
thesis, Chapter 7 will explore TVoC (2012)’s Baidu Tieba fan community in 
detail.  
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Chapter 6: Critical audiences of The Voice of 
China (2012): beyond anti-fandom 
 
‘Dislike is as potentially powerful an emotion and reaction as is like.’ 
- Jonathan Gray (2003)  
  
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explored how Chinese audiences actively responded to 
the industry promotion of TVoC (2012) through the social media platform Sina 
Weibo. Weibo allows its users (audiences/fans) a chance to interact with 
celebrities with the illusion of intimacy, and to effectively organise and 
mobilise active groups. It also explored the relationship between Canxing 
Production, celebrities and audiences within the Weibosphere with regard to the 
managed promotional work done by Canxing. Through the analyses of three 
time periods, it was revealed that Chinese audiences’ response during the later 
broadcast time were critical and negative towards TVoC (2012), as well as 
describing and discussing social controversies and issues arising from the show. 
The audiences’ engagements were not only linked to the show and the 
contestants and celebrities involved, but also to the wider socio-political 
situation with respect to government regulation and intervention, China’s 
political system, and industry promotion. The aim of this chapter is to build 
towards a more balanced view of the reception of TVoC (2012), looking at the 
negative interpretive processes of Weibo audience/users, which arose despite 
the show’s reported actual successes.  
Thus, this chapter will explore how and in what ways audiences 
criticised TVoC on Sina Weibo, focusing on the emergence of multiple critical 
voices within the fandom and how these appeared, spread and helped to 
generate new kinds of audience engagement with the show. To be more specific, 
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my interest here is to find out how audiences resist, and what they are being 
critical about, while further investigating what kinds of communities Chinese 
audiences constructed when they were critical on Weibo. From the realm of 
communication studies, there are two contradictory views about users being 
actively and critically engaging on Weibo (mainly referring to Sina Weibo) in 
China. On the one hand, some scholars have emphasised the censored and 
surveilled nature of the online environment of China. Thus, many studies have 
been conservative about user participations and expressions, and have turned 
their focus to how the government monitors people's uses of the Internet in 
general as well its watch of specific terms and websites (Jiang, 2014).  
 On the other hand, some scholars (Leibold, 2011; Esarey and Xiao, 
2008; Yang, 2009) give focus on the use of Weibo and its effects on citizens' 
political attitudes and behaviours. They claim that Sina Weibo, as well as the 
Internet, could potentially enable and facilitate a civic culture in the 
authoritarian state of China (Chan, Wu, Hao, Xi and Jin, 2012) as users freely 
express opinions about government and politics on Weibo. Some of them even 
consider Weibo as a contributor to China’s democratic progress that is bringing 
‘a broadening of opportunities for individuals and grassroots communities to 
tell stories and access stories others are telling, to present arguments and listen 
to arguments made elsewhere, to share information and learn more about the 
world from a multitude of other perspectives’, mirroring the processes Jenkins 
and Deuze (2008) have observed in a democratic Western cultural background.  
However, this chapter suggests a different view from which to explore 
and examine critical audiences, in not only seeing such Weibo users as political 
activism. The followers of TVoC (2012)’s Weibo site are potentially fans or 
anti-fans of the show and celebrities (including the four judges and popular 
contestants). This chapter is going to explore and understand the critical 
audiences’ responses to and engagements with TVoC (2012), addressing the 
notion of ‘anti-fandom’ (Gray, 2003). As Gray (2003) points out, fans and anti-
fans share similarities in that they are audiences who like or dislike a 
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personality, content or artefact, keep up-to-date with news and social media and 
make time to express their positive and negative views. However, anti-fans, are 
those who strongly dislike a given text or genre, considering it inane, stupid, 
morally bankrupt and/or aesthetically poor.  
It is not necessary and not the intention of this chapter to divide 
audiences of TVoC (2012) simply as fans and anti-fans, or non-fans. It suggests 
the while they watch the show, audiences could have both positive (like) and 
negative (dislike) feelings in concert with the show and its contestants, or 
beyond the show’s content itself. But by being critical and negatively 
expressing opinions towards TVoC (2012) on the Weibosphere, audiences seem 
to have more influence and agency within the Weibo community, as the power 
generated by them is neither industry led nor in the hands of Chinese 
government. Audiences’ engagements with TVoC (2012) on Weibo indeed have 
contributed to the success and prosperity of the show; even the bad publicity 
created was good for the popularity ratings of the show. Aside from this ‘no 
news is bad news’ aspect, most audiences’ critical and negative/dislike 
emotions towards the show are not welcomed by industry promoters. It is not 
like the phenomenon Annette Hill (2012) has examined – the anti-fandom of 
professional wrestling – where the negative emotional engagement is vocal, 
energising, fun and passionate, and welcomed by industry.  
Following the methodology of the last chapter, in which online 
ethnography about audiences’ responses to and engagements with TVoC (2012) 
is explored, this chapter will mainly focus on the later broadcast time period, 24 
August - 30 September 2012, exploring critical comments from Chinese 
audiences on the official Weibo site for TVoC (2012), which had 1,858,881 
followers and 12,026 Weibo messages at this time. Divided into four key 
sections, this chapter has four key aims. First, section one and two will explore 
the negative comments and audience criticism of TVoC (2012) on Weibo, 
investigating what texts (and which particular episodes) they disliked and how 
such texts were formed and their sources. Gray (2003) has highlighted the 
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importance of studying media textualities as we study media audiences. My 
interest here moves on to look at certain groups and communities of anti-fans 
on Weibo, rather than focusing on individual’s interpretations of texts and their 
negative emotions. The chains of conversation between anti-fans are examined 
hereafter in this chapter to reveal critical discourses. Section three then looks at 
issues of over-commercialisation as claimed by audiences and will explore how 
audiences resist the ‘over-commercialisation’ phenomenon on the Internet. It 
draws on theories of distinction and taste (Bourdieu, 1984), and in particular 
discusses issues around taste and authenticity when audiences criticise 
commercialisation. Finally, section four will contribute to work on TVoC (2012) 
as a media phenomenon by focusing on how SAPPRFT and government 
regulations were critiqued by anti-fans on Weibo. Through responding to a 
reality show, Chinese audiences are actually expressing their wider political 
interests and attitudes. 
   
6.2 Fans and anti-fans 
This chapter uses the fans and anti-fans theory of Annette Hill and Jonathan 
Gray’s that features in Hill’s work. The concept of the anti-fan is another 
crucial development in fan studies, and is one which Jenkins (1996) and Hills 
(2003) have covered in some detail. In essence, the anti-fan is seen as a core 
component in the overall matrix of fan identity, thus expressions of distaste for 
a certain media text have a broader socio-cultural purpose than simply the 
venting of a point of view. Rather, as Jenkins and Hills have both observed, 
anti-fans will often engage in great depth with the very texts which they 
ostensibly dislike. This engagement can take a variety of forms, and appear 
across a variety of platforms (blogging, tweeting, word-of-mouth, podcasts and 
so on). Jonathan Gray (2003) and Cornel Sandvoss (2005) argue that to fully 
understand what it means to interact with texts we must also examine anti-fans, 
rather than simply focusing on and categorising fan activities as forms of 
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resistance. The articulation of anti-fandom has come to occupy a significant 
portion of the subcultural mediasphere, through which numerous subcultural 
phenomena are connected by online media, thus aggregating into a broader, 
decentralised community.  
Recent fan studies and cultural studies research into the idea of anti-
fandom can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s, specifically in regard to the 
idea of ‘sub-cultural capital’ put forward in Sarah Thornton’s works on club 
culture in Club Cultures: Music, Media, and Subcultural Capital (1996). In this 
text, Thornton moves away from Bourdieu’s ideas of cultural capital, positing 
her own idea of subcultural capital which serves as a mode of resistance to 
mainstream culture. The important critical progression, here, is that Thornton 
applies the general principles at play in Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital to 
those who exist outside the dominant culture: the marginalised or niche. 
According to Thornton, subcultural capital is associated with a kind of identity 
construct configured in opposition to the dominant social codes which surround 
music and club life. As an example, subcultural capital is directly connected 
with a rejection of the (mainstream) music industry’s formations of authenticity 
and status. Indeed, a direct rejection of dominant culture is a key component in 
subcultural capital, in that individuals accrue status precisely by rejecting the 
conventions of status offered up by the recording industry. UK club-goers, 
Thornton argues, forge identities oriented around music which are crafted in 
negation of the recording industry’s dominant tropes. Through the application 
of Boudieu’s notion of taste and cultural capital, and Thornton’s subcultural 
capital, to anti-fandom we can identify a connection between all the academics 
mentioned above. A principle connecting component is the theme of symbolic 
resistance, particular inasmuch as cultural practices may be employed in ways 
which articulate positions of resistance to the dominant culture.  
 TVoC (2012) achieved extraordinary commercial success and popularity 
in China, however its audiences were clearly struggling to negotiate between 
the position of fans and anti-fans during the show’s broadcast. On the Weibo 
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page of TVoC (2012), there was a wealth of fan material that discussed the 
show with clearly positive voices, but others were more negative and critical in 
their judgements. As observed in the last chapter, those negative voices 
emerged on Weibo mostly during the later broadcasting time period, 24 August 
to 30 September 2012. TVoC (2012) in total had 14 episodes, categorised into 
three sections: the blind auditions (13 July–17 August 2012), the battle rounds 
(24 August–14 September) and the knockout rounds (21 September–30 
September). The contestants who successfully passed the blind auditions went 
through to the battle rounds, where singers from each of the four teams were 
put into pairs and performed against each other in a mock boxing ring. The 
other three coaches were also given opportunities to express opinions and 
suggestions, helping the mentor to identify the competition and cut their team 
of 12 contestants to just four.  
Within this competition-based narrative, the setting of a mock boxing 
ring during the battle rounds is particularly interesting. For the producer, such a 
setting was used to add on-stage effects and to increase the competitive 
atmosphere. For the audience, there was undoubtedly a dilemma around 
alternative choices, as they needed to give support to the contestant they liked 
and be actively against the others simultaneously. During this time period, 
audiences actively played the role of being fans and anti-fans at the same time 
on Weibo, displaying their intense emotional engagement in opposition to each 
other, expressing their feelings of like and dislike for the show and the 
contestants.  
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Figure 3. Mock boxing ring of the battle rounds of TVoC (2012) 
In her article Annette Hill (2014) analysed and explored different types 
of labours involved in live wrestling events, where spectators switched roles 
between performing as a fan and an anti-fan. For Hill (2014), audiences’ 
expressions of passion towards sports entertainment is the key point, and can 
include both negative and positive emotions. Fans and anti-fans put on a show, 
taking up alternating positions so that they can revel in controlled chaos. In the 
case of TVoC (2012), the mock boxing ring during the battle rounds hence 
produced and heightened in audiences a balance of tension and excitement, and 
then live emotional engagements were strongly encouraged on Weibo. This 
created in Weibo a similar type of space to those found in live wrestling events. 
For example, there were intense discussions of audiences on Weibo in response 
to the ninth episode of TVoC (2012), the battle rounds from mentor Na Ying’s 
team, on 7 September 2012. The official Weibo page of TVoC (2012) posted 
nearly 60 Weibo at the same time as the show was being broadcast on Zhejiang 
TV. Eight of them were about the contestant Liang Bo, a 21-year-old man from 
Na Ying's team, who won the championship in the first season of TVoC; and 
Huang Yong, Liang’s opponent, who was the owner of an independent nail art 
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shop. Looking at certain groups of Liang and Huang’s fans and anti-fans on 
Weibo, and exploring the chains of conversation between them, it is not hard to 
see that audiences switched between the position of fan and anti-fan constantly. 
Those who acted as anti-fans engaged as much as the fans. This can fit with 
what Matt Hills has called ‘just-in-time-fandom’, where fans ‘go online to 
discuss new episodes immediately after the episode’s transmission time – or 
even during ad-breaks – perhaps in order to demonstrate the ‘timeliness’ and 
responsiveness of their devotion’ (Hills, 2002, p.178). 
The official Weibo page of TVoC (2012) updated Weibo in a timely 
fashion to introduce audiences to the competition happening in real time on 
Zhejiang TV, including which contestants and songs would be airing. Each 
Weibo generated nearly 1,000 comments, with one even gathering more than 
2,000 comments. One particular Weibo called out its audiences to participate in 
the discussion and to speculate about the winner of the contest between Liang 
Bo and Huang Yong: 
TVOC: #The Voice of China# Liang Bo vs Huang Yong, on the sixth 
group of contestants from Na Ying’s team, who will be better tonight? 
Zhegjiang satellite TV is now broadcasting! Participate in the official 
interactive discussion. @Zhejiang TV China Blue @5ige Original Music. 
@Xinlan net @Jieliya (7 September 2012, 22:15p.m.) 
Most of the audience members who responded to this Weibo and reposted it did 
so by answering to the question with a ‘shout out’ of Liang Bo or Huang 
Yong’s name. In the meantime, many fans of Liang Bo switched to being active 
anti-fans of Huang Yong, and critically judged Huang as: 
 Dumaomaobobo: too artificial and exaggerated, he is a Beijing singer not 
some nail art boss, so fake. (07 September 2012, 22:18 p.m.) 
Keerdodo: @Dumaomaobobo Huang Yong has overdone the 
performance, he was  imitating all the time… (07 September 2017, 
22:18 p.m.) 
Qiuxiaju: too many skills overshadowing his voice (07 September 2017, 
22:19 p.m.) 
DreamingMZ: @Qiuxiaju: this is rock and roll. You know nothing! (07 
September 2012, 22:24 p.m.) 
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Yongyi: @DreamingMZ you don’t need to be hysterical all the time to 
rock and roll (07 September 2012, 22:24 p.m.) 
Here, fans switched to being anti-fans as a support for their existing fan object. 
Anti-fans critically judged Huang Yong’s performance and talent rather than 
his personality. They treated him as an anti-object and a text that they could 
symbolically rework. Many examples can be found on Weibo, such as like the 
conversation between @qiuxiaju, @DreamingMZ and @Yongyi presented 
above. In facilitating this process, Weibo’s functions @ and #hashtag allowed 
audiences, fans and anti-fans to be more visible to each other. Through their 
conversations against each other and expressing negative engagements, they 
were communicating and sharing with each others, which brought them 
enjoyment and fun.  
Fans and anti-fans, by being critical about certain episodes, contestants 
or mentors, together tried to make themselves as visible as possible, not only to 
each other, but also to the online audience as a whole, to the celebrities and to 
TVoC (2012). Moreover, spectators not only switched roles between performing 
as a fan and an anti-fan. Some fans/anti-fans could move from one fan object to 
another, while retaining an interest in both objects, rather than discarding one 
and replacing it with another.  
 
6.3 Anti-fans and negative news reports 
In Yu and Asur’s work (2011), the authors examine the key topics that trend on 
Sina Weibo and contrast them with their observations of Twitter. They found 
out that, compared to a global social network such as Twitter, on China’s 
Weibo, trends are created almost entirely from reposts of media content such as 
jokes, images and videos. In contrast Twitter trends seem to have more to do 
with current global events and news stories (Asur, Huberman, Szabo, and Wang, 
2011). However, their argument is not entirely correct with regard to Weibo 
and its users. In fact current news reports frequently lead to online discussions 
on Weibo, especially if taking TVoC (2012) as an example. During the later 
 149 
 
broadcast period, negative news reports about TVoC (2012) emerged. As the 
show aired, some contestants grew in popularity, attracting vast numbers of 
fans, and in consequence they also received higher social attention and interest. 
Media news outlets treated some contestants like celebrities, reported their 
personal lives and careers, and there was some invasion of their privacy. Such 
contestants as Li Daimo, Xu Haixin and Jike Junyi all experienced problematic 
situations resulting from ‘being exposed on the Internet’.  
Most of these negative news reports then became the trending topics on 
Weibo and created chaos in the boisterous Weibo space where various opinions 
could be amplified. But what is more interesting here are audiences’ responses 
to negative news, especially the anti-fans’ critical views and behaviour. Here, 
those who hated TVoC (2012), responded in a particular way which was called 
renrou sousuo (人肉搜索) and translates to ‘human flesh searches’. Playing the 
role of online vigilante justice, some ‘netizens’ track down and punish people 
who have attracted their dislike, anger, and wrath. Their goal is to make the 
targets’ lives a misery, shamed by public judgement, according to Daily Mail 
(2014) 
In the case TVoC (2012), several contestants became ‘human flesh’ 
sought out by furious netizens for exposure on Weibo. Take contestant Li 
Daimo as example: he rose to fame after he sang Wanting Qu's You Exist in My 
Song (Wo De Ge Sheng Li) in the blind audition and was selected to joint 
mentor Liu Huan’s team. On 27 August 2012, Weibo user Yikeludan (一颗卤蛋) 
posted a Weibo including his photo with Li Daimo, speaking in the tone of Li’s 
boyfriend: 
Yikeludan: My ex-boyfriend, we were in a good relationship before, Now 
he is famous, we broke up, Fuck you. @Li Daimo  
His Weibo soon generated lots of online discussions. Other netizens also 
engaged with these ‘human flesh searches’ using their own knowledge and 
perceptions. They had guessed Li Daimo was gay because they had researched 
him online and discovered this information, as exemplified in the following 
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posts reproduced by a news outlet: ‘he followed many Weibo accounts/users 
who are homosexual’, ‘the bear T-shirt he wore when he sang You Exist in My 
Song is a very popular one among the homosexual community’ (China News, 
2012). Anti-fans’ practices such as these indicate the potential joy and pleasure 
they experience when discussing gossip and rumours relating to fan objects. 
Through this collective work, anti-fans were building groups and communities 
attached not to the original show, but to a new fan object of hatred. 
Jonathan Gray (2003) identified anti-fans though looking at certain 
aspects of shows that fans dislike, such as:  
audiences having previously watched the show and having found it 
intolerable; to having a dislike for its genre, director or stars; to having 
seen previews or ads, or seen or heard unfavourable reviews (Gray, 2003).  
He also suggested that anti-fandom is disruptive on many levels, and it remains 
an amorphously defined, highly pathologised, and is an easily dismissed blind 
spot in fan studies (Gray, 2003). I argue that renrou sousuo (human flesh 
searches) are a particular and excessive way of practicing anti-fandom in 
mainland China. Rather than dismissing one of the fan objects or switching 
between fan and anti-fan roles, there was a particular audience group, who may 
not even have watched TVoC (2012), who extremely negatively expressed their 
dislike for it on Weibo. Their knowledge of the show came from without 
audiences’ own programme viewing experiences, from negative news reports 
and online (Weibo) discussions. One Weibo noted: 
Doeike: Such a rubbish programme! Impressive shady stories! Never 
watched it! But I heard so many shady stories of the show! So I come and 
see what’s so great. Frankly, The Voice of China gained good 
sponsorship…with the funds, even the most terrible programme would 
get some fame. All TV programmes are profit driven, but I think a good 
one must be fused with real needs. Can’t be vague on the most original 
minds and dreams! (31 August, 23:42 p.m.) 
Although some audiences dislike and refuse to engage with any meaning in the 
original texts they can still construct images of the original text somehow. For 
different types of audiences, there are certainly different types of textuality. 
This is indeed what Gray posits when he identifies that audiences’ positive and 
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negative feelings can be constructed from paratextual fragments such as ‘news 
coverage or word-of-mouth, reading, watching and learning all they can about a 
show, book, or person in order to better understand and criticize the text’ 
(Williams, 2013).  
 
6.4 Critical Audiences: Anti-over-commercialisation 
By showing their dislike, audiences were judging and identifying what a text 
should be like, what they consider is a waste of media time and space, what 
morality or aesthetics texts should adopt, and what we would like to see others 
watch or read. As stated by Gray, there are always expectations behind dislike 
(Gray, 2003). This section therefore draws on theories of distinction and taste, 
to explore how audiences criticised TVoC (2012) on Weibo as ‘overly 
commercialised’ and looks at what they expected to come from their criticisms. 
Issues of taste and authenticity are an important part of the ways in which 
audiences criticise on commercialisation.  
Generally, Chinese audiences had very strong anti-commercial feelings 
and responses towards the show, as can be seen from an examination of the 
official Weibo page of TVoC (2012). When audiences complained on Weibo 
and expressed a great deal of resentment corresponding to the ‘over-
commercialisation’ debate, what did they mean by over-commercialisation? 
What issues and problems were they addressing? In the case of TVoC (2012), 
the production company provided advertisers with opportunities for new ways 
to incorporate publicity within shows. For example, the colour red element in 
TVoC (2012) reminds the Chinese audience of the local main sponsor 
Jiaduobao (a herbal tea), as in the Netherlands, this element subtly refers to 
Vodafone. Through making use of product placement or explicitly placing 
logos on the screen, the show and sponsor indeed drew the attention of Chinese 
audiences and consumers to commercial interests. This activity provides a sense 
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of how television programmes sought to brand themselves as part of an overall 
cultural repertoire or production strategy.  
However, from the perspective of some audience members, frequent 
spots and advertisements for Jiaduobao drink were hard to bear: 
FuMOMO: Too many adverts!!!!!! Won’t watch it again! Such a low, 
rubbish show (30 September 2012, 23:56 p.m.) 
Banyewugengshuibuzhao: I feel like I am being attacked by adverts! Bury 
me…(30 September 2012, 23:57 p.m.) 
ShanghaiRose_Zhangjun: Cannot stand it [adverts] anymore, I’d better go 
online to watch the replay. (1 October 2012, 01:09 a.m.) 
Hai Qing, a famous Chinese actress, also described her feelings on her Weibo 
page: #The Voice of China# ‘It feels like somebody pinches the judges’ neck 
when the advertisement suddenly came out at every tense moment…’ (31 
August 20102, 22:41 p.m.). In total 539 Weibo users responded to her with the 
same negative attitudes to the adverts, and even TVoC (2012) reposted and 
responded to Hai Qing’s Weibo saying: ‘sorry, but we had no choice’ (31 
August 2012, 22:57 p.m.). In this way, audiences’ critical reception of the show 
as ‘low’ and ‘commercial’ was also concerned with association with the 
collective power to change this situation that, as Weibo user Liufangdeqie 
appealed, ‘@yixiangblog Let’s repost this, let the organizers see this… make 
some adjustments!!!’ (1 September 2012, 00:27 a.m.). Clearly, there was strong 
dislike in the responses of the audiences discussions on Weibo, and disliking is 
as potentially powerful an emotion and reaction as is liking. Hai Qing then 
became a symbolic object, as the leading voice of this anti-fan community.  
Through criticising advertising and over-commercialisation, and seeing 
TVoC (2012) as a symbol of these disliked aspects of current Chinese culture, 
anti-fans here gained a thrill above and beyond what they saw as the 
sensibilities of the mass culture. They adopted the stance of superior and 
assertive audiences, to distance themselves from others who they constructed as 
‘inferior and threatening, a mindless and conformist horde associated with mass, 
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middlebrow and legitimate culture’ (Jancovich, 2000, p, 26). The critical 
receptions from anti-fans below show us how they resisted these ‘others’: 
 Mtanteshenjingxixi: The good advertisements of China!! Exactly how 
many ads??? (30 September 2012, 23:56 p.m.) 
MonsterTsui: I will chose…the adverts! (30 September 2012, 23:56 p.m.) 
Yanbt: Who will remain on this stage and sing for everyone 
is…..Jiaduobao!! (30 September 2012, 23:56 p.m.) 
Yueeryuehaisen: I seriously want to protest to Zhengjiang TV that do not 
supports The Voice of China when broadcasting the movie trailers and 
adverting. (30 September 2012, 23:36 p.m.) 
Here they sought to emphasise their negative feelings and emotions towards the 
show by being ironic about advertising. They defined TVoC (2012) as an 
inauthentic commercial product of mainstream culture that is opposite to their 
own privileged tastes as ‘real’ and ‘authentic’. ‘The good (something) of China’ 
even became an ironic template for other issues afterwards, such as ‘The good 
actor of China’, ‘The good business of China’. When using this, people were 
ironically suggesting that they were not good things of China, and not authentic. 
The other two sentences ‘I will chose…’, ‘who will remain on this stage and 
sing for everyone is …’ are used to mock the mentors as they frequently 
repeated these phrases in the show.  
In addition, anti-fans were targeting certain objects to hate while they 
made distinctions between ‘them’ and ‘the industry’. Audiences claimed that 
Hua Shao, the host of TVoC (2012), became the representative of this over-
commercialised programme. The production team of TVoC (2012) promoted 
Hua Shao as a multi-talented presenter: 
TVOC: #The Voice of China# Hua Shao is one of the best presenters 
from Zhejiang TV. He has also dabbled in many other fields such as 
creative, literary, film, drama, musical, director, etc. A great number of 
TV viewers see him as a mighty host. Participate in the official interactive 
discussions. @Zhejiang TV China Blue @ 5ige Original Music. @Xinlan 
net @Jieliya (August 31, 20:54 p.m.) 
However, audiences criticised and mocked him as a ‘salesman of tea’ 
(Jiaduobao) and ‘the tongue of China’, because of his extraordinary fast-
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speaking 40-second presentation of the long advertisement for Jiaduobao in 
every episode. 91 Weibo users reposted this Weibo message and responded 
with 156 comments. All of these comments were posted in opposition to the 
official promotional description of Hua Shao: 
weifeng-zhiliang： extremely don’t like him!!! Please repost!!! (31 
August 2012, 20:55 p.m.) 
gudansongruanmianbaodian: why doesn’t he become a behind-the-scenes 
worker, as he has so many talents? (31 August 2012, 20:56 p.m.) 
longxiaqianchen: he sucks!! Slurred speech… no good sense of humour. 
He is the biggest failure of the show…. (31 August 2012, 21:07 p.m.) 
red—zheng: he is ugly and low… a salesman not a presenter (31 August 
2012, 21:32 p.m.) 
Yidongxiaofeixie: really do not fancy him. He has no interactive move, 
no passion, no  expressions, and no style, only a vast amount of 
advertising! (31 August 2012, 17:23 p.m.) 
They are not only saw Hua Shao as an inauthentic presenter, but also as the 
symbol of overly commercial production, representing the low, inferior and 
inauthentic mainstream Chinese TV industry. Hence, by showing their dislike 
and expectations, they were actually trying to distinguish themselves from low 
and bad taste aspects of mainstream culture.  
It is interesting that audiences also made comparisons between TVoC 
(2012) and other versions, such as The Voice (U.S.) and The Voice of UK, some 
of them claiming they would not continuing watching TVoC (2012) as it was 
not the original text but a by-product of globalisation. They suggested that the 
format was importing Western cultural imperialism, and causing the destruction 
of cultural identities, and creating victims of the accelerating encroachment of a 
homogenised, westernised, consumer culture (Tomlinson, 2003). Others 
showed positive expectations and a willingness to watch this globally popular 
programme and they felt proud of having their own version of The Voice. In 
other words, some people may have seen TVoC (2012) as a platform that could 
bind communities and nations together, however, others worried more about the 
reduction in cultural diversity and variety. These struggles for originality are 
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embedded in the wider issues of globalisation. Those audiences who fear the 
obvious power of globalised capitalism to distribute and promote its cultural 
goods to every corner of the world are anti-globalisation, as they fear it may 
prey on their cultural identity. Through their resistance to the force of capitalist 
globalisation, they are demonstrating their superior positions as thoughtful 
people.  
 
6.5 Towards a critique of the wider political environment in 
China 
For a long time, China’s regulations on reality shows were seen as very strict 
and selective, in that SAPPRFT produced many specific regulations applying to 
the film and TV industry and its contents. Surprisingly, SAPPRFT’S attitude to 
TVoC (2012) was positive, and the show has been credited with helping to 
rehabilitate the TV entertainment genre. This follows on from authority crack-
downs on vacuous, vulgar broadcasts prior to TVoC (2012)’s broadcast. 
SAPPRFT issued a report on 26 July 2012, after just two episodes had been 
screened, saying that the show's grassroots singers had moved audiences with 
their extraordinary talents, and praising the judges' comments for their warmth 
and sincerity (Xinhua Insight, 2012). This gives us a sense that TVoC (2012) 
had won approval from SAPPRFT which was China’s broadcasting watchdog 
At the time. This statement by SAPPRFT also reveals the congruence of 
political attitudes between SAPPRFT, the producers of TVoC (2012) and the 
show’s content. 
Similarly the voice of the Chinese government was completely 
consistency with SAPPRFT. Later, on 24 August 2012, Ge Huijun, a member 
of the standing committee of Zhejiang’s provincial committee, and the vice-
governor and head of the publicity department of Zhejiang province, announced 
official recognition of TVoC (2012) on the SAPPRFT webpage: 
The show The Voice of China from Zhejiang Satellite TV highlights the 
characteristics of public good, encourages positive motivation and 
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positive energy, and shows that ‘the beauty, the goodness and the truth’ 
lives on for a new world. The Voice of China is a good show that unifies 
the orientation, the artistry and the visual value (SAPPRFT, 2012). 
Those words ‘good’, ‘positive’, and ‘the beauty, the goodness and the truth’ 
together constructed a dominant view and a positive image of TVoC (2012); it 
further implied what a reality talent show should look like in China. Xu Fan, a 
researcher with the Communication University of China, even praised the show 
as transmitting positive values and deep humanistic concerns in modern China 
society.  
However, audiences for TVoC (2012) were not as positive as SAPPRFT 
and other government figures. A wealth of critical discussions on Weibo 
regarding the show revealed struggles and conflicts between audiences and their 
wider real-life political interests. While fans largely embraced the popularity 
and success of the show without taking a political position, anti-fans were 
clearly troubled and confused by the show in concert with negative emotions 
which they held about SAPPRFT. They received the show as an inauthentic 
compromise with the government regulator, SAPPRFT, and the CCP.  
SAPPRFT functions as one of the ministries of the State Councils and 
regulates broadcasting nationally, and this and the CCP are the most consistent 
objects and symbols that Chinese audiences blame and criticise in their online 
discussions. ‘Guangdian’ ( 广电 ), which is the oral short description for 
SAPPRFT, and ‘Dang’ (党), which is short for the CCP, are the most common 
words that audiences utilise in expressing their negative emotions regarding 
China’s political situation. These two words are symbolically perceived as 
meaning ‘power’ and ‘dominate’ and became anti-fandom objects.  However, 
the bureaucratic system in China is extremely hierarchical, and is spread 
through governmental bodies and CCP institutions (Anokwa, 2003). The 
Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of CCP is actually the de-
facto top administrator of China’s media industry, including broadcasting. 
Hence, SAPPRFT’s head is only the deputy minister in line below the 
Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP. As such, the 
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Propaganda Department of the CCP’s provincial committee is the top regulator 
of media in each province. Therefore, Zhengjiang’s provincial TV broadcasting 
is under the supervision of the Zhengjiang provincial propaganda office. It can 
be said that the effectiveness of SAPPRFT's regulatory policies is greatly 
impacted by the attitudes of provincial governments.  
This can be seen clearly in the case of TVoC (2012), where audiences 
blamed SAPPRFT and the CCP without carefully looking into the power 
relations in the hierarchical political system existing among governmental 
bodies and CCP institutions. For instance, on 30 September 2012, TVoC ended 
its first season with a live performance show. Liang Bo, a 21-year-old man 
from Na Ying's team, won the championship based on voting from limited 
audiences at the live show and 99 media representatives. He won with a 
performance of ‘I love my country’, a rock song written by Chinese rock 
musician Wang Feng, but many audiences felt disappointed and criticised him 
on Weibo:  
kuailexiaoyu1108: although Liang Bo was steady, his performance has no 
sincerity and no emotion. However the judges like him, there is nothing 
we can do… (22 October 2012, 09:20 a.m.) 
vvvickybaby: anyone would be better than Liang Bo. I like Zhang Wei. (5 
October 2012, 09:46 a.m.) 
gouxuedepianjiaming: there is no justice in this country!!! Everyone 
should have his or her own champion in the heart. There is no need to 
taunt on Weibo. It’s meaningless. (3 October 2012, 11:52 a.m.) 
Emotional reactions registered by Weibo users indicated a growing intolerance 
for fake and vague discourses based on the champion contestant Liang Bo’s 
performance but reflecting the core of the government’s propaganda line. 
Furthermore, they made their negative perceptions ever clearer in the following 
sentence:  
Leslie-Du: It’s a competition for singing talent, not a show of selecting 
patriots. This is so political conspiracy…. (30 September, 2012, 23:57 
p.m.) 
Daisy_Duanxu: no need to continue the match, Liang Bo will be the 
champion! We all know…. (30 September, 2012, 23:56 p.m.) 
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Yangpangxie de kuailewa: the voice of the Party, fuck! Who else could 
 be the champion if it’s not you. (30 September, 2012, 23:56 p.m.)  
Keaide Jincan: Is this song going to celebrate the upcoming National Day? 
(30 September, 2012, 23:56 p.m.) 
Liang’s version of ‘I Love my Country’ is not a real ‘red song’, when compared 
to the traditional version of ‘I Love You China’ by contestant Ping An. The 
term ‘red song’ here refers to a genre of songs from the days of communist 
propaganda in the Mao era (Wang, 2012). Red songs originate and are adapted 
from old folksongs, poetry and anthems from the Sino-Japanese war, have 
messages and meanings such as ‘love Chairman Mao’, ‘love the Party’ and 
‘hate the Japanese’ (Wang, 2012). In recent years, according to Wang (2012), 
the government has repackaged red songs as popular music and simultaneously 
adapted popular music into the red song repertoire as ideological education 
aimed at Chinese young people. Some people see red songs as a symbol of 
revolution and socialism, standing for revolution and socialism in China, while 
more critical views see it as ‘red culture’ used recently to promote social 
stability and party propaganda. In addition to local singing activities and red 
song TV singing contests, the genre of the red song even merged into reality 
talent shows in 2012. From the perspective of the television industry, it is a 
clever way to be ‘politically correct’ in China. This also demonstrates that 
politics and culture, propaganda and commerce, education and entertainment 
are all mixed together for the smooth operation of ideological control in today’s 
China, as Wang (2012) has examined and argued. Nevertheless, looking from 
the audience perspective, receptions are much more negative and critical 
towards such control.  
As Liang Bo was crowned for his rendition of this song, lots of audience 
members then linked it to nationalism and ‘revaluing our culture and roots’ in a 
negative way: ‘It’s the wrong time to show support of red songs now and it can 
be very risky’, ‘Liang Bo’s victory shows the ‘official’ standard of aesthetics 
and value systems in current China.’ Weibo user @panghurui then commented: 
 ‘Mainstream voice. Official values. Of course Liang Bo wins because it’s 
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National Day. Even entertainment shows are telling us: ‘Please be 
politically correct all the time’. 
Some people may see TVoC as a platform that binds communities and nations 
together, however some may also worry more about the reductive effect on 
cultural diversity and variety.  
Here, audiences related Liang Bo’s performances to their own 
conditions of existence, which were characterised by wider political attitudes 
and perceptions of power. While they saw the rock song ‘I love my country’ as 
a party propaganda ‘red song’, they also implied that TVoC (2012) was an 
inauthentic show with political corruption. In this way, audiences were making 
distinctions within fan cultures between authentic and inauthentic shows, and at 
the same time were also making a sense of the distinction between ‘them’ and 
‘us’, between powerless civilians and powerful government regulators. On one 
level, in maintaining the official Weibo site for TVoC (2012), Canxing 
Production sought to extend its reach by merging, co-opting, converging and 
synergising their brands and intellectual properties across all of these channels. 
As Jenkins states, this maintenance has concentrated the power of traditional 
gatekeepers and agenda setters in some ways. And in other ways, it has 
disintegrated the tight control over our culture.  
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Chapter 7: Breaking the ‘rules’: Regulations and 
Fan Hierarchy within Fandom for The Voice of 
China on Baidu Tieba 
Within the informational economy of the net, knowledge equals prestige, 
reputation, power. Knowledge gains currency through its circulation on 
the net…  
– Henry Jenkins (1995) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Although audiences’ engagement with TVoC (2012) is the main focus of this 
thesis, various relationships between Chinese audiences, industry promoters 
and government regulators are also examined throughout sections one and two 
of this chapter, and a range of examples of audience engagement with the show 
are explored and analysed. Section three continues considerations of Chinese 
audiences’ engagement within an unofficial online space – Baidu Tieba – 
through an exploration of a particular fan community of TVoC (2012).  
Section three will focus on fans, who can be defined as viewers who act 
outside the common expectations for a member of the audience. Unlike 
‘followers’ on Sina Weibo, who enjoy the show but do not claim a fan-related 
social identity, Baidu Tieba, as its initial declaration states, offers a ‘completely 
user-driven network service’ to its users. The site has obviously signalled that it 
is a meeting place for fans. In mainland China, Baidu Tieba, also known as 
‘netbars’ or ‘postbars’, has generally been seen as a platform where China’s 
Internet ‘fan culture’ originated (Li, 2014), made up of numerous keyword-
based discussion forums and film/TV series fan clubs. In considering Baidu 
Tieba and fan culture, current Chinese scholars see Baidu Tieba as playing a 
role in developing fan culture in China (Chen and He, 2008), which is to say 
that its popularity is closely linked to ‘fans’ and ‘fan culture’. The fan culture 
residing on Baidu Tieba is marginal and deviates from mainstream culture; fans 
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create new meanings for texts through the ways in which they restructure and 
collage them to form a unique fan subculture on the platform (Leibold, 2011). 
With its millions of topic-based forums, Baidu Tieba can function 
simultaneously as a self-aggregating ‘hive mind’ and ‘cloistered cocoons of 
cognitive consonance’, as Leibold (2011) noted.  
However, it has also been noted that Baidu has close relations with the 
Chinese government and strictly complies with national policies and regulations. 
Baidu Tieba is the forum which most strictly censors its content for violence, 
pornographic content and anti-government articles. It was widely known in 
2012 by Chinese Internet users that Baidu Teiba imposed very strict political 
censorship, in particular in blocking and deleting politically sensitive terms, as 
defined by the government propaganda department. Tieba posts would also be 
accidentally deleted when clearing robot spam posted on the platform by online 
marketing. In China, such spam is known as ‘the navy’ (‘shuijun’, 水军) 
‘hanging around’ in the Internet. In dealing with this, the head of Baidu Tieba, 
Shu Xun, revealed that Baidu Tieba on average deleted one million posts every 
day (Qiwan, 2010).  
So far there is no evidence showing that posts on Baidu Tieba for TVoC 
were removed or censored by the central government, but there is a great deal 
of evidence showing that the content of fans’ posts were censored and removed 
from the tieba by its moderators, known in Chinese as bazhu (吧主). In the 
vocabulary of bazhu from different online communities, this regulatory activity 
has been called shantie fenghao (删帖封号), which means ‘deleting the posts 
and closing relevant Baidu accounts’. This information is important to know in 
enabling understanding of the role of the moderators of Baidu Tieba and how 
they regulate their online communities. The following sections will further 
explore how fans engage with TVoC on Baidu Tieba, and its regulatory rules in 
relation to such engagement. 
My interest here is to observe how the ideas of power and hierarchy 
have imbedded into the fan community of TVoC on Baidu Tieba. Within the 
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Baidu Tieba space, the Chinese government and industry promoters play the 
role of authority figures, the symbols of power. Under these circumstances, it is 
interesting to explore the engagement and negotiation of power within the fan 
community. It is clear that industry promoters have interfered in fans’ TVoC 
spaces on Baidu Tieba, spaces which used to be, in the organisation’s words, 
‘completely user-driven network services’ in mainland China. Struggling to 
express themselves in the shadow of industry promoters and community 
regulations, fans of TVoC sought ways to break and challenging the ‘rules’ and 
hierarchy, such as expressing and discussing their discontent and resistive 
reception with each others; appealing to be fairly treated within the community 
and reporting and complaining about others’ potentially harmful posts and 
requiring them to be removed.  
Using ideas about power and hierarchy, this chapter is going to 
investigate questions about the extent to which fans are ‘free’ to engage with 
TVoC on Baidu Tieba: how and in what ways are their interactions and 
discussions monitored, controlled and censored in this space, by whom and why? 
It will investigate the nature of the censorship involved and will also look for 
evidence of ‘resistive’ reception and behaviour that might still challenge official 
directives and regulatory frameworks. The previous chapter’s exploration of 
audience’s reception based upon fragmented comments and expressions on 
social media will be extended within this chapter to consider how Chinese fans 
resist the content control over the Baidu Tieba of TVoC (2012).  
This chapter argues that, with the emergence of ‘participatory culture’ 
(Jenkins, 2006), fandom of TVoC (2012) within Baidu Tieba offered 
opportunities for fans to participate in the community-making process of any 
fan object, enabled ‘executive fans’ to exercise dominant power over other fans 
and set out regulations and rules within a fan hierarchy. Instead of the 
traditional split of fan identity between the ‘good’ fan producers and the ‘bad’ 
fan consumers (Hills, 2002), this chapter focuses more on the fan hierarchy of a 
community that integrates fan self-regulations and fan promotion. It can be 
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argued that tieba bazhu and other fans of TVoC occupy a hierarchy of power, 
with the bazhu positioned as dominant, followed by users who identify 
themselves as real fans. The bazhu hold the dominant power in regulating the 
other fans, as they are able to set the agenda for fan discussion through the 
imposition of specific regulations, and may further to control the information 
flow in their own way. Meanwhile, other fans have been offered an upgrade 
system that uses credits (jinyanzhi) for engagement to exchange for higher 
privileges and power, such as fan ‘discursive power’. 
This chapter examines the fan community of TVoC at Baidu Tieba, in 
order to understand fan hierarchy and power relations within the online fan 
community. In focusing on Chinese audiences’ online engagement with TVoC, 
an audience reception study approach would be the best method for gaining 
critical insights into fan hierarchy and regulations. The goal of this chapter is to 
identify the contours and patterns in the audience reception data, and to analyse 
similarities and differences of perception and practice in fan’s interactions with 
the community regulations and their meanings. To be more specific, this 
chapter focuses on a number of divergent materials collected from the Baidu 
Tieba of TVoC, community regulations and rules made by Baidu Tieba and the 
bazhu of TVoC. 
TVoC’s tieba was founded in June 2012, with user being mainly from 
mainland China; it is still updating continually. Up to 28 Sep 2015 there were 
686,292 topics and 25,938,805 posts in total. This tieba is divided into five 
zones: the posts zone (kantie, 看贴), which is constantly updated by members; 
the fan-created pictures zone (tupian, 图片), which includes photos and cartoon 
images of the show; the short videos zone (shipin, 视频); the quality posts zone 
(jinpin, 精品), i.e. those recommended by bazhu; and the chat room (zuqun, 组
群), for small groups, where members can chat with others about shared 
interests and topics. In general, many original Baidu Tieba users would first 
visit the quality posts zone when they entered a community. It is the bazhu, 
which has the power to identify a post as a quality post. This helps to tag and 
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categorise valuable posts so that members can easily find relevant contents or 
related, and it is a way to encourage member engagement and participation.  
In this chapter, I will first explain how Baidu Tieba works and in what 
ways fans can participate in the community and interact with each other. Then I 
will summarise the main themes from the data and discourses collected from 
Baidu Tieba of TVoC, exploring what kinds of content and posts placed in this 
community are in danger of potentially being removed and censored by the 
bazhu, or required to be ‘deleted’ by a normal fan. Within this community, fans 
of TVoC occupy a hierarchy of power. As Matt Hills (2002, p. 46) noted, 
fandom should be viewed as ‘a social hierarchy where fans share a common 
interest while also competing over fan knowledge, access to the object of 
fandom, and status’.  
This hierarchy can be clearly identified in TVoC (2012)’s tieba in the 
way that fans comply with regulations and rules within the community. Andrea 
MacDonald’s (1998) study of online fans provides an introduction to how 
hierarchy operates within fan culture and how media outlets regulate meaning 
through Internet settings. Furthermore, she provides a sensitive and detailed 
account of five dimensions of fan hierarchies: hierarchy of knowledge, 
hierarchy of fandom level, hierarchy of access, hierarchy of leaders and 
hierarchy of venue. She also argues that fans that are at the top of all five of 
these hierarchies are ‘executive fans’. According to Matt Hills (2002), fans with 
very high cultural capital will become the ‘executive fans’, and will therefore 
also possess high levels of social capital. The notions of ‘cultural capital’ and 
‘social capital’ originally come from Pierre Bourdieu’s work ‘Distinction: A 
Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste’ (1984). Many scholars use them in 
the discussion of fan culture generally (Hills, 2002; Jenkins, 2006), as well as 
of the term ‘subcultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1984; Thornton, 1997), which 
implies an assertion of difference and status which would not be recognised by 
the wider society, given the generally low cultural prestige of fan cultures 
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(Thomas, 2002). My intention here is to examine fans’ knowledge, and the 
power relations among fans within TVoC’s online fan hierarchy. 
 
7.2 Fandom within Baidu Tieba  
For nearly a decade, more and more entertainment channels and faster and 
faster broadband networks have been developing in China. Stimulation of 
consumer society, the needs of the market, the rapid development of mass 
media, a more liberal cultural environment, the specific cultural needs of fan 
spaces and other factors, have together promoted the prosperity and 
development of fan culture in mainland China, as Liu Zhiyou and Zhao Zuo 
(2012) discovered. Fans are no longer just passive receiving audiences or 
mindless consumers, or enthusiastic participants. Fans are able to participate in 
the pleasure of being part of the process of creating fan culture and community 
and in this process positive fan culture can meet the psychological needs of fans.  
As ‘textual poachers’ (Jenkins, 1992), fans may purposefully participate 
in media activities, creating a fan culture that is characterised by systematic 
production and transmission. On the other hand, as consumers in target markets, 
they help produce huge fan industries through their consuming potential and 
consuming behaviours. Cai Qi (2010) indicates that the fan economy in China 
is operated through two main strategies – the reproducing strategy of the 
cultural industry era and the integrating strategy of the media convergence era. 
It is a crucial distinctive aspect of the Chinese markets. This structure reflects a 
shift in the perception of fan culture within China’s film and television industry 
and is indicative of the emerging industry’s deeper penetration into fan 
communities and fan spaces. 
There are many online sites in mainland China that offer users spaces to 
build fan communities, and of these Baidu Tieba is China’s biggest online 
community. It has 12,797,295 communities, covering all aspects of 
entertainment, games, novels, and life style. In providing social networking 
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services, it can be said that Baidu is a community of communities, with most of 
those communities acting as online fandoms for entertainment media and 
popular culture worldwide. Baidu Tieba is a publicly accessible and searchable 
message-board system where specific boards (tieba) can be freely created by a 
registered user under a specific title. Although established in 2003, it is since 
the popularity if Super Girl in 2006 that Baidu Tieba has risen to prominence. 
Nowadays, Baidu Tieba has become an extremely popular and comprehensive 
forum, with a large number of active users posting their creative posts, replying 
to each other, and engaging in interactive activities. Overall, Baidu Tieba is 
perceived as the birthplace of online fan culture in mainland China. 
Baidu Tieba can be accessed through its homepage on PCs, and there 
are also user access options for the service from mobile phones and tablets, 
enabling functions such as posting from multiple accounts at the same time. It 
provides users with query-based searchable communities for exchanging views 
and sharing knowledge and experiences. They are connected to Baidu's search 
engine, which, like Google, can link up to an enormous and ever-enlarging 
network of information. Baidu is China's largest commercial web portal, 
offering a search engine for websites, audio files and images. 
Once a tieba is created, Baidu will index its name automatically and the 
contents within boards become easily searchable. The significance of Baidu 
Tieba lies in this function – it has abandoned the traditional mode of operation 
of discussion boards and become a group, a community, grouped around one 
keyword which could be a single idea, a person, show or event or a shared 
interest. In this way, it can keep people with the same interests connected, 
communicating and helping each other. It is in Baidu Tieba that millions of fans 
of TV dramas and films find ‘families’ – self-styled communities – to share 
their interests with, and locating them is as easy as typing the title in the post 
bar window (Kong, 2012). Baidu Tieba has thereby encouraged participatory 
fandom. As Steven Duncombe (2012: p.1) explains it: 
Fandom provides a space to explore fabricated worlds that operate 
according to different norms, laws, and structures than those we 
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experience in our ‘real’ lives. Fandom also necessitates relationships with 
others: fellow fans with whom to share interests, develop networks and 
institutions, and create a common culture. This ability to imagine 
alternatives and build community, not coincidentally, is a basic 
prerequisite for political activism.  
Duncombe’s definition perfectly explains the Baidu Tieba fandom of self-
identified fans who participate – as writers, artists, film-makers, organisers, 
community moderators, coders, archivists, bloggers, co-players, gif-makers, 
episode reviewers, fan work critics, fandom activists, and more – in some kind 
of fan culture. Generally speaking, to be a ‘fan’ is to ‘negotiate meanings and 
interpret messages with others, to participate in a range of activities that extend 
beyond the private act of viewing and reflects an enhanced emotional 
involvement with a television narrative’ (Bielby, Harrington and Bielby, 1999: 
p. 35). The enhanced emotional involvement of fans refers to their becoming 
excessive readers, being discerning, critical and productive, and carrying out 
creative and interpretive practices. 
Fans may ‘lurk’ at TVoC (2012)’s Baidu Tieba everyday and browse 
through endless gossip about every tiny aspect of contestants’ and judges’ lives 
and discuss various social and personal issues. At the same time, fans may also 
write fan fiction and cultural criticism, produce fan art and videos, and seek out 
other fans with whom to share their enthusiasm and build groups and 
communities.  
It is worth thinking about whom these fans browsing on Baidu Tieba 
spaces might be. According to statistics, Baidu Tieba has more than 60% users 
who were born in the post-90s, while 90% of users are under the age 34 (Zhang, 
2015). The so-called post-90s generation in China has been stereotyped as ‘lazy, 
promiscuous, confused, selfish, brain-damaged and overall hopeless’ (Farrar, 
2010). They are the first generation that has grown up with the Internet, and 
they are also the most controversial generation in China. The post-90s 
generation constitutes the majority of active Internet users in China, and these 
are the media users who access popular cultural products (music/TV/films) 
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through the Internet rather than through conventional transmission vehicles 
(radio/TV/cinema).  
Jonathan Noble (2012, p, 51) describes that while Chinese society 
worries a great deal about this generation, the post-90s generation sees itself as 
having such characteristics as ‘a high aptitude to adapting to change’, ‘an 
interest in promoting one’s individuality’, ‘a tendency to pursue hobbies that 
are not understood by adults’, and ‘growing up early’. The Internet culture 
created by young Chinese audiences through thousands of members 
communicating, has adopted its own a special Internet language called 
‘Martian’. The ‘Martian’ dialect is essentially standard Mandarin written using 
the most obscure characters possible, which most closely identifies with the 
post-90s alternative subculture of ‘brain-damaged writing’. Speaking in the 
‘Martian’ dialect, fans can communicate more effectively on Baidu and enjoy 
the fact that their posts are ‘not understood by the adults’. 
As previously mentioned, in recent years Baidu Tieba has been changed 
considerably to conform with China’s Internet policies and media regulations. 
Since the end of 2010, Baidu Tieba only allows posting by registered account 
holders with username shown as the author, thus removing anonymous posting. 
Although anonymity may encourages more sensitive topics of discussion, the 
CCP would not allow the behaviour known as ‘wangluo yuyan baoli’ (Internet 
verbal violence), such as flaming, trolling, hacking and any sort of ‘trash-talk’, 
all of which are considered uncivil. Baidu Tieba allows users posts limited to 
containing at most ten pictures and one video quoted from certain broadcast 
websites. Published posts cannot be edited but users can delete their own 
published posts and comments from other users relating to their posts. 
In 2012 Baidu Tieba went through huge changes in its interface and 
functions. It changed from a simple reply-by-sequence user interface to a more 
complicated reply-in-same-floor version. Baidu Tieba’s statistical counting 
system of ‘reply-in-same-floor’ (the nearest equivalent in a forum would be 
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‘reply in same thread’) posts is unique, so some associated terms need to be 
clarified before further exploration: 
• tiezi (帖子): texts posted by users on website BBs as topics 
• lou (楼): equivalent to the order of topic commenter within each tiezi: for 
instance, the 5th lou means the fifth message responding to a topic 
• louzhu (楼主): a registered user who created the tiezi (topic) and the first 
one posted in the lou 
• gentiezhe (跟帖者): registered members who post within certain tiezi, 
usually followed louzhu  
• bazhu (吧主): community moderato 
The ‘reply-in-same-floor’ posts system subdivides many roles and positions 
that different fan could take while they are communicating with each other. It is 
this system that allows the community to be more clearly classified in terms of 
power and hierarchy. For instance, a louzhu has the right to delete any posts 
related to their topics (tiezi), but under the censor of the bazhu. 
Each tieba would have at least one, but no more than three, bazhu, and 
these acts as the regulator and moderators who formulate a series of rules and 
regulations. In TVoC (2012)’s tieba, the moderator community is called bawu 
tuandui (吧务团队, regulating team). In total 42 users together maintain and 
organise the community; three of them are elected and voted to be bazhu, 22 of 
them are xiao bazhu (associated moderators), and there are also eight candidates 
who self-nominate to join the bawu tuandui. This small group was established 
to manage the whole community of 905,728 fans. Fan members are known as 
linghun gezhe (灵魂歌者), which means ‘the soul singers’. This is like a pun 
made about a celebrity’s name and used to describe their fans.  
The figure below shows the structure of the bawu tuandui who manage 
TVoC’s tieba, which has more than 900,000 fans and 25,881,662 posts.  
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Figure 4. Bawu tuandui (moderator group) made up of 42 fans 
Fans of TVoC are from different regions of China, have different cultural 
backgrounds, and are of different social classes. It is their common interest and 
enthusiasm for the television show and certain celebrities associated with it that 
has gathered them on Baidu Tieba. Through participating in discussions, 
sharing information and providing each with other help, they created a family-
like community, and started to call each other ‘qin’ (dear, 亲). In their 
participations and interactions, fans do not only share information but they also 
form common ideologies and values, and these meet individual’s needs to 
achieve self-identification and pleasure.  
Although fans are only allowed to post on Baidu Tieba using 
a registered account with its username shown, they give themselves special 
names in the community to identify themselves and their levels of fandom. 
Each tieba fan group has its own unique name to allow members to identify 
themselves as supporters of their fan object. These names can then be formed 
into various codes in discussions, such as fans giving nickname to their 
favourite stars. The shared codes they use within a community could hence 
create feelings in fans, such as group belonging.  
Each tieba has its own organisational structure and core group 
(moderators group). Led by their own opinion leaders, TVoC’s tieba have been 
ensured normal operations under the subdivision functions of the core group 
bazhu3	People
picture	editors2	People video	editors2	People voice	editor5	People publication5	People broadcasting3	People
associated	bazhu22	People
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members (see Figure 1.). Moreover, each tieba has its own regulations that fans 
gradually comply with leading to the formation of habits and respect. Fans 
comply with the rules in order to integrate into to the bigger fan 
community/family, to acquire a group identity and a sense of belonging to 
certain groups. The next section will specify and examine the rules and 
regulations existing in TVoC (2012)’s tieba. 
 
7.3 Baidu Tieba’s exchange system and fan hierarchy  
This chapter draws on Andrea MacDonald’s work, which is itself influenced by 
Bourdieu via Hills and Jenkins. The approach here specifically uses the notion 
of ‘fan hierarchy’ adapted from Hills’ book Fan Cultures, in which he suggests 
it is necessary ‘to consider any given fan culture not simply as a community but 
also as a social hierarchy where fans share a common interest while also 
competing over fan knowledge, access to the object of fandom, and status’ 
(2002, p. 46). While Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital has been widely 
applied by many academic critics, Hills suggests we should more explicitly 
analyse the social hierarchy of fandom, as the idea of cultural capital has been 
overly emphasised while social capital and symbolic capital have been 
underplayed in fan culture studies. Hills also points out that Bourdieu’s 
‘dominant/subordinate’ model is rather limited to ‘read[ing] moral and aesthetic 
differences off from the master-grid of class difference’ (2002, p. 64). 
 Building upon Hills’ observations, this chapter explores the ways that 
fans engage with particular texts and engage with one another. Specifically it 
examines 1) ways in which hierarchies are established within and between the 
Baidu tieba fan communities of TVoC and 2) ways in which fans’ different 
forms of capital shape the existing hierarchies within the communities. 
Bourdieu’s theories on distinctions and capitals provide the theoretical 
foundation that can be applied to fan cultural studies. However, his theory is 
based on the class distinctions of Western capitalist societies, whereas in terms 
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of the case of TVoC’s online fan community in China, class difference is not the 
main discussion point of this thesis. Baidu Tieba allows fans to police/regulate 
other fans, and this has created a very different way for fans to demonstrate 
their knowledge and skills, and for the researcher to calculate the different types 
of capital created. Thus, the discussions of fan hierarchy in this chapter examine 
the applicability of Bourdieu’s theories in the context of China. 
  In her article, ‘Uncertain utopia: science fiction media fandom and 
computer-mediated communication’, MacDonald (1998) observed that the 
community’s determination of who is an authority coincides with the authority's 
position within various fan hierarchies. She notes that control over venue is 
important in establishing oneself at the top of the fan hierarchy, and this is 
indeed the case within TVoC (2012) fandom, in that the bazhu, who run 
message boards, can exercise control over the fans who frequent them. Baidu 
Tieba offers fans a system in which the jingyanzhi (经验值 , credits for 
engagement) plays a significant role in regulating fan privileges and power. 
Through actively engaging on tieba, fans gain higher jingyanzhi and get the 
opportunity of becoming a bazhu. An example of a user gaining power and 
privilege via jingyanzhi is allison1987, who has been using Baidu Tieba for five 
years, has posted more than 50,000 posts, and is now one of TVoC’s tieba 
bazhu. This system of rewarding jingyanzhi allows fans to apply for the 
position of bazhu in a way similar to applying for a job. This process is 
specified by the Baidu Tieba bazhu policy: 
Bazhu are the core users of Baidu Tieba, chosen from hundreds of 
millions of enthusiastic users. They were selected according to certain 
criteria for approval by the official team. Their main roles are 
constructing content of interest, as well as administrating and regulating 
other users within each tieba. 
This suggests that bazhu are at the top of the community hierarchy and 
exercise power and control over other fans. It also shows a relatively fair 
exchange system built on ‘online engagement’, ‘jingyanzhi’ and ‘levels and 
privileges’. Jingyanzhi is the intermediate indicator used to measure the 
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exchange relationship between ‘online engagement’ and ‘levels and privileges’. 
Higher ‘levels and privileges’ need more jingyanzhi to exchange, as shown in 
Figure 2. The first column shows the levels (from 1 to 18), the second column 
shows the name of each level (‘titles’ given to the levels), and the third column 
tells how many credits (Jingyanhi) are needed for each level. 
 
 
Figure 5. Exchanging jingyanzhi for ‘levels and privileges’ 
This structure and system creates a number of levels and barriers to entry and 
‘promotion’ between levels. Although the entry barrier is low for fans wanting 
to join a tieba and its community, it is not easy to complete the move from the 
‘edge’ of the community to its centre, or from the bottom to the top. Gaining 
jingyanzhi certainly equates to vast amounts of time and energy in terms of fans’ 
online activities and engagement, and demands their thought, talents and 
contributions. Once fans enter a tieba, while they participate and share with 
each other they are at the same time competing with each other for power and 
privileges.  
After a considerable period of such competition, the internal structure of 
a tieba develops levels of differentiation, forming a pyramid structure from the 
bottom to the top – from the majority of ‘ordinary’ fans to a minority of 
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executive fans. At the bottom of the pyramid structure lies a large number of 
qianshuizhe (潜水者, ‘diving viewer’, lurker) and general supporters and in the 
middle of the structure there is a group of active and positive supporters, while 
at the top of the pyramid the community’s opinion leaders and public figures 
often occupy an important and dominant position. 
Thus, within this structure and system, each fan can gain a title (social 
identity within this group) and a relevant level, depending on their contribution 
of fan labour, the information and resources they have, and their 
communication skills. For instance, when users log in to Baidu Tieba, the 
system will show them their jingyanzhi, title and level. In the case of TVoC’s 
tieba, fans can earn a higher level and more prestigious title in the community 
through accumulating more jingyanzhi, which reflects their engagement and 
experience in the community. The figure below shows columns for the 18 
levels and the rows show the various privileges available to users at each level, 
and the required amount of jingyanzhi corresponding to each. The higher the 
level fans achieve, the more power and privileges they will have, including the 
right to speak, to get closer to industry information and celebrities, the power to 
guide public opinion and the opportunity to vote.  
Figure 6. Hierarchies and equivalent privileges 
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It can be suggested that the subcultural capital of fans is dependent on 
the amount of knowledge of the fan object that the fan possesses. As John Fiske 
has noted, fan knowledge ‘serves to distinguish within the fan community. The 
experts – those who have accumulated the most knowledge – gain prestige 
within the group and act as opinion leaders. Knowledge, like money, is always 
a source of power’ (Fiske, 1992, p. 43). Within Baidu Tieba, jingyanzhi can be 
seen as a way of measuring fan knowledge, and then using it to allow them to 
gain status and prestige within the fan community, as it calculated based on the 
number and quality of posts made, and other aspects of online engagement. 
Fans who eagerly collect and display their knowledge acquire a way to display 
their subcultural capital and to accrue power over less ‘educated’ fans. The 
achievement of higher community status by some fans indicates that they are 
more knowledgeable than others. 
 
7.4 Power relations and TVoC (2012)’s tieba regulations 
When fans actively engage with others in the same community, they have 
already started an internal competition over identity, status, power and 
hierarchy. Baidu Tieba, as a traditional virtual community space, has a social 
hierarchy where fans share a common interest while also competing over fan 
knowledge, access to the object of fandom, and status. In a study of online 
‘Buffy’ fandom, Rebecca Williams has examined the spoiler sources that 
allowed executive fans to post spoiler information online and thus act as a 
conduit between fans and the TV industry. The idea of executive fans being 
able to exercise power over other fans through control of knowledge as their 
subcultural capital and social constraints as their social capital (Williams, 2004), 
can be clearly seen in Baidu Tieba’s integrated system. Bazhu, as the executive 
fans (although not the owners of the website), are empowered to strictly govern 
topics of conversation and control debate through ‘benign dictatorships’ (Smith 
and Kollock, 1999, p. 5). By making regulations and rules for TVoC’s tieba, 
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executive fans are perfectly justified in exercising control with the informed 
consent of other fans.  
Overall, the restrictions, curtailments and rewards within TVoC’s tieba 
target three aspects of control: shantie (删帖, deleting posts), fenghao (封号, 
closing Baidu accounts), and jiajin (加精, selecting quality posts). All of those 
regulations and rules were made by the show’s baizu and reflect a stringent list 
of banned topics, including discussion of politics, religion, eroticism, privacy 
invasion and humiliating quarrels. Almost all fans will consciously comply with 
these rules, as this complicity constitutes a means of showing respect to their 
fan objects and achieving a sense of identification with certain celebrities.  
Although bazhu hold the highest level of power within a fan 
community/hierarchy, it is the central government’s political requirements 
which overlay all the rules made by them, and these requirements are aimed at 
protection on the one hand but censorship on the other. In relation to the former, 
the Chinese government has recently imposed strict new policies seeking to 
protect young people from pornography, violence, superstition, and ‘pernicious 
information’. In terms of censorship, however, these requirements are a way for 
government to strongly maintain Internet safety, but for primarily political 
reasons. Almost every tieba’s first rule requires fans not to violate the law, 
public morality, and the Baidu Tieba Agreement. The Baidu Tieba Agreement, 
in compliance with CCP policies, contains 52 restrictions on users’ online 
behaviour, guiding ‘the right way’ for reading a text, interpreting meanings, 
online communication language and so on (Jenkins, 1992, p. 86). Baidu holds a 
very strong position in requiring its users’ obedience: 
If you have any challenges to the provisions of this agreement, you can 
choose not to enter Baidu Tieba; when you enter Baidu Tieba it means 
that you will agree to comply with all requirements under this Agreement, 
and fully subject to the unified management under Baidu Tieba. 
Most regulations are concerned with national security and the regime; 
Baidu Tieba requires users to follow the government’s policy of ‘seven bottom 
lines of Internet civilization’ which must be adhered to, these being: laws and 
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regulations, the socialist system, national interests, citizens' legitimate rights 
and interests, public order, social morality and authenticity of information. In 
another words, each tieba follows this agreement via the actions of the bazhu, 
who are responsible for enforcing, regulating and making appropriate fan 
interpretations. The system itself empowers the executive fans, not only by 
recognising and developing their knowledge, but also by giving them the 
‘ability to determine who is and is not worthy of participation’ in a community 
group (Macdonald, 1998, p. 86).   
Jenkins (1992) has explained fandom as interpretative communities 
‘where competing interpretations and evaluations of common texts are 
proposed, debated and negotiated’, an explanation which gives no consideration 
to the external forces coming from government and industry promoters. In 
certain ways, the executive fans, bazhu, can stifle some aspects of fan 
discussions and interpretations. For instance, any tieba accounts deemed to be 
‘in relation to racism of the minority group and anti-government’ would be 
censored by being closed down. If one contestant of TVoC (2012) comes from 
Tibet and so identifying themselves as from the Zhuang group (a minority 
ethnic group), fans cannot debate and discuss about that contestant as such 
discussion might involve issues such as the tense relationship between the CCP 
and Tibet.  
In addition to censoring, bazhu also have the power to positively guide 
what fans should do, as well as making rules on ‘flaming’ (arguing online) and 
‘netiquette’ (appropriate online behaviour). Posts would be taken into 
consideration for ‘deleting’ if someone uses ‘uncivilised language to verbally 
abuse or insult others’, or if there are ‘too many posts on the same topic within 
one day’. More specifically TVoC’s tieba rules require that ‘fans’ community 
ID photos should not contain any filthy, erotic, horror or sensitive political 
information’. In order to maintain the quality of the tieba, it has also been 
announced that bazhu will deleted some ‘tiezi with few replies, barely any 
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meaning, no substantial content or timeliness’. Fans have varying levels of 
understanding of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ netiquette.  
The question is, to what extent and in which ways can bazhu stimulate 
or stifle fan discussion in regard to fans’ different interpretations. Williams has 
examined executive fans’ ability to ‘attempt to gain further fan social capital 
through their online participation, with the ultimate goal being to attain 
discursive power and achieve the position of being able to control fan 
discussion to enforce their own interpretations through their subcultural capital’ 
(Williams, 2004, p.3). Williams concludes that fans’ discursive power and 
subcultural capital decide the extent of their control over other fans. Standing as 
they do between industry sources and other fans, bazhu can even require that 
other fans must mark and indicate posts by using the term ‘spoiler source’ in 
the headline when posting any spoiler information, such as competition results. 
They are not completely forbidding other fans’ discussions and behaviours, but 
they are controlling and regulating them in line with certain standards which 
they themselves have made. 
The CCP’s political impact on tieba, regulations over the power of 
bazhus, and influence and interference from industry promoters also need to be 
discussed. As stated by Brown (1994, p. 132), the ‘control of knowledge is a 
major form of social power’ and in this regard bazhu are likely to have the 
highest level of fan social capital, through their connections with Baidu’s 
official management team and industry sources (promoters). However, the 
following interesting example shows obvious industry guidance and penetration 
into the fan community. There is one particular rule which bazhu emphasise: 
TVoC (2012) is officially licensed by the Netherlands’ programme The 
Voice, and is the only such show with The Voice copyright in China. Any 
posts which slander the show in regard to issues of plagiarism and piracy 
would be deleted without notice.  
This tone of this rule sounds as though it originates from industry people who 
are trying to influence audiences’ understanding and interpretation of text. 
Further examples also evidence such input into bazhu rules: 
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TVoC (2012) will be in peaceful coexistence with other Zhejiang TV 
television programmes and those of other TV stations. Posts will be 
deleted if they excessively belittle other programmes. 
Rather than being subject to the directly stated intentions of industry 
promoters, rules and regulations imposed by bazhu are far more convincing and 
acceptable for fans. Bazhu can be popular because of their high social capital, 
gained from daily communication with other fans, such as regular posting and 
even personal message communications. To a greater or lesser extent, fans may 
have respect for these executive fans who are more knowledgeable than they 
are and have higher subdural capital and fan social capital. In contrast fans 
might be easily disgusted by industry interference and promotional resources. 
   
7.5 Challenging the power: Fan resistance 
Rebecca Williams notes how powerful an executive fan - the well-known 
‘spoiler fan’– can be in a fan hierarchy. Comparatively, she also mentions ‘a 
fan banned from a message board quickly loses his social standing within the 
fan community and may find himself ostracized from numerous other sites’ 
(Williams, 2004). However, in the case of TVoC’s tieba, the situation is 
somewhat different. The less powerful fans have been given opportunities to 
defend and explain themselves in relation to posts deleted by bahzu. TVoC’s 
tieba bazhu open up a ‘floor’ ‘shantie fenghao publicity floor (删帖封号公示
楼)’ to explain the reason why a post has been deleted or an account closed. 
Only within this floor (which resembles a ‘thread’ on a standard forum), are 
fans allowed to negotiate around their interpretations of censorship, or discuss 
the tieba rules made by bazhu.  
Struggling to express themselves, caught as they are between the 
influences of industry promoters and community regulations, fans of TVoC seek 
ways to break and challenge ‘rules’ and hierarchy. These include expressing 
and discussing their discontent and resistive receptions with others; appealing 
to be fairly treated within the community; and reporting and complaining about 
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others’ potentially harmful posts and requiring them to be removed. Although 
bazhu hold the dominant position in the tieba hierarchy, the other fans are 
actively seeking greater levels of fan ‘discursive power’, and challenging the 
regulations and fan hierarchy, by showing their increasing ‘social capital’.  
In the resistance process, some other fans use their knowledge of 
political policies and tieba regulations to defend for themselves. They are 
intentionally aiming to increase their power and capital so that can reach a 
higher position within the fan community. Jenkins has recognised the 
importance of knowledge, stating that ‘within the informational economy of the 
net, knowledge equals prestige, reputation, power. Knowledge gains currency 
through its circulation on the net’ (1995, p. 59). The more a fan is familiar with 
the regulations and rules, the more likely he or she is to have developed an 
approach which accords in some respects with the community’s hierarchy, and 
which will allow them, therefore, to exercise some power over the moderator 
group. For instance one fan, @lwchwqq, states: 
Can somebody explain to me why my post ‘As a singer, can Wu Mochou 
finally be the champion after ten years?’ has been deleted? Here is the 
tieba rules I found and I have carefully studied the rules and regulations 
that are publicised in the tieba. However I didn’t see any rules that my 
post appears to violate or go against (5 April 2014, 17:31 p.m.).  
After several rounds of communication and negotiation, one bazhu released this 
post from the black list, while admitting that ‘the moderator group has been too 
strict and sensitive about the content’. Whether a censored post will be released 
from a ban actually depends on the bargaining process of fans’ interpretations 
of the rules and the issues, in another word, on their knowledge.  
Some fans who challenge the interpretations of tieba regulations and 
appeal to be fairly treated within the community will also use their knowledge 
of political policies and tieba regulations to help other fans who are in similar 
situations and difficulties. Thus a fan, by challenging the rules, is also 
increasing their social capital, as they then get support from other fans with 
whom they have resonance. It is their discussions and cooperation that would 
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together challenge the bazhu’s power position and authority. Greater group 
social capital resources lead to greater group power that they can wield against 
the dominant power and the interpretations of text meanings. As fans declare: 
As a country has state laws, the tieba also has its rules, and now that we 
were forbidden free speech we must be given reasons. Please inform us of 
the reason for being banned. If it is reasonable, we certainly will accept it. 
However, if the forbidden [post] does not breach the rules, we will 
complain to the end. 
These fans were speaking as a group, considerably united, which challenged the 
moderator group, the dominant level of the fan hierarchy. Therefore, although 
bazhu seem to have the most power in the fan hierarchy, they continually 
maintain the community with the help of other moderators, together seeking 
higher levels of discursive power, subcultural capital and fan social capital.  
As explored, bazhu may have the highest level of power, but other fans 
are also simultaneously challenging their authorities, seeing them as helpless 
deceitful watchdogs. Many fans are uncomfortable with bazhu and the 
moderator group explicitly acting like authorised professionals by showing off 
their knowledge and subcultural capital. For instance, one fan complained that:  
This is just a post for passers-by to leave their complaints and comments. 
I wondered why those slanderous posts in the music tieba were not 
deleted, whereas this post, which was just for fun, was deleted? I 
seriously doubt that the administrator who deleted my post is a fan of a 
contestant. For his own ends he violated the fair principle of this tieba, 
abusing public power. So unprofessional! This is a kind of behaviour that 
pushes out opponents and forces others’ opinions’ (20 August 2013, 
14:35 p.m.). 
Fans were showing their dismissive and resentful feelings, trying to question 
and to challenge the bazhu’s legitimacy and authority. When it comes to fans’ 
favourite objects, their resistance can be even fiercer and they will use offensive 
and aggressive language in a way to satirise the bazhu’s rights, position and 
power of authority: 
@JSHY631: As I am in the black list all the time, I really want to discuss 
with the brain-damaged bazhu some issues regarding teenagers’ culture 
and philosophy of life (13 July 2013, 01:35 a.m.) 
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This is intriguing as it suggests that a bazhu is a brain-damaged person, which 
can harm and damage the enthusiasm of fans that participate in this community. 
This statement suggests that the bazhu and moderator team are in some way 
reprehensible and that the ‘victim’ fans are innocent in this demanding 
environment of network and political pressures.  
Although the mass of fans, in comparison to bazhu, have less 
subcultural capital, fan social capital, and less fan ‘discursive power’, they have 
been given opportunities and pathways to resist and challenge the dominant 
groups within the fan culture. And as explored in a previous section, some fans 
to some extent have a respect for these executive fans who are more 
knowledgeable than they are, and have greater fan social capital. However, 
when the situation becomes an extreme quarrel on censorship, to some other 
fans the executive fans are perceived as ‘abusing fan power’, ‘less 
knowledgeable in fan culture’, ‘using double standard on regulating’, ‘being 
retaliative and selfish’, or even being guilty of ‘dereliction of their duty within 
the community’. This would suggest that the contradiction between fans and the 
moderator group is irreconcilable, and not just in TVoC’s tieba, as Baidu 
Tieba’s jingyanzhi exchange system has advanced and empowered executive 
fans into the dominant positions. 
In summary, this chapter has explored the online fan community of 
TVoC (2012), suggesting that hierarchies do indeed exist within Baidu Tieba. 
Through Internet-based communication, users are able to come together over a 
wide variety of topics and interests, in addition to overcoming geographical 
distance (Baym, 2007), leading to the formation of online fan communities. 
Thus to explore fan communities, discussions around hierarchy and power 
seems inevitable, as many other scholars have agreed (Thornton, 1996; 
Macdonald, 1998; Hills, 2002; Williams, 2004). Within the fan hierarchy of 
TVoC’s tieba, it is the bazhu who hold the dominant position in the fan 
community, as they have greater subcultural capital, social capital and 
discursive power. The jingyanzhi (credits) exchange system empowers fairly, 
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and ensures executive fans the greatest levels of power and position in 
regulating the rest of the fans’ online behaviour, discussion and interpretations 
of texts. However, this research is obviously restricted to one qualitative 
research method only, the audience reception method, and this chapter has used 
that method to look into what fans have said and done, and attempted to 
interpret the meanings drawn from the viewpoints of critical scholars. To 
further understand how fans view their own status and power, parallel 
interviews with particular fans, or discourse analysis of online postings, may be 
needed to substantiate my research. This critical analysis of the ways in which 
fan hierarchy and power have been affected and exercised by TVoC fans’ 
engagement on Baidu Tieba, in relation to Chinese government political policy 
guidance and industry interference, could provide further insights into issues of 
fan community, power and hierarchy which fall outside Western research.  
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Chapter 8: From Strategies to Tactics: Fan 
Productivity and Creativity within Baidu Tieba 
for The Voice Of China (2012) 
 
Tactics can never fully overcome strategy; yet the strategies cannot 
prevent the tactician from striking again. 
  – Henry Jenkins (1992) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the fan community and hierarchy of TVoC (2012) 
within Baidu Tieba (tieba), where executive fans (bazhu) have dominant power 
over other fans, as they regulate the content and meanings of posted text to 
control the information flow in the space. The regulations and rules made by 
bazhu contain a stringent list of banned topics, including discussion of politics, 
religion, eroticism, privacy invasion, and humiliating quarrels. This chapter 
moves on to look at how fans within such a community actively resist such 
control by ‘poaching’ and appropriating cultural texts in creative ways.  
The aim of this chapter is twofold: firstly to explore to what extent 
TVoC fans engaged with the show tactically and creatively within Baidu Tieba, 
and, more importantly, to what ends they practiced their creativity. This chapter 
will examine examples from TVoC’s tieba, focusing on the main themes of fan 
creativities and the ways in which fans practiced their productive works. It also 
explores not only the enthusiasm of the fandom of TVoC (2012), but also the 
purposes of their fan creativities, based on the affective bond between fan and 
fan object and the impact of these on the substance of participation and 
interactive support. Although Baidu Tieba is a space where fans’ engagements 
were highly censored and regulated, fans could practice creativities at the micro 
level, as a form of resistance from the bottom of the power hierarchy.  
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First of all, this chapter will briefly review and apply Michel de 
Certeau’s notion of ‘strategies and tactics’ to fan creativity. Then, it will 
pinpoint the themes and patterns apparent within fan creativities on TVoC’s 
tieba that differentiate their particular fandom identities from those of other 
fans or non-fans. It will focus on examples of fans’ engagement, such as fan 
fiction, fan art, creating videos and gifs, character analysis and fan criticisms. 
The regulations imposed within Baidu Tieba, which were investigated in the 
previous chapter, can be seen as examples of ‘strategy’ (de Certeau, 1984) as 
mediated by the bazhu from their position of strength, employing the property 
and authority that belonged exclusively to the literary ‘landowners’ (Jenkins, 
1992, p. 45) of TVoC (2012). 
In contrast to the concept and practice of ‘strategy’, this chapter is 
interested in exploring the notion of ‘tactics’ (de Certeau, 1984) employed from 
the bottom up, where fans within Baidu Tieba practiced creativity in resisting 
government regulations and media censorship. Drawn from de Certeau’s notion 
of strategies and tactics, and fan studies and subcultural studies (Abercrombie 
and Longhurst, 1997; Jenkins, 1992; Scott, 2008, 2013; Sandvoss, 2011; 
Crawford, 2012; Hartley, 2012; Salkowitz, 2012), this chapter explores two 
tactics identified as fan creativities within TVoC’s Baidu Tieba: e gao (online 
spoofs) as a new subcultural phenomenon and tu cao (fan criticism) as 
collective resistance by fans. The terms ‘e gao’ and ‘tu cao’ will be explained 
in detail in the following sections.  
Both are Chinese terms used to describe particular fan creativities 
within Chinese online cultures. The English translations provided for them 
cannot fully explain their meanings and uses by Chinese audiences. In order to 
understand fan creativities among Chinese online fan communities, this chapter 
suggests that these two phenomena are the major fan practices which need to be 
addressed and discussed.  
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8.2 Application of ‘tactics’ to fan creativity  
By tactics, this chapter refers to de Certeau’s (1984) notion that everyday 
creativity proliferates in minute discursive practices, but is simultaneously 
disciplined by macro-structural forces. Strategies and tactics, as two forms of 
power, are the terms used by de Certeau to explain the resistance and power 
relations between producer and consumer. According to de Certeau (1984, p. 
38), strategies ‘are actions within a place of power that have enforced systems 
of distribution’ and the systems referred to include institutions, organisations 
and authorities who utilise their power to shape, direct, or control the behaviour 
of individuals. Tactics are applied by individuals who then appropriate the 
products of such strategic authority for their own ends.  
Drawing on the Certeau’s binary of strategic and tactical reading and 
poaching of texts, Jenkins suggests that ‘tactics can never fully overcome 
strategy; yet the strategies cannot prevent the tactician from striking again’ 
(1992, p. 45). As interpreted by Jenkins (1992), tactics belong to the mobile 
population of the dispossessed and the powerless, gaining in speed and mobility 
what they lack in stability. Such concepts have also been employed by media 
studies scholars to explain the relationship between media producers and 
consumers. Paul Booth (2008) claims that producers and consumers are at war 
with one another over meaning, and suggests that the strategies of the producer 
determine the tactical uses of media. While producers encode meaning through 
strategies of power, consumers tactically decode their own meanings (Hall, 
1980). Nevertheless, this chapter goes beyond the encoding/decoding model in 
understanding the tactics of fans’ online engagement. It aims to unfold the fan 
creativity and resistance which resides within the Baidu Tieba space.  
Fans will initially consume text, as suggested by Booth (2008), and then 
they may ‘poach’ text (Jenkins, 1992), reinterpret it (Baym, 2000), or make ‘a 
tactical response’ to it (Tulloch and Jenkins, 1995). The new media technology 
represented by Web 2.0 has given rise to the theory and practice of user-
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generated content (known as UGC) which has become a new style of media 
culture – participatory culture. When fan groups entered the new media age, 
they quickly become a prime force in the first wave of participatory culture. 
Fans use texts to create something entirely different by combining and 
reworking them; they use digital technology to create, to change, to appropriate, 
to poach, and to write. Jenkins describes fans/readers not simply as poachers, 
but also as ‘nomads’ who are always in movement, ‘not here or there’, not 
constrained by permanent property ownership but rather constantly advancing 
upon another text, appropriating new materials, and making new meanings 
(1992, p.36). Thus, the boundary between producer and consumer is now 
blurring, allowing fans to produce their work based upon their own 
interpretations within fan community cultures.  
Fandom has become a participatory culture that transforms the 
experience of media consumption into the production of new texts, indeed into 
the production of new cultures and new communities (Hills, 2002). Within 
TVoC’s Baidu Tieba, fans actively updated posts with their creations of fan 
fiction, fan art, folk songs and fan videos, which not only appeared to 
demonstrated their fan identities but also their resistance to the cultural power 
of media authorities. However, this chapter is not aimed at arguing about the 
‘democratised fan creativity’ which has become ubiquitous in Western 
countries, but rather at exploring fan creativity and productivity within the 
restrained and regulated space of fandom which exists in China, suggesting that 
fans are not only a spur for a deeper appreciation of the original text, but also 
that they use knowledge and criticism in making an effort to challenge the 
existing authority and regulation.  
This chapter suggests that in the case of TVoC’s teiba, the strategies 
applied from the top of the hierarchy were the jingyanzhi (经验值, credits) 
exchange system and the tieba regulations which were put in place by authority 
powers. Simultaneously, fans were able to tactically respond to these strategies 
through their ‘movements that change the organization of a space’ (de Certeau, 
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1984, p. 38). Here, Baidu Tieba as a space full of tactical movements, used and 
customised by active fans who remade them into what they needed in order to 
subvert and divert the dominant power through their own conceptual, creative 
and political practices. The ability of the fans to change the organisation of the 
online space was primarily achieved by their practices and creativity. From this 
stance it is possible to state that readers and fans might fight from a position of 
power and authority relative to media regulators, in order to create for 
themselves a level of freedom of movement at the expense of acquiring 
resources. Indeed fans’ tactical and creative practices are determined by the 
strategies upon which they are based.   
 
8.3 E gao (online spoofs) as a New Subcultural Phenomenon  
This section will explore and examine how TVoC (2012)’s fans practiced 
creativity in the form of e gao (online spoofs) within the Baidu Tieba space. 
The e gao phenomenon began to emerged on the Chinese Internet in 2006. The 
first well-known example was a 20-minute video spoof entitled A Bloody Case 
over a Steamed Bun. This was a video made by Hu Ge, a sound engineer and 
freelancer, in response to Chinese film director Chen Kaige’s blockbuster film 
Promise (Wuji). Promise, which was released in 2005, topped all previous 
domestic blockbusters, with a budget of ¥300 million ($37.5 million). Hu Ge 
made the spoof video in order to express his extreme disappointment with this 
heavily promoted film which had been aimed at winning box office success 
across East Asia. The spoof contained a mixture of comic text and subversive 
criticism of political and social issues in China. Soon after A Bloody Case over 
a Steamed Bun became popular on the Internet, Chinese video satire came to 
widespread domestic and international attention (Meng, 2011).  
This section will not focus on professional e gao works produced by 
professional practitioners, these being extreme cases that have had evident 
social influences. However, in recent years, new technologies and the Internet 
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have greatly reduced the barriers to production and distribution, hence 
gradually lowering the threshold for more general participation in online e gao 
production. The lower barrier to entry has expanded access to innovative and 
creative ideas, aided by easier ways to employ new technologies, such as 
simplified editing software. It can be said that e gao has become a subcultural 
phenomenon in China which has flooded the online space and which 
deconstructs serious themes to entertain people with comic effect, 
‘characterised by humour, revelry, subversion, grassroots spontaneity, defiance 
of authority, mass participation and multi-media high-tech’ (Huang, 2006). 
In TVoC (2012)’s Baidu Tieba, the search engine service allows 
searches for key words, to trace back existing posts within each tieba. The 
search results for ‘e gao’ show that more than 4,239 posts involved e gao topics 
and 200 of them had ‘e gao’ in the title, as named by the fans who had posted 
and identify their works as such. While acknowledging e gao as a subcultural 
phenomenon that disseminates individuality, satirises society, subverts classic 
texts, and deconstructs tradition, most Chinese scholars seem to hold essentially 
negative positions and critical views of e gao culture. Professor Wen Rumin 
from Peking University argues that the deconstruction and subversion of classic 
texts despises, distorts and profanes authority and tradition. He believes that the 
e gao phenomenon, incorporated into the world of business, will lead Chinese 
society towards cultural degeneration. Researcher Xu Youyu appeals for the 
establishment of a certain moral ‘bottom line’ for online e gao. Moreover, 
Professor Zheng Yuanzhe sees e gao culture as nothing but the netizen’s 
carnival, releasing public spirits, but as briefly as fireworks. Scholar Cai Qi 
examines and explains the resistance to e gao culture and argues it is only a 
ceremonial form of resistance, as it faces structural constraints from political 
and economic forces, suppression by the current mainstream ideology, political 
incorporation and commercial culture incorporation. In most of these studies, e 
gao neither qualify as rational debates aiming to achieve consensus nor have 
they produced any visible policy consequences. But they constitute a significant 
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component of civic culture that offers both political criticism and emotional 
bonding for participants in China. What is less discussed is how since 2006 the 
e gao culture has become embedded into Chinese fan culture as part of 
everyday fan practices.  
In considering suppression by mainstream ideology and political 
incorporation, it can be seen that the e gao phenomenon sparks fear in the heart 
of the CCP’s concern with its regime and maintaining ‘hexie shehui’ 
(harmonious society). Consequently, the SAPPRFT and the Ministry of 
Information Industry reacted to the e gao phenomenon in an attempt to 
establish an effective monitoring system of online audio-video production. The 
SAPPRFT issued ‘Regulations on Administration of Internet-based Audio-
Video Program Services’ (互联网视听节目服务管理规定) applying from 31 January 
2008, which allows only state-owned or state-controlled companies to operate 
audio-video websites and requires all existing audio-video websites to obtain 
renewable licenses. Hu Qiheng, the head of the China Internet Association, 
even claims that e gao (online spoofs) of the ‘red classics’ (红色经典) and 
‘traditional culture’ (传统文化) cannot be tolerated as they will hurt the nation’s 
feelings. Such grandiloquent speech about national feelings indicates the 
concerns of the Chinese elite, who may not always fully understand (or be 
willing to understand) the grassroots level of participation as well as the 
political expression involved. In the face of censorship, the e gao phenomenon 
has gradually becomes an alternative means of ‘conducting political discussions 
using entertainment discourses’ in post-socialist Chinese society, as Meng 
Bingchun (2011, p. 34) has claimed. 
This thesis would argue that the e gao phenomenon has not disappeared 
or been undermined by policy restrain, but rather has becoming more 
ubiquitous and pervasive, as a form of online fan practice that is full of 
interconnected creativity and tactical resistance. In contrast to most of the 
claims in the literature reviewed above, this thesis believes it is necessary to re-
examine e gao culture by taking into account burgeoning online fandom and 
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fan creativity, adopting as it does the form and political implications of e gao in 
the digital environment.  
To focus on Chinese fans’ online creativity requires some sense of what 
e gao is as a new kind of subcultural phenomenon, and how Chinese fans 
practice e gao culture. In this respect, this thesis will explore the meaning of e 
gao and how it has developed since 2006 in China. The character for ‘e’ means 
‘evil,’ and for ‘gao’ means ‘to make fun of’. By combined these two words, the 
phrase created is a new multi-media expression that makes fun of original 
works, often with malicious intent. It can be traced to the Japanese concept of 
‘kuso’, an Internet subculture that deconstructs serious literature or artistic 
materials to entertain people. Following the arrival of this Japanese subculture 
in mainland China in 2002, its meaning and political implications shifted 
towards tactical resistance by way of appropriation, imitation, parody, irony and 
resignification of existing cultural texts.  
In recent years the range of online spoof objects has been widened, and 
is no longer limited to ‘red classics’ and traditional culture, but has extended to 
high school textbooks, historical heroes, reality television, pop music, movies, 
film stars and news presenters. Moreover, the practice of e gao has diversified 
into not only the format of video, but also to the photoshopping of pictures, gifs, 
art, fiction, digital memes etc. 
Posted on 14 November 2013 at TVoC’s Baidu Tieba, fan Xiadelan 
created an online video spoof of TVoC (2012). Adopting the formatted narrative 
of TVoC (2012), this 7-minute video spoof turned the original contestants into 
comic characters from One Hundred Thousand Bad Jokes (十万个冷笑话), a series 
of Chinese comics that consisted of several parodies of classic animations and 
comics, mostly from China and Japan, but also included some Western 
fairytales, as well as some original mini-series. In the spoof, the original texts 
of the judges and their facial expressions and conversations were montaged and 
re-contextualised. In summary, the primary target of this spoof was the show, 
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and it compounded various trending discussion topics and issues on the Internet 
around TVoC (2012). 
 It made an obvious contrast between the poor, ‘talented’ contestants 
and the over-performing judges. First of all, the programme replaces the 
original contestants with three comic characters with different background 
stories and dreams: Niuren (牛人), Huluxiongdi (葫芦兄弟), and Xiaolong (小龙). 
In order to interpret the fan resistance evidenced in the online video spoof, this 
chapter will textually analyse two of the comic contestants in detail: Niuren and 
Xiaolong. The first ‘contestant’ – a comic ox – sings Michael Jackson’s well-
known song ‘Beat it’ completely out of tune; he was introduced in the 
programme as follows:  
The first contestant comes from the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the 
niuren (the ox man) Andy. He has been always hoping his mother would 
get to see him singing on the stage while he has been away from home 
and has worked hard for this for years. Today Andy comes to The Voice 
of China, he wants to sing for his mother, and sing for his distant relatives 
across the ocean. Hope they all will be proud of Andy. 
 
Figure 7. First contestant (niuren) of the video spoof 
This description of Andy in this introduction is as a niuren (牛人) which comes 
from the other side of the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese character niuren (牛人) 
literally means ‘the ox man’. But the Chinese connotation of this term also 
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means to praise a person’s ability and talent. In contrast to his status, Andy’s 
singing of Jackson’s song ‘Beat it’ is absolutely not ‘talented’, as his voice was 
out of tune and his words unclear. In response to Andy’s performance, the four 
judges gave him considerable affirmation and encouragement. The video spoof 
mix cut some of the most exaggerated facial expressions and performances of 
the judges.  
 The satire here aimed to create new meanings to criticise the judges’ 
artificial performances and professional music commentary through the 
combined effect of comic presentation and subtly changed lyrics, from ‘beat it’ 
to ‘be lie’. It also reflects the voice of most of the audiences, who think the 
contestants’ personal stories are deliberately arranged by the production team. 
As many contestants come to the stage to ‘sing for his mother, sing for the 
distant relatives’, or sing for their father or a deceased person, the judges give 
them a pass, even if their singing is terrible. This plot represents the opinions of 
a large group of audiences and fans who think the four judges are performing in 
the show through expressing their compassion and concern. It reflects issues 
around contestants’ touching stories or even possibly ‘cheating’ stories, stories 
which had been widely discussed on the Internet and had turned out to be 
industry-manipulated fakes. The background story of Andy epitomises many 
other contestants who had been criticised by audiences as winning by selling 
stories rather than through their real talent for singing. This online spoof 
demonstrated fans’ ability to discern the ‘truth’ rather than simply accept what 
they were given to watch, as well as their resistance to mainstream commercial 
culture and ideologies.  
 The last ‘contestant’ is a popular game character called Xiaolong who in 
the video sang the song I love you from a Hong Kong comedy martial arts 
movie The Eagle Shooting Heroes (1993). With the four judges collectively 
standing up and emotionally applauded for Xiaolong, the competition ends with 
a cliched ‘happy ending’. With a ridiculing tone, the spoof introduced him as:  
Xiaolong is not coming from a noble family. He gained people’s 
recognition and expectations through his hard work and effort. Can he 
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prove his own worth through singing tonight? Will he have a magnificent 
transfiguration after his hard work? He has been highly anticipated… 
 
 
Figure 8. Contestant Xiaolong singing I Love You 
‘Hard working boy’, ‘born of ordinary’, and ‘the competition song’, the 
fragmented information collaged together is alluding to one real contestant in 
the first season of TVoC, Liang Bo, who was the champion of the competition 
with his singing of a ‘red song’, I love you China.  
 Two main points emerge from this statement: first, it intentionally 
addresses Xiaolong’s family background as ‘not a noble family’. As Liang Bo 
was crowned for his rendition of this song, there were many gossip stories 
about his background on the Internet. Many audiences questioned his victory 
and thought his success was due to his father's sponsorship of the show. 
Although this rumour has since been proved to be false, it did reflect Chinese 
audiences’ doubt and distrust of the authenticity and fairness of the programme, 
and the dominant media. Second, the storyline invokes a scene of the finale 
with Liang Bo singing I love you China in rock style. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
the song I love you China is not a typical ‘red song’, but it indeed shows the 
intention of the production company of TVoC to be ‘politically correct’; and it 
also demonstrates the smooth operation of ideological control in today’s China. 
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Nevertheless, the spoof video and statement demonstrate that Chinese 
audiences are disgusted with the text of patriotism. The satire made here by 
fans is intended to ironically express their dislike of such deliberate imposition 
of ideological control in popular culture artefacts.  
 By mixing together images and characters from some very well-known 
cultural products with the typical narrative and style of TVoC, while making 
constant reference to relevant issues that had already been discussed on the 
Internet by audiences, this online video spoof successfully creates a comic yet 
creative text that ridicules the programme. In this way, and to a certain degree, 
e gao allows fans to be more creative in creating indirect political implications 
through their subcultural capital.  
New technologies allows more ordinary people to engage with this kind 
of (sub)cultural production. Thus, many scholars believe e gao has empowered 
grassroots audiences and given them voices to express concerns which are often 
neglected by the mainstream media. In Alexander Lugg’s examination of 
Chinese video spoofs, he suggests the e gao phenomenon can be understood in 
terms of James C. Scott’s ‘weapons of the weak’ and Václav Havel’s ‘power of 
the powerless’, as they could disturb the hierarchical status quo of the Chinese 
media (Lugg, 2013). The form of video spoofs allows fans to creatively express 
discontent with a range of government policies and political–social issues.  
The state broadcaster, China Central Television (CCTV), generally 
perceived as full of ideology-driven indoctrination (Meng, 2011, p, 42), has 
been criticised and satirised by many fans. CCTV’s famous news report 
programme, China Legal Reports, is probably the most targeted object of video 
spoofs. Adopting the standardised tone and traditional style of typical CCTV 
news reporting that any Chinese audience could easily identify, fans make 
video spoofs to target political and social issues that may arouse collective 
resonances among users of the Internet in China. In this respect, e gao indeed 
allows Chinese netizens to reclaim expressive space in Chinese–language 
cyberspace. And its meaning seems to be shifting from personal engagement 
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with popular culture into political criticism. In regard to TVoC, fans adopted its 
name (directly translated as China Good Voice) and format to create many 
video spoofs relating to social issues. For instance, China Good Vacation was 
intended to remind Chinese consumers to beware of tourist traps.  
However, in order to be precise and rigorous, this chapter suggests that 
the e gao phenomenon should not be regarded too optimistically. Within 
TVoC’s Baidu Tieba, fans can only repost online video spoofs from licensed 
audio-video websites such as Souhu, Tudou, and Youku, with their own or 
other fans’ creative video spoofs needing first to be uploaded to licensed audio-
video websites. This means that these video spoofs have already been censored 
and filtered. During the research process, many posts were retrieved when 
searching for the key words ‘e gao’. However, no content could be seen when 
they were clicked on. The picture below shows the official explanation of a 
visit rejection or deleted posts: 
Sorry, the post you visit has been concealed, and temporarily cannot be 
seen. Posts cannot be seen if user’s account is blocked. Hidden message is 
not deleted and can be seen once the user gets unblock status.  
 
 
Figure 9. Official explanation of a visit rejection or deleted posts 
Such regulations and implemented censorship will only cause more resentment 
and resistance from Chinese audiences. Disguised in the form of parody, e gao 
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practitioners believed they could circumvented official censorship to speak out 
the ‘truth’ and their real opinions. Despite this type of censorship, when 
presented in the forms of art and fiction online spoofs are more likely to escape 
political censorship and remain visible online. Pictures and fiction are less easy 
to detect and therefore less likely to be deleted by regulators such as the bazhu 
of tieba. Political resistances have become embedded in fans’ creative works, 
by their use of ironic, subtle, implied and obscure expressions. In summary, e 
gao has provided fans with a creative way to vent social pressures, negative 
emotions and feelings. Blindly criticising, controlling and restraining the e gao 
phenomenon will not solve the fundamental social-political problems in 
Chinese society. 
 
8.4 Tu cao (fan criticism) as Fan Resistance 
It is the bazhu of TVoC’s Baidu Tieba who have the power to put other fans’ 
posts into certain categories, listing them as ‘show-related resources’, ‘fab 
pictures’, ‘music criticism’, ‘original creation’ etc. As the last section examined, 
some fans’ work was sometimes suddenly removed from tieba without notice; 
in contrast, some of their posts were promoted by bazhu, highlighted them as 
‘quality posts’ and thus making them more visible to the community.  
However, while this promotion system may have helped to encourage 
fan engagement to some extent, it was not the fundamental motivation for fans 
to do creative work in the Baidu Tieba space. When fans interactively engaged 
with TVoC (2012) with creative work based on their affective bond between 
themselves and their fan objects, they used their own language and ways of 
identifying such work. When fans criticised the show or contestants, they called 
their work ‘tsukkomi’ (吐槽, criticise), meaning they were going to criticise 
strongly, but also with humour, commenting in a jokey way. Tsukkomi 
originated from the Japanese ‘突っ込み’ , meaning to ‘butt in’ – to criticise in a 
violent way but also with humour. This principally means to make seemingly 
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negative comments in a funny way, and is seen as a kind of language art. High 
quality tsukkomi has also been called ‘神吐槽’, meaning to criticise with rich 
knowledge and a great sense of humour.  
Within Baidu Tieba, fans usually use brackets as a format to highlight 
their posts of tu cao. In this way some fans will put ‘(吐槽)’ at the beginning of 
the post title to indicate the category, the purpose and motivation of a post; 
others will put ‘(一起来吐槽)’ which means ‘to criticise together on something’ in 
order to show collective resistance to regulation and control by bazhu, and to 
the content of TVoC (2012). Although the term tu cao comes from Japanese 
anime, comic and games culture it has changed its meaning and been shaped 
within the context of mainland China to meet the country’s unique social and 
cultural context.  
As with e gao, the process of searching for the key words ‘tu cao’ in 
TVoC’s Baidu Tieba reveals more than 77,249 relevant posts including 1,972 of 
them with the term ‘tu cao’ in their titles. Thus there are almost 100 times as 
many tu cao posts as e gao posts. This quantitative data directly reveals the 
popularity that this other cultural term – tu cao – has generated as a subcultural 
phenomenon in China.  
From a grammatical perspective, ‘tu cao’ is a noun, however fans 
generally used it as a verb. They use the verb ‘tu cao’ to identify their creative 
fan works and simultaneously to attract attention from other fans. In this respect, 
fans interactively engaged with TVoC (2012) through creative work based on 
the affective bond between themselves as fans and their fan objects. Moreover, 
their tu cao practices helped to establish a communication bond among fan 
communities. When fans criticised the show and wider issues, they identified 
their work as tu cao practices, meaning they were going to criticise and 
comment in a very strong way, but also with humour.  
In a way, tu cao are similar to e gao (online spoofs) in that they both 
emphasise the aspect of humour and irony. Originating in Japanese cartoons as 
a way of describing and exposing unreasonable behaviours or expressions in a 
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humorous way, tu cao is similar to the Japanese term tsukkomi, but is not a 
direct equivalent. The latest edition of the Dictionary of Modern Standard 
Chinese defines the term ‘tu cao’ as ‘quick, sharp criticism of dialogue or 
events that are perceived as violating norms’. To put it more clearly, tu cao can 
be generally and frequently used in situations in which a fault is pointed out 
directly and without respect but in most cases with a sense of humour. Thus tu 
cao can be understood as ‘to tease somebody or something’. For most fans tu 
cao is a way of criticising on the Internet but without using directly violent 
language. Most tu cao zhe (the term refers to people who like to criticise) carry 
an attitude of ridicule and accusation, but also of humour. They see tu cao as 
satiric and ironic, but harmless. 
So far, there have only been a few limited academic studies examining 
tu cao as a cultural phenomenon. And it was not until 2014 that the term tu cao 
was granted admission to the respected realm of official Chinese lexicons, 
along with another 100 new terms, many of them being slang or online 
neologisms, such as ‘diao si’ (loser), ‘shengnü’ (leftover woman), and 
‘baifumei’ (white, rich and beautiful). The Chinese public gradually accepted 
these new words which were generated from the Internet in an era of new media, 
according to a news report by People.cn (2014). At present, online tu cao has 
become a new norm in mainland China. Widespread tu cao practices on 
websites such as Douban, Tianya, and Baidu Tieba, have fostered a large 
number of cyber language terms, online neologisms and (sub)cultural 
phenomena. 
Professor Wang Fang and Wu Jun (2015) have characterised tu cao as 
an emerging subcultural phenomenon in mainland China, through their 
exploration and examination of its social significance and subcultural 
mechanisms. They point out that current Chinese society is in a transition 
period, which is full of contradictions and problems. Thus tu cao as an ironic 
way of expression allows people to release resulting pressures and vent their 
frustrations tactfully. They also suggest tu cao constitutes both rituals of 
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resistance and expressions of civil discourse power couched in an entertaining 
way.  
Building upon their argument, this chapter suggests that tu cao is a 
popular form of fan practice as collective resistance that has emerged on the 
Chinese Internet in online fan spaces. The main object of various fan 
productions with tu cao is not mainstream culture but popular culture and is 
embedded with representative ‘commercialisation’ and vulgar content. The 
emergence of this type of resistance can be attributed to the subcultural 
characteristics and traditions of the Internet’s grassroots producers, principally 
the fans who use it as a forum for communication and creativity.  
In the Baidu Tieba of TVoC (2012), user Yi Mi Xing Guang posted on 
12 September 2012, appealing to other fans to engage with the tu cao of the 
show. This post then generated 5,269 responses from other fans. Here, fans 
gathered together, analysing the content and plots from each episode, such as 
the interactions among the four judges, their conversations, facial expressions, 
and even semantics. For example, there is a tu cao of episode 4 of the first 
season of TVoC, in which one fan describes the plot of the show exaggeratedly, 
by saying ‘Zheng Hong, known as the Chinese Adele, had four judges turned 
towards her’. The judge Yang Kun made concessions in order to gain this 
contestant: 
Yang Kun: The way the other three judges are looking at you, suddenly 
makes me feel they are being very kind to you. Better than I am. So don’t 
choose me today. Even if you choose me, I do not want to train you. Why? 
Because I saw the sincerity of other judges; they really need you.  
Yu Chengqing being surprised: Yang Kun is so not himself today! 
Yang Kun: Of course I don’t mind if you chose me. lol  
Yu Chengqing standing up and shouting: What f*ck! I want to hit you 
with Jiaduobao (加多宝)! (12 September 2012, Yi Mi Xing Guang) 
Another fan then commented and tu cao-ed this plot by saying: ‘This is a 
creative product placement! Yu Chengqing did well. But I wonder how much 
money he took from Jiaduobao’. His words revealed his discontent and obvious 
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resistance to commercialised and vulgarised mass culture products. Jiaduobao 
is a herbal drink producer that endorsed TVoC (2012) with a ¥60 million (US 
$9.43 million) sponsorship deal. This sponsorship fee was considered very high 
compared to other reality programmes in China. Thus, some fans complained 
about the advertisements and product placement of Jiaduobao in TVoC (2012) 
as being too direct, excessive and appearing too frequently, aspects which 
widely caused strong dislike and resistance to the brand among fans: 
Wo De Meng 957: I know there will have to be tu cao of the advertising 
of Jiaduobao; tell me I am not the only one (16 August 2012). 
Lan Zhou La Mian: Unable to tu cao... the advertising makes me sick (22 
August 2012). 
Miss6: (tu cao) Please do not insert The Voice of China in the ad! (22 
August 2012). 
Music er: TVoC is China’s ‘good stories’ and China’s ‘good advertising’. 
It will receive massive tu cao tomorrow (17 September 2012). 
The huge commercial success of TVoC in 2012 caused general discontent about 
Canxing Production’s excessive promotional processes, including the 
derivatives of the programme (such as the film adapted from TVoC (2012), 
offline charity events, and other peripheral products). Chinese fans tu cao-ing 
of the content of TVoC (2012), its celebrities and contestants, and the 
advertisements and product placement within it, showed their strong resistance 
to the Chinese television industry. Examples of fans’ tactical resistance can be 
found within TVoC’s tieba space, both from their demonstrations of critical 
attitudes to politically-charged issues of power, ownership, consumption and 
regulation in China, and from the ways in which they performed and practiced 
their creativity, by means of tu cao, which collectively and tactically resisting 
certain issues and events.  
This thesis does not neglect the significance of creative works from fans 
as supporters displaying enthusiasm rather than resistance or scepticism. 
However, the focus of this chapter is on fans’ tactical practices within Baidu 
Tieba. Through the analysis of the tu cao phenomenon, this chapter tries to 
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demonstrate a moment of transition at which the political role of the Internet 
was expanding. Although the tactics of fans cannot significantly diminish the 
power of broadcast media, fans can and will continue to fight for their 
discursive power and free expressions within the Chinese Internet. 
Fans’ practice of tu cao on the Internet has became an important cultural 
phenomenon in mainland China in recent years, with the new digital 
environment expanding the scope and reach of fans’ activities and forms. Tu 
cao often appears in online spaces, and arises after all kinds of social events. 
Fans could make individual and collective tu cao in a creative and tactical way 
to resist hegemony and censorship, and the commercialisation of cultural 
artefacts. Indeed, tu cao is not just the embodiment of fan creativity. On other 
network platforms (such as Weibo, Weixin, Douban, etc), there are also various 
forms of tu cao adopted by Chinese Internet users as forms of tactical resistance 
to emerging social-cultural events and hegemony (class, cultural, ideology). In 
the case of TVoC’s tieba, fans gathered together and engaged with each other 
within the show’s online community. Their creative fan practices mainly 
focused on two aspects of resistance, one being the over-commercialisation of 
television programmes and product placement, the other the restrictions of 
government censorship and monitoring on China's network platforms.  
 
8.5 The political implications of fan creativity 
8.5.1 Circumventing censorship 
In following the Internet regulations and key documents issuing from the CCP, 
Baidu Tieba is responsible for what is published on its part of the network. As 
the previous chapter examined, within TVoC’s Baidu Tieba, it is the bazhu 
appointed by Baidu Tieba officials as executive fans who can exercise 
dominant power over other fans, regulating content and meanings of texts to 
further control the information flow in this space. This multilayered, self-
censoring structure, consisting of fans regulating other fans, is in accordance 
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with the CCP’s response to the challenge of the Internet as a decentralised 
medium - ‘the decentralization of control’ (Lin, Tao & Liu, 2003). 
Technological convergence and the development of the Internet and new media 
have turned Internet services providers (ISPs) into content controllers, even 
though they are aware that the communications administration does not monitor 
them continuously. To avoid causing problems with the regulators, ISPs such as 
Baidu Tieba censor themselves and have in effect become part of the state’s 
control regime. This situation makes it necessary but difficult to explore 
political resistance as it emerges in non-conventional formats of fan creativities. 
Compared to audiences in the democratic settings of Western countries, 
Chinese audiences face long-established oppression from a decentralised 
censorship process which combines coercive measures with self-censorship. 
Most Chinese audiences/fans feel powerless in their everyday lives, both in 
online and real spaces, and, as a consequence, they experience difficulties in 
exerting power in expressing political opinions. Consequently, fans’ posts 
within Baidu Tieba which contain sensitive words will be automatically deleted 
or will be officially hidden by bazhu. Moreover, dissidents may be arrested if 
they directly take part in political activities that challenge the authority of the 
government or the CCP. As a previous chapter has examined, Chinese 
audiences/fans are not allowed to publicly vote for reality shows such as TVoC 
(2012), and those people being too critical about politics in mainland China are 
widely conceived as being ‘in danger’.  
Under these circumstances, ‘e gao’ and ‘tu cao’ both offer Chinese 
Internet users new popular forms of expression and communication that can 
undermine state control. As the scholar Meng argues, making fun of the 
establishment through online spoofs becomes a safer route of communication 
(Meng, 2011), and an alternative format for conducting political discussions. 
She also believes that the comic effect produced by e gao can have political 
connotations as ‘it satirizes those who possess the power to define the 
parameters of appropriate forms of speech’. On this point, Meng claims e gao is 
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a stylistic means of ‘smuggling ideas past a censor’ for Chinese Internet users 
(Meng, 2011, p. 81). The tu cao phenomena can also achieve radical re-
interpretation and re-contextualisation of political discourses through integrated 
multi-media materials. Both the direct control over political discussion and the 
indirect regulation exercised by ISP’s self-regulation will only cause more 
audiences to resist hegemonic power. However, although these new forms can 
easily avoid regulation and bypass censors, their very indirectness means that 
they will not lead to direct change of, or influence over, China’s current 
political environment. At least at present, such forms will not successfully 
achieve digital democracy (Jenkins, 2006) in China to match Jenkins’ example 
in the US context of popular culture having direct political effects on a 
presidential election. In fact, the so-called decentralisation of control is not seen 
as a positive factor but rather as a vicious circle, in that ‘decentralization leads 
to disorder; disorder leads to centralization; centralization leads to stagnation; 
stagnation leads to decentralization’, as Lin, Tao and Liu (2003, p. 11) have 
argued.  
8.5.2 Interactivity: engaging with social issues 
At present, China is undergoing a social transition period in which various 
social contradictions remain unsolved: the imbalance of wealth, environmental 
concerns, urbanisation, ethnic tensions, corruption, crises of confidence in 
education and food safety etc. All of these social conflicts cannot be simply 
resolved in a short period of time. Thus they have caused many Chinese people 
to feel powerless and confused about their current social status. Online 
communities such as Baidu Tieba provide fans with a means to express their 
distrust of the official news media and their discontent with political 
propaganda. In this way, the role of the Internet and new media goes beyond 
being a popular tool for expression; by using satire and parody embedded in 
creative works, fans can aim to engage with social-political issues, to make 
social comments and to collectively push forward social movements. 
Participators’ discontent and grievance are manifested through a variety of 
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wider critiques about social-political issues. Public discontent and grievance 
have erupted following some emerging public affairs and media events, and 
these triggered hidden social conflicts and class contradictions. Hence, tactical 
resistance arises against the normal status, which is that people in China endure 
in silence.  
Current social issues such as the seemingly irrational rises in house 
prices, serious air pollution in Beijing, unhealthy food sources, and inequitable 
educational opportunities, are constantly embedded in the online discourses of 
fan participation and interactivity. The participation in, and sharing of, fan 
creativities and activities cultivates decentralised grassroots communities. 
Through shared interests and common understanding of satires and critical 
spoofs, emotional bonds have been generated, constructed and disseminated 
among Chinese fans and wider Chinese Internet users. Fans gather together by 
making contributions to existing e gao and tu cao works, through reposts and 
improvements, enriching not only meaning but also creating collective forces.  
Bakhtin’s (1984) readings of the ‘carnivalesque’ allow for a more 
thoughtful and sensitive understanding of the tactical resistance of Chinese fans 
reflected in the everyday fan practices of e gao and tu cao works, and also in 
other forms. The notion of the ‘carnival’ and ‘carnivalesque’ not only 
permeates reality television but also online participatory culture. According to 
Bakhtin, carnival/carnivalesque content reconstructs a type of folk humour that 
challenges the hegemonic hierarchy, through laughter, masks, masquerades, 
and performance, and that allows for a temporary inversion of the hegemonic 
hierarchy. In her work on Bakhtin (1984), Meng (2011) has said that ‘carnival 
is not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, and everyone participates 
because its very idea embraces all the people’ as she emphasises links to the 
participatory nature of medieval carnivals (Meng, p. 47).  
Fans disseminate content as tactical resistance in entertaining ways such 
as e gao and tu cao. Thus within this ritual form of resistance, fans embrace a 
festive carnival atmosphere and are released from their institutional constraints. 
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The effect and influence of such resistance is difficult to measure directly, as 
there is no direct resolution to current social-political issues. However, what 
fans can achieve is a symbolic control of discursive power in society, and this 
enables them to enjoy equality, even though they do not have democratic power. 
Fans’ engagement with social-political issues can invoke common concerns 
within the people of China which go beyond their private lives and popular 
cultural consumption.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
9.1 Summary  
This study has explored China’s media production culture, as well as the media 
consumption culture of the nation. It has not only engaged with the fields of 
audience reception studies and television studies, but it also has implications for 
the wider field of cultural studies. Using Douglas Kellner’s (2011) multivalent 
approaches to culture, this thesis has explored, from the perspectives of political 
economy, text analysis, and audience reception, how Chinese audiences 
engaged with the reality television show TVoC (2012) through social media 
platforms. This thesis has been developed through six chapters grouped into 
three sections, each of which has answered certain aspects of the research 
questions asked in the introductory chapter. In the first section, the power of 
government media policies in shaping television industry and media content is 
highlighted. The political context for understanding how Canxing Production 
interpreted and implemented SAPPRFT’s media polices in the adaptation and 
localisation process of the imported format of The Voice in 2012 has been 
highlighted, together with a review of how these adaptations and localisations 
would further influence Chinese audiences’ online discussions and activities 
towards the show.  
 In the second section, and within this context, this study has explored 
and discussed the promotional strategies that Canxing Production used to 
promote TVoC in 2012, particularly addressing its Sina Weibo, and has 
explored the managed promotions and interactive illusions which Canxing 
Production provided for audiences. Furthermore, these chapters discussed and 
examined audiences’ engagement with TVoC (2012) on two social media 
platforms: Sina Weibo and Baidu Tieba. In doing so, this study has explored 
Chinese audiences’ participation and interactivity with TVoC (2012), through 
their critical, creative and political practices on both platforms. It has also 
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demonstrated how audiences interpreted political regulations and online 
censorship, and the extent to which they were free to engage with TVoC (2012) 
and practice fandom through social media. Both their engagement and 
resistance through social media are significant for the understanding of 
‘interactive television and participatory audiences’ in mainland China, as the 
title of this thesis suggests.  
Mixed methods were used to apply three methodological approaches to 
cultural investigations. Rather than viewing the issues from a single perspective, 
adopting a historical reception studies method together with online ethnography 
has allowed this research to look simultaneously at the relationships and the 
tensions between government media policies, the Chinese television industry, 
and audience reception. The following sections of this chapter will first 
summarise the key findings of this study through engagement with existing 
theory and methods. Then the ‘big picture’ implications of the relationship 
between the Chinese television industry, government media policy and Chinese 
audiences will be reflected upon. Finally, the limitations of this inquiry and 
suggestions for future research are also presented.  
 
9.2 Key findings 
To sum up, within the main relationships outlined, those between government 
media policy, the television industry and Chinese audiences, the key findings of 
this research relate to four main aspects: television production companies, 
SAPPRFT (government censorship), Chinese audiences and the role of social 
media platforms.  
9.2.1 SAPPRFT 
This thesis demonstrates that China’s television industry has undergone huge 
transformations since China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. Benefiting from 
cultural globalisation, China’s television market was opened up to international 
businesses and opportunities, and underwent a period of tremendous growth. 
 209 
 
However, during this time the media policy of the Chinese government 
continued to play a crucial role in regulating the Chinese media market as a 
whole and, more specifically, media content. Although then and now the state 
advocates a market-economy orientation for the Chinese television industry and 
media markets generally, concerns about its own legitimacy and ideological 
dominance remain its first priority.  
 In order to effectively investigate the Chinese government’s 
regulations and censorship over the media industry and its content, this study 
has briefly reviewed the history of television in mainland China. This review 
has looked at both television institutions and television content, and has 
demonstrated the significant developments and huge transformation of China’s 
television industry and systems from 1958 to the present day. This review 
demonstrates that over this time the role the party state plays in the Chinese 
television market remains central and powerful. By studying both the political 
environment and particular media policies of Chinese television, this thesis has 
mapped a wide-ranging picture of the complex relationships between the CCP, 
the government media regulator, television stations, and production companies. 
It provides significant context for understanding and explaining how the 
television industry interprets media policies and is subordinated to the state’s 
ideological dominance. 
This study has demonstrated that since the nationwide success of Super 
Girl in 2005, the control of the central regulator SAPPRFT (and its predecessor, 
SAPPRFT) over reality television programmes has become increasingly strict 
for a wide range of aspects, including content censorship, broadcasting time 
limits, and even the forms of audience participation allowed. Then two main 
regulatory media policies (put in place in 2011 and 2013) were particularly 
addressed, in order to analyse how SAPPRFT has attempted to curtail and 
control the Chinese television market with regard to imported foreign television 
formats. In doing so, this thesis highlights the most significant contextual issues 
for the importation, production and broadcasting of TVoC in 2012.  
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9.2.2 Television production companies 
In China’s media market, the television industry has undergone a 
transformation as, under the influence of media globalisation, it has became 
both transmedia and transnational in character. International television formats 
and content flow into China, and these inevitably influence the Chinese media 
market and shape online participatory culture in China.  
Despite media regulations and censorship, reality television is booming 
in mainland China, particularly since 2012. The popularity of reality television 
programmes in China has led to some industrial and academic exploration and 
discussion of the reasons for it. In regard to Canxing Production’s promotional 
strategies for TVoC in 2012, this study has highlighted the popularity and 
unprecedented success of the show, as well as two major issues caused by it. 
First, TVoC (2012)’s success encouraged an industry-wide importation of 
foreign television formats; it also generated massive audience engagement with 
such formats through social media platforms. The analysis of the Chinese 
television industry in Chapters 1 and 2 contributes to the current debates in 
China about the success of TVoC. The commercial success of TVoC has 
propelled Chinese TV show producers, from traditional broadcasters to video 
sites, to pursue and produce highly-rated shows that use well-established 
foreign TV show formats.  
 On the one hand, this thesis demonstrates the importance of television 
formats which are already successful in other countries, as they can facilitate 
the standardisation and quality of content between China and the rest of the 
world. It agrees with Waisbord’s (2004) point about global television formats 
providing new possibilities for cultural hybridisation within global TV 
exchanges. Thus, for most production companies in China, successful television 
formats offer the chance for domestic TV networks to achieve good audience 
ratings with lower costs and risk. Nevertheless, this study also challenges some 
scholars (Wang, 2013; Yu, 2012; Liang, 2012) who have argued that using an 
 211 
 
imported successful foreign television format can secure the success of a reality 
show in China.  
It also suggests that in practice it is not necessarily easier for local 
producers to localise TV formats than it is to produce new/original shows, thus 
taking a different view from Waisbord’s (2004) observation. To summarise, 
this thesis has argued that although production companies can benefit from 
using mature television formats which have already been successful elsewhere 
in the world, the localisation process for such foreign formats has been 
influenced heavily by the Chinese government’s media policies. The 
promotional strategies as explored in Chapter 2 and the managed interactions in 
the Weibosphere as discussed in Chapter 3 both demonstrate Canxing 
Production’s ideological interpretations, adaptation and implementation of 
government media policies. It has been seen that it is crucial for television 
producers to consciously apply political awareness while they localise 
television formats and content.  
To further evidence this argument, this study examines the wider scope 
of the institutional system of China’s television stations, and the power 
relationships between the state-owned broadcasters and private production 
companies. In particular, in the Introduction and Chapter 1, it addresses STVPB 
policy. This thesis demonstrates the links between the development of Chinese 
television industry and media policies, and suggests that the STVPB policy 
opens up opportunities for independent production companies and the 
penetration of global trade in cultural products in China. Although private 
ownership of television channels is still prohibited in China, the implementation 
of STVPB policy enlarges the possibilities for the importation of foreign 
television formats. In addition, this study reflects on the extent to which the 
Chinese television industry relies on government media policies, and 
production companies rely on the broadcasters. 
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9.2.3 Social media  
With regard to the success of TVoC in 2012, the second important debate is 
about the use of social media by the television industry as a promotional 
strategy. Significantly, this thesis has found that Chinese audiences cannot vote 
in reality television programmes. Consequently, Canxing Production had to 
interpret SAPPRFT’s updated regulations in this regard during the format 
localisation process. It also cooperated with a state-owned TV station (Zhejiang 
TV), sharing risks and revenues, and working together to steer and manipulate 
audience participation in the light of the ban on voting by audiences. As 
addressed many times in this thesis, SAPPRFT has authority over guiding the 
television industry’s operations and business imperatives in China. In its 
location between government regulations and audiences’ needs, this study has 
found that Canxing Production turned to providing its audiences with key 
factors such as ‘dream-fulfilment’ and ‘democracy’ by offering 
participatory/interactive opportunities through social media platforms. This 
finding engages with Jian and Liu’s (2009) exploration of fan voting in Super 
Girl, where they argue that, paradoxically, unpaid labour performed by fans 
delivers a promise of audience agency. Jian and Liu’s study highlights the ways 
production companies steer and manipulate audience’s participation.  
Likewise, in terms of industry strategies, this thesis addresses Canxing 
Production’s promotional strategies for TVoC (2012) through which it intended 
to encourage media convergence and audience participation by tapping into the 
interactive potential of digital technology. Chapter 2 analyses the 
participatory/interactive opportunities embedded within the weekly narrative of 
the first episode of the first season of TVoC. Through this analysis, it is argued 
that the Chinese television industry largely sold an illusion of ‘interactive 
opportunities’ to audiences to get the show promoted and to achieve high 
audience ratings. In doing so, Canxing Production mixed up the two 
terms/concepts of ‘participation’ and ‘interactivity’.  
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This study argues that the term ‘interactivity’ has become an important 
term and concept in the Chinese television industry which implies the passing 
of power to audiences. This point has engaged with Marshall’s (2004) 
definition of ‘interactivity’, which states that it has been overused by the new 
media industries in order to sell the distinctiveness and value of their new 
technologies, to the point where interactivity seems to represent little more than 
‘hyperbole, hucksterism and hype’. In addition, this thesis has also found that 
the Chinese television industry only offers Chinese audiences a ‘vision’ of 
participation, rather than the real power proclaimed as being provided by the 
industry itself. Chinese audiences had no direct interactive power, as their 
engagement could not be woven into the narrative and content of TVoC (2012). 
Therefore, this study has reflected and engaged with Jenkins’ (2004) argument 
in which the author states that all interactivities offer participation, but that not 
all participation can be interactive. 
 From 2005 to 2009, reality shows in China mainly provided audiences 
with ‘interactivity’ through text messaging, the conventional telephone, and 
online forums. Nowadays, the term ‘interactivity’ used by the industry largely 
refers to the use of social media platforms such as Sina Weibo (microblog). 
Social media in China, such as bulletin board systems, social networking sites, 
blogs, and microblogs, have offered numerous channels and various platforms 
for Chinese audiences to participate in cultural practices in pursuit of all kinds 
of fan objects (Zhang and Mao, 2013). Among these platforms, social 
networking sites are the most popular, and often contain the most audience 
engagement with television programmes. As demonstrated, the social media 
platform Sina Weibo played a significant role in promoting TVoC (2012). This 
exploration provides a potentially significant development in our understanding 
of audiences and their relationship with media (Deller, 2010), and of the 
convergence between old and new media and between producers and 
consumers (Jenkins, 2006). This study has found that almost all reality 
television programmes in China now operate at least one official microblog 
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account, as a complementary way of spreading programme information, and 
bridging audience communication and participation with the show.  
9.2.4 The value of audiences’ engagement 
In analysing audience engagement on two social media platforms, this thesis 
argues that audience discussions and practices on Baidu Tieba (non-official 
space) are to some extent different from the ones appearing on Sina Weibo 
(official space). For many Chinese audiences, the particular characteristics of 
social media platforms greatly determine the ways in which audiences respond 
to and engage with television programmes. As this thesis suggests, the 
boundary between ‘general audiences’ and ‘active fans’ is becoming blurred. It 
is not the aim of this study to define and distinguish fans from audiences, or to 
clarify a centralised or dominant culture as against subcultures within Chinese 
society. Such research would, in fact, be useful in investigating how audiences 
identify their own uses of social media. The official Sina Weibo site for TVoC 
(2012) offered Chinese audiences a platform to share their evaluations of the 
show and its actors (judges), their expressions of fandom and their critiques of 
the contestants.  
 In addition, Canxing Production used the Weibo site to build 
communications and interactions with celebrities, which together provided 
audiences with the illusion of getting close to celebrities. Focusing upon 
specific celebrities’ Weibo accounts, their followers and TVoC (2012)’s Weibo, 
this study analyses the emerging hierarchies of power relations among those 
groups. It demonstrates that celebrity accounts play a crucial role in generating 
more audiences and fans, as they are powerful in influencing options and 
discussions within the Weibosphere. The complicated interplay between 
audiences/consumers and Canxing Production reflects the value of audience 
engagement to television industry. The interaction between audiences and 
television now matters greatly to China’s television industry, taking over from 
audience ratings, which were formerly the key focus of the measurement of 
success within the industry. 
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Accordingly, through analysis of how the ideas of power and hierarchy 
are imbedded into the TVoC (2012) fan community online at Baidu Tieba, 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that Baidu Tieba is a different type of social media 
space, with different ways of constructing hierarchy and community. Fans of 
TVoC (2012) were caught between the industry and its promoters, and the 
online regulation of the community. They did not only ‘sample dialogue, 
summarise episodes, debate subtexts, create original fan fiction, record their 
own soundtracks, make their own movies and distribute all of this worldwide 
via the internet’ (Jenkins, 2004: p. 34), but furthermore they sought ways to 
break and challenging the ‘rules’ and the hierarchy, by expressing and 
discussing their discontented and resistive receptions with others, by appealing 
to be fairly treated within the community, reporting, and by complaining about 
others’ potentially harmful posts and requiring them to be removed.  
This research also demonstrates the similarities between audience 
engagements on both platforms. Chapter 4 analyses the emergence of multiple 
critical voices within the Weibosphere, spreading and helping to generate new 
kinds of audience engagement with TVoC (2012). And in Chapter 6, this thesis 
analyses the ways in which fans are being creative by using ironic criticism in 
resistance to online censorship on TVoC (2012)’s Baidu Tieba. In order to avoid 
political censorship while at the same time expressively participating, Chinese 
audiences became more creative and active in engaging with popular cultural 
artefacts. This thesis suggests that the active engagement of Chinese 
audiences/fans can be read as grassroots resistance and ‘tactical responses’ and 
that such resistance can be achieved through different practices depending on 
the platforms being used. Fans are not only spurring a deeper appreciation of 
the original text, but are also using knowledge and criticism in an effort to 
challenge existing authority. In other words, this study illustrates that online 
censorship in China shapes audiences’ online participation and interactivity 
through social media.  
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Therefore, the value of audiences’ online engagement with TVoC (2012) 
as discussed in sections two and three, opens up the potential for the wider 
application of De Certeau and Jenkins’ views on fans and audiences. In seeing 
Chinese audiences’ engagement with television programmes as a social 
participation phenomena, this study addresses debates about audiences’ 
agencies and power with regard to the specific political economy context of 
mainland China. Audiences’ critical online discussions and creative labour can 
be seen as a form of social-political participation, in which individual audience 
members or fans become more active agents who contribute to discussion and 
reflection on social issues in mainland China. 
To sum up, by tracing back to the historical moment and events around 
TVoC in 2012, this thesis has found that Internet technologies and social media 
enabled and stimulated important individual critical thinking and creativities 
which could be used against structural constraints such as censorship and 
commercialisation in recent China. Although no direct political participation 
was allowed within China’s cyberspace, Chinese audiences expressed and 
negotiated power in their own ways that will help to construct political value in 
China.  
9.2.5 Localisation/globalisation of television formats 
In the past four years there has been further progress in the issues of global 
format trading, which have also proved and extended these research findings 
and research frameworks. Canxing Production and the Dutch media entity, 
Talpa, failed to agree on the conditions of a renewal contract before the 
previous contract ended in 2016. This conflict between the two companies 
provides a good case for discussing global format copyrights which deserves 
investigation in future studies. Back in 2012, Canxing Production paid more 
than ¥2 million ($300,000) in license fees to Talpa to obtain the format 
for TVoC. However, according to Canxing Production, in 2016 the Talpa 
demanded a license fee that was ‘more than a hundred times’ its initial price of 
four years earlier (China Real Time Report, 2016). Consequently, Canxing 
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Production refused to pay for the license renewal, which had risen to ¥60 
million. Together with the provincial broadcaster, Zhejiang Satellite Station, 
Canxing holds the right to use the Chinese name of 中国新歌声 for the fifth 
season of TVoC, also known as Sing China. In comparison with the TVoC 
(2012) format, it can be seen that the all-new Sing China show has partially 
changed the original format to avoid copyright issues. For instance, the new 
show features sliding rollercoasters as judge’s chairs instead of using the 
famous red spinning chairs.  
The issue which must be addressed here is the influence of the new 
show on the official Sina Weibo account of TVoC (2012). Canxing Production 
created a new Sina Weibo site for Sing China in 2016, with the previous one for 
TVoC being removed. This did not impact on the data collection and analysis 
for this research, as it had already be done before this happened. However, this 
issue demonstrates the uncertainty and ambiguity around the future 
development of reality television in China. This means that attention must 
continue to be paid to the ongoing transformation of the Chinese television 
industry. Under continuing cultural globalisation and media convergence, the 
specific media market in China engages with new questions and debates that 
are worthy of further exploration, and such issues will contribute to the global 
study of television-format trading, reality television and convergence culture.  
 
9.3 The ‘big picture’: Implications and contributions 
Current audience studies and fan theories are often Western-centric, and 
optimistic about the power and agency of audiences and fans in a democratic 
society and relatively free-speech environments, as introduced in Chapter 1. By 
presenting an exploration into the specific context of mainland China, this 
thesis provides a more comprehensive view from which to understand the 
theory of online participatory culture. Exploration of audience engagement with 
cultural artefacts within a non-Western political context has therefore 
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challenged most of the Western-centric audience/fan studies and theories. It 
does not negate the rising power of audiences as they archive, annotate, 
appropriate, and recirculate media content, in which tasks they are enabled by 
the explosion of new media technologies. The Internet, with its technological 
advantages, has indeed given audiences and fans more opportunities to 
participate and interact with cultural artefacts. But the restrictions and 
regulations of media content imposed by SAPPRFT in China demonstrate a 
different picture from those seen in Western-centric audience studies and fan 
theories.  
This thesis also contributes to the understanding of the politics of reality 
television in China. From both the textual and contextual levels, this thesis has 
found that TVoC (2012) presents strong political implications and meanings. 
For instance, this study discusses the myth surrounding the winning song ‘I love 
you China’ (sung by Liang Bo) in the final show of TVoC (2012), and has 
explored the compulsory charity events that contestants were required to attend.  
There was clear political propaganda impact on the content of the 
programme. This study analyses two main regulatory media policies imposed in 
2011 and 2013, and indicates that SAPPRFT has imposed strict regulations on 
television programming since the broadcasting of TVoC in 2012. It is also 
worth noting that in 2015 SAPPRFT further strengthened its regulations on the 
television industry, with additional policy directives relating to foreign film and 
television content, including specific limitations on when and how often foreign 
and foreign-format shows could air on television and on streaming sites, and 
even imposing specific limitations on singing competition programmes.  
Following the growing popularity of reality television in China, 
SAPPRFT recently imposed new regulations specifically addressed towards 
reality television shows. On 22 July 2015, SAPPRFT issued a new ‘notice’ 
strengthening the management of reality shows. The key points of this most 
recent directive require that reality television shows in China should: 
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• avoid excessive stardom  
• repel vulgar and excessive entertainment, and low taste  
• deliver ‘socialist core values’ 
• transmit ‘positive energy’ and have a ‘positive educational purpose’  
• carry ‘Chinese dream’ themes as well as patriotism and Chinese 
traditions 
• promote innovation and originality in reality shows  
• indicate the producers’ confidence in China’s own culture and create 
original insights into TV programme planning. 
In this ‘notice’, SAPPRFT did not mention specific shows that were good or 
bad examples of acceptable reality television programming. Rather, it set up a 
main theme and standard for the whole of Chinese reality television. Reality 
television shows in most Western countries star actors, sportspeople and other 
celebrities, who appear more concerned with showing off their personal 
achievements (Chin, 2016) than expressing core moral values. In contrast, this 
particular policy shows the intentions of the Chinese media regulator to firmly 
embed the CCP’s political ideologies into media content. For instance, ‘avoid 
excessive stardom’ essentially demonstrates a perception of the appearance of 
capitalism in a socialist country. In the industry, a popular star’s income might 
be much higher than average wage earnings, and this does not conform with the 
spirit of frugality advocated by the Chinese government. Such capitalistic 
manifestations are considered by policy makers to be inappropriate in such 
shows. Also, the government repels vulgar and excessive entertainment, and 
low taste, which reflects government control of current cultural phenomena in 
China. The government will introduce control measures whenever any kind of 
cultural phenomenon tends to be over-popular.  
The previous two points reveal those features which the government 
does not want to see. On the other hand, government does hope that reality 
television content could play an important part in educating people. Under the 
big theme of ‘Chinese dream’, the Chinese government wants the television 
industry to embed notions of patriotism and socialist core values in television 
content to achieve a positive educational impact on the Chinese people. The 
 220 
 
government’s emphasis on the originality of reality television necessarily resists 
imported foreign television formats in order to promote China’s own culture in 
an isolated media market. 
Viewing China’s media market as an isolated one is an accurate position, 
because media content has been strictly controlled by the imposition of ‘right’ 
political ideologies. The success of the reality television market for imported 
television formats has led to the development and innovation of China’s 
television industry, and has helped it to keep up with international trends at the 
economic level. Nevertheless, at the textual level, the content of reality 
television remains ‘national’ and with ‘socialist core values’, as dictated by 
government propaganda.  
China’s entry into the WTO has opened up the TV market in the country, 
but only to a small degree. Tight censorship regulation by SAPPRFT limits the 
entry of foreign players, especially from Western countries. Foreign players are 
restricted in terms of foreign investment, as China’s television market is still 
dominated by state-owned television stations. At present, it is difficult for 
foreign television programmes to directly penetrate into mainland China, and 
this is another reason why a successful foreign television format can be popular 
in the Chinese television market. 
For decades, Chinese TV was dominated by programming designed to 
dispense socialist wisdom to the masses. But with China’s market economy 
reforms, diverse culture and cultural products have flourished on the 
airwaves. In consequence, with regard to the future of the media, foreign 
ideologies that carry over into mainland China are the biggest threat and 
concern to the CCP. The popularity of reality television shows in China seems 
not to be decreasing, even at this uncertain moment of CCP leadership 
transition and strict media content control. New government media policies and 
regulations are emerging which intensify media market competition in this 
country. It is to early yet to judge whether strict media policy will harm or limit 
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the development of the Chinese television industry. What is certain is that it has 
influenced and shaped Chinese audiences’ online participatory culture.  
 
9.4 Conclusion  
The great success of TVoC (2012) was a result of the rapid changes that had 
been taking place in China’s government policies, the television industry, new 
media production and social media. TVoC (2012) is not only a case of a 
successful reality television programme, but it has generated a cultural 
phenomenon. In conclusion, this thesis seeks to emphasise again the importance 
of taking multivalent approaches to exploring new cultural phenomena in China, 
by examining them from the perspectives of political economy, text and 
audience reception. Specifically in the context of mainland China, in order to 
understand reality television and its audiences, the tensions and power 
relationships between government media policies, the television industry and 
Chinese audiences should not be neglected. Addressing these issues from a 
single perspective, either through textual analysis, audience reception studies or 
industrial analysis, is not comprehensive enough to provide an insight into 
participatory culture in China.  
This thesis does not suggest that a single methodology is not important 
in general, but it posits that it is unlikely to provide an accurate exploration of 
TVoC (2012), involving as it does various key elements which need to be 
addressed: the transformation of the Chinese television market, the Chinese 
government’s media policies and regulations, global television-format trading, 
cultural globalisation, social media, Internet censorship in China, media 
convergence and online participatory culture. By taking a multivalent approach, 
I hope that this thesis contributes to current debates in the international research 
fields of reality television, audience reception, and studies of contemporary 
popular culture in mainland China, as well as offering methodological direction 
for further studies of similar cases and cultural phenomena. 
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Further research focuses can be expand upon this thesis because this 
research has only explored Chinese audiences’ engagement through two major 
social media platforms. As new media and technology progresses, it will be 
interesting to see how Chinese audience’s engagements with reality television 
may shift to reflect the new spaces in which they use. Other online spaces such 
as Tianya (天涯) and Jingjiang (晋江), as well as various online subcultural 
communities, would also be of great interest in such explorations.  
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